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Companies and organizations collect and use vast troves of sensitive user data whose
release must be carefully controlled. In practice, the access policies that govern this data
are often fine-grained, complex, poorly documented, and difficult to reason about. These
issues make it easy for principals to accidentally request and be granted access to data
they never use.
To encourage developers and administrators to use security mechanisms more effec-
tively, we propose a novel security model in which all security decisions are formally
explainable. Whether a query is accepted or denied, the system returns a concise yet
formal explanation which can allow the issuer to reformulate a rejected query or adjust
his/her security credentials. In order to demonstrate the practical applicability of our
approach, we implement and evaluate a disclosure control system that handles a wide
variety of real SQL queries and can accommodate complex policy constraints.
Our explainable security model is based on a new theoretical foundation for reason-
ing about information disclosure in database systems that we call disclosure labeling.
Information disclosure is expressed in terms of a set of security views that are defined by
a human administrator and reveal types of information that are relevant to the security
constraints of the system at hand. Disclosure labeling allows us to precisely characterize
which subsets of the security views contain enough information to determine a query’s
answer; such characterizations form the basis for the explanations generated by our
system.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Gabriel Mintzer Bender was born in Providence, Rhode Island, in July 1987, son of
Yvette Mintzer and Michael Bender and brother to Ariel Katz (ne´e Bender). At the age
of ten he moved with his family to Princeton, New Jersey, where he remained until he
was 18.
In 2005 he set out for college at the University of Chicago, where he learned to brave
the frigid winters of Illinois. While at UChicago he become involved in an internship
with Pedro Felzenszwalb, who, along with Anne Rogers and Anna Lysyanskaya, was
responsible for introducing him to academic research in Computer Science.
Gabriel graduated from UChicago with Bachelor’s Degrees in Mathematics and in
Computer Science in 2009 and left Illinois for the slightly milder climes of Upstate New
York, where he became a Ph.D. student in Computer Science at Cornell University. He
joined the Cornell Database Group a year later under the supervision of Johannes Gehrke,
who eventually become his advisor. He maintained his residence in Ithaca until the fall
of 2013, when he spent a year studying in absentia at the University of Washington.
The rest is a work in progress.
iii
To my family.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The material presented in this dissertation is the result of a close collaboration with Łucja
Kot and my advisor, Johannes Gehrke. I would like to thank both of them for their
mentorship, moral support, and intellectual contributions over the past four years.
I’d also like to thank the mentors (both official and unofficial) from all my internships
over the past ten years – especially Pedro Felzenszwalb, Anna Lysyanskaya, Xiaokui
Xiao, Jessica Staddon, Aleksandra Korolova, Nikhil Singhal and Jon Rascher.
Thanks to my family – especially Yvette, Michael, and Ariel – for their continued
support over the years.
Thanks to Magda Balazinska, Dan Suciu, and the University of Washington Database
Group for hosting me in Seattle during the last year of my Ph.D.
This dissertation has benefited from the feedback of Dexter Kozen, Rafael Pass,
and Johannes Gehrke. The work presented here also benefited from questions asked by
Christoph Koch, Ashwin Machanavajjhala, and U´lfar Erlingsson.
The research presented here was supported by Grant 279804 of the European Research
Council, the National Science Foundation under Grants IIS-1012593 and IIS-0911036,
by the iAd Project funded by the Research Council of Norway, and by a Google Research
Award and an NEC Research Award. However, the opinions, findings, and conclusions
expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Disclosure Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Explainable Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Layout of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Related Work 9
2.1 Queries and Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Answering Queries using Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Conjunctive Queries under Set Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 Finding Query Rewritings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.3 Query Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Database Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Non-Truman View Rewriting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 Truman View Rewriting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.3 Inference Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Security and Privacy Potpourri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.1 Programming Language Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.2 Reasoning about Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.3 Usability of Security Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Disclosure Labeling 27
3.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.1 Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Disclosure Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1 Disclosure Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.2 Disclosure Lattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.3 Disclosure Labelers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.4 From Labelers to Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Generating labelers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.1 Downward Generating Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.2 Generating Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Labeling Conjunctive Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.1 Single-Atom Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.2 Multi-Atom Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
vi
3.5.1 Representing Disclosure Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.5.2 Representing Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6 Labeling in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6.1 Reviewing Facebook’s APIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6.2 Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4 Disclosure Labeling on Multiplicity-Sensitive Queries 80
4.1 Core Query Language: Definition and Formal Semantics . . . . . . . . 82
4.1.1 Datasets and Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.1.2 Equivalence, Homomorphisms and Foldings . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.1.3 Equality Predicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 Query Rewritings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.1 Rewritings and Expansions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2.2 Finding Rewritings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3 Disclosure Labeling under Combined Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3.1 An Order Based on Equivalent Rewritings . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.2 Labeling Single-Atom Queries under Combined Semantics . . . 104
4.3.3 Query Dissection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5 Towards Practical Disclosure Labeling 111
5.1 Filter-Project Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.1.1 Rewritings of Conjunctive Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.1.2 Measuring Disclosure for Filter-Project Queries . . . . . . . . . 121
5.2 SQL Query Language and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.2.1 Terms, Formulas, and Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.2.2 Query Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.2.3 Free Variables and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3 Query Generalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.3.1 Predicate Generalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.3.2 Automated Query Rewriting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.3.3 Query Generalization and Disclosure Orders . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.4 Condition Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.4.1 Constructing Condition Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.4.2 Correctness for Restricted SQL Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.4.3 Correctness for Extended SQL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6 Explainable Security 157
6.1 Policy Formulas and Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.1.1 Generating Data-Derived Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.1.2 Minimal Policy Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.2 Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.3 Query Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
vii
7 Explainable Security in Practice 175
7.1 Generalization Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.2 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
8 Conclusion 187
Bibliography 189
viii
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 Notation summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Inconsistencies between the FQL and Graph API permissions labeling
of User attributes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Database and security views. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Disclosure control system model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Example User relation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Representation of User table as a set of relational atoms. . . . . . . . . 11
3.1 Sample dataset, security views, and queries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Disclosure control system model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Security views and corresponding disclosure lattice. . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 All relational projections of Contact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Disclosure labeler performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Policy checker performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.1 Sample dataset based on the Facebook Apps schema. . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Effect of copy variables on query evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3 Removing equality predicates through variable unification. . . . . . . . 93
5.1 Sample database schema. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 Evaluation semantics for SQL terms and formulas. . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3 Truth tables for three-valued Boolean logic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.4 Sample dataset based on Facebook Apps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.5 Rules for computing free variables in terms and formulas. . . . . . . . 131
5.6 SQL queries handled by our condition graph algorithm. . . . . . . . . 148
5.7 Condition graphs for queries from Fig. 5.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.1 A set of security views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.2 Algorithm for computing policy formulas (decomposable case) . . . . 162
6.3 Axioms encoding relative information revealed by sets of views. . . . . 166
7.1 Computing policy formulas – System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.2 Query generalization pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.3 Architecture of Prototype System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.4 Performance for ordinary queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.5 Performance for prepared statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.6 Performance for complex SQL features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
x
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades we have seen the emergence of companies like Google and
Facebook that collect and store large amounts of personal user information. This data
can be used to deliver highly relevant content to end users. It can also be used to match
advertisements with users’ interests, thereby creating significant value for advertisers.
However, companies risk serious damage to their reputations if they lose control over
this data. Fine-grained permissions provide better control over who can access what
resources, and as a result, platforms such as Google Android and Facebook Apps have
dozens of distinct permissions, each regulating access to a different resource or type of
user data. Similarly, commercial solutions such as IBM’s Label-Based Access Control [9]
and Oracle’s Virtual Private Database [11] give database administrators precise control
over which principals can see which parts of a database. Such control is largely motivated
by the Principle of Least Privilege [48], which states that principals should be granted
the least permissions needed to do their jobs.
Although our emphasis here is on controlling what data or resources untrusted
programs can access, we should note that the use of permissions (and fine-grained
permissions in particular) can be as much about transparency as about control. Apps
written for platforms such as Android and Facebook Apps can request any permissions
they want. However, users can see what permissions apps want before installing them,
and can choose not to install apps that request access to resources or user data that seem
excessive or otherwise suspicious. They can even post on the app stores to warn off other
users. In these cases, fine-grained permissions force apps to tell users up front which
resources they want access to, thereby improving transparency.
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Unfortunately, the benefits of fine-grained permissions come with a high cost: fine-
grained permission structures are inherently complex and difficult to reason about. To
make matters worse, the documentation for these permission structures is often inaccurate
or buggy. [15, 28] If a query fails due to insufficient permissions, the path of least
resistance is to blindly request more permissions until the problem goes away. As a result,
principals frequently violate the Principle of Least Privilege by acquiring permissions
that they never use. [28]
The fundamental problem is not that current security mechanisms are incapable of
encoding complex security policies. After all, there has been a substantial amount of
research on database access control, and there are even systems such as IFDB [51] that
control both disclosure and information flow. Also, in practice, app ecosystems do have
a simple way of controlling disclosure: they allow users to set data permissions. Each
permission conceptually regulates access to a specific view of the data.
However, existing approaches to disclosure control have some major disadvantages.
There is evidence that both users and developers misunderstand and misuse app per-
missions [28, 29]. As new data is added to the database and old data is put to new
and unexpected uses, the permission structures can get out of date and inconsistencies
occur. For example, the Facebook permission named user likes confusingly gives
apps access to both a user’s “Liked” pages and the languages the user speaks. In short,
complex security policies are difficult for humans to reason about. This complexity
makes it difficult for developers to determine what permissions their apps should request,
and makes it easy for developers to request permissions that may look relevant to their
apps but are not actually needed.
The problem can be addressed in one of two ways: platform providers such as Google
and Facebook can either revert to simpler permission structures or else can build tools
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to help principals reason about complex ones more effectively. Although reverting to
simpler and coarser-grained permissions is a viable option, doing so gives users less
control over who can access their data. For this reason, the development of tools that can
help principals use complex permission structures is an important thread of work.
The development of such tools – and the theoretical foundations to support them
– is the focus of this dissertation. Disclosure labeling, which provides a formal basis
for reasoning about information disclosure, is described at a high level in Section 1.1
and is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. On the practical side, Explainable security is
a new security model built on disclosure labeling that can provide concrete feedback
to principals about the permissions that they should be requesting; it is summarized in
Section 1.2 and is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
1.1 Disclosure Labeling
On the theoretical side, we propose disclosure labeling as a formal foundation for
reasoning about information disclosure. In contrast with most previous models of
information disclosure used by the database community, disclosure labeling is data-
derived. In a data-derived disclosure model, the disclosure associated with any view
over the database is a mathematical function of the data needed to compute the view.
This is very different from ad-hoc hand-generated disclosure descriptions such as the
Facebook user likes permission; a data-derived approach would remove opportunities
for human error caused by misleadingly named permissions such as user likes. A
further advantage of a data-derived approach is that the information disclosed by a view
can be computed automatically from the view definition, which reduces the burden on
humans and makes the process less error-prone.
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However, being data-derived is not enough; for example, a definition of disclosure in
terms of the number of bits that are being disclosed (in the spirit of Differential Privacy
[26]) is unlikely to be meaningful to a user. Thus we need a notion of disclosure that
is not just data-derived, but also semantically meaningful, which means that disclosure
maps to a concept that the user can intuitively understand.
The third requirement for a disclosure model is that it should be expressive. While
the security policies for games and social apps are often simple, the corporate world is
also becoming increasingly dependent on app ecosystems through BYOD (Bring Your
Own Device) solutions [3]. Mobile apps are also used in the military [10]; both of these
use cases demand significantly more complex security policies.
1.2 Explainable Security
We use disclosure labeling as the basis for a new security model in which all security
policy decisions are explainable. Instead of simply rejecting unauthorized queries, our
system provides the issuer with concise explanation of why the queries were rejected
and what additional permissions would need to be granted for a successful execution.
The principal can then refine the queries or request additional permissions based on the
explanation.
We begin with a generic architecture for access control that is applicable to many
modern DBMSs. We clarify how our explainable model compares to traditional database
security models and identify concrete properties that should be satisfied by explanations
for policy decisions.
The example database shown in Figure 1.1 is based on the schema that Facebook
4
User Friend
uid name hobby
1 Babbage, Charles math
2 Church, Alonzo math
3 Lovelace, Ada music
4 Turing, Alan chess
5 von Neumann, John history
uid1 uid2
1 3
3 1
2 4
4 2
4 5
5 4
CREATE VIEW V1 AS
(SELECT name, hobby FROM User WHERE uid = 1);
CREATE VIEW V2 AS
(SELECT name FROM User WHERE uid = 1);
CREATE VIEW V3 AS
(SELECT U.uid, U.name FROM User U, Friend F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid2 AND F.uid1 = 1);
Figure 1.1: Database and security views.
exposes to third party app developers through the Facebook Query Language (FQL) [4].
The schema contains two tables: User, which has a User ID (uid), name, and hobby for
each user in the dataset, and Friend, which tracks friendship relations between users.
The system controls disclosure of this data using a reference monitor (RM) that
enforces a security policy. At the time that the database schema is designed, a trusted
system administrator defines a set of security views that reveal known types of information
about the dataset. All subsequent policy decisions are made with the help of these security
views. In Figure 1.1, V1 reveals the uid, name, and hobby of User 1 (Charles Babbage)
while V2 reveals his uid and name but not his hobby and V3 reveals the uids and names
of his friends. In a real system, an analogous set of security views would be generated for
each end user; appropriate security views can easily be generated from templates defined
by a human administrator. Many permissions used by Facebook [4] and Android [2] are
essentially simple security views, though they are not formally defined in SQL.
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Database 
Principal Reference 
Monitor 
Answers 
Queries Query Q      Policy Check 
 
𝐏 := views principal can 
access 
 
𝑓: 𝑄, 𝐏 →          or 
Answer 
Denied 
Figure 1.2: Disclosure control system model
The RM sits between the query evaluation engine and the principals who issue queries
(Figure 3.2). When a principal issues a database query Q, the RM performs a policy
check in order to determine whether the query should be accepted or rejected. This policy
check is divided into two steps.
In the first step, the RM computes the subset P of the security views to which the
principal has been granted access. An untrusted third-party app running on Charles
Babbage’s behalf might be permitted to see the contents of V2 but not of V1 or V3. In
practice, this computation might be based on an Access Control List (ACL), a set of
Credentials supplied by the issuer, or a Role-Based security mechanism.
In the second step, the RM checks whether the views in P contain enough information
to answer the principal’s original query. The determination is made by a policy function
f that takes Q and P as inputs and returns 0 or 1. If f returns 1 then the principal
receives the query results; otherwise, the query is denied. The function f is said to
be database-dependent if its output can depend on the current state of the database, or
database-independent otherwise. Our focus in this work is on database-independent
policies; this ensures that neither policy decisions nor the corresponding explanations
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can leak potentially sensitive information about the current state of the database.
Ideally, f would be based on a simple mathematical criterion: it would determine
whether the security views that the principal had access to contained enough information
to answer Q. If so, f would output 1. Otherwise, it would output 0. In practice, however,
f is typically a very crude and conservative algorithm.
If access control policies are specified using the GRANT and REVOKE keywords pro-
vided by the SQL standard, the onus is on the principal to write the query in terms of
the views he or she can access. Let us return to Figure 1.1; suppose an app that has been
granted access to V2 but not V1 issues the following query:
SELECT name FROM V1;
This query will be rejected even though it only reveals information that the app is allowed
to access – specifically, it reveals the name of User 1, which can be computed from V2.
The function f is not data-derived: it checks whether the principal is allowed to access
all the views in the FROM clause, but it does not account for the information that the query
and the views reveal about the underlying database.
When the query is rejected it would be helpful for the RM to point out that the query
can be rewritten using V2 – which the principal has access to – in the following manner:
SELECT name FROM V2;
Better yet, the reference monitor should be able to search for rewritings automatically,
and use them – if found – whenever it enforces a policy or generates an explanation.
Reference monitors that can automatically search for suitable rewritings have been
proposed in previous work [46]. However, the reasons behind security policy decisions
made by such reference monitors can be difficult to understand; in particular, explanations
for rejected queries are often insufficient or nonexistent [42]. Even worse, systems such
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as Oracle’s Virtual Private Database [11] accept unauthorized queries and modify their
execution semantics without users’ knowledge [46]. In contrast, our model can provide a
concise explanation for any policy decision, regardless of whether a query is reject or
answered.
1.3 Layout of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is laid out as follows. In Chapter 2 we review related work
from the database and security literature. In Chapter 3 we formalize the problem of
disclosure labeling and develop algorithms that can solve the problem. We provide
practical results for a specific query language: conjunctive queries under set semantics.
In Chapter 4 we extend the results to an extended version of this query language, and in
Chapter 5 we show how the results can be extended to a fragment of SQL that includes
conjunction, disjunction, correlated subqueries, NULL values, and negation. In Chapter
6 we discuss explainable security and other applications of disclosure labeling. Finally,
in Chapter 7 we discuss a prototype system that was designed to assess the viability of
explainable security.
The results in this dissertation were previously presented in two conference papers.
The first [15] covers a subset of the material in Chapter 3. The second [14] covers a
subset of the material in Chapters 5 and 6, and 7.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
In this Chapter we review prior work that is related to disclosure labeling and explainable
security. In Section 2.1 we introduce the language of conjunctive queries under set
semantics, which are central to many of the results in Chapter 3. We next review the
problem of finding rewritings for queries in Section 2.2; these results make it possible
to compare the relative amounts of information revealed by different database queries.
In Section 2.3 we review work on the problem of defining and enforcing access control
policies in database systems. Finally, in Section 2.4 we discuss results from the broader
security literature that are relevant to this dissertation.
2.1 Queries and Views
Throughout this dissertation we will refer to database queries extensively. Informally,
queries are functions that map datasets to tables. For example, when evaluated on the
dataset shown in Figure 2.1 (which contains a single table), the SQL query
SELECT name FROM User WHERE uid < 7
will return a table with a single column whose title is “name.” The first row in this table
will have the name “Alice,” and the second will have the name “Bob.”
We assume that any queries under consideration are defined in some predetermined
language. The precise language we focus on will depend on the context, however: we
will work with at least four different query languages in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
Semantically, views and queries are interchangeable: they are typically defined in the
same languages and have the same evaluation semantics. The difference between the
9
uid name email
1 Alice alice@domain.net
2 Bob bob@gmail.com
3 Charlie charlie@hotmail.com
Figure 2.1: Example User relation.
two boils down to how they are used. Queries are issued by client applications or end
users of a database. Views, on the other hand, are used internally by the DBMS to assist
in the answering of queries. They can be used to integrate data from multiple sources
into a unified logical schema (e.g., [38], [44]), to answer queries faster (e.g., [31]), or to
enforce security policy constraints (e.g., [46], [53]).
2.2 Answering Queries using Views
In order to provide concrete examples of how views can assist in the answering of
queries we next briefly introduce a concrete query language (conjunctive queries under
set semantics) and review basic facts about queries in this language. Our discussion is
informal; for a more rigorous discussion we refer readers to the work of Chandra and
Merlin [19] or the language extension defined in Chapter 4.
2.2.1 Conjunctive Queries under Set Semantics
A conjunctive query Q takes takes the form
Q(t) :− R1(t1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rn(tn)
where each Ri a relation name and each ti is a list of constants and variable names. We
refer to Q(t) as the query’s head; intuitively it represents the query’s output. We refer
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{ User(1, ’Alice’, ’alice@domain.net’),
User(2, ’Bob’, ’bob@gmail.com’),
User(3, ’Charlie’, ’charlie@hotmail.com’) }
Figure 2.2: Representation of User table as a set of relational atoms.
to each Ri(ti) as a body atom; all of the body atoms together comprise the query’s body.
Every database has an accompanying schema, which contains a list of relations that
appear in that database and a fixed arity for each relation. For example, the schema
shown in Figure 2.1 contains a relation named User whose arity is 3. The following
conjunctive query is defined on that schema:
Q1(n) :− User(4, n, e) ∧ User(u, n, e)
The input and output of a conjunctive query are both represented as sets of relational
atoms. For example, the User relation shown in Figure 2.1 is represented as the set of
atoms shown in Figure 2.2.
We next provide an example to illustrate how query evaluation works. The answer to
the query Q1 above consists of a set of relational atoms of the form Q1(n) where n is a
constant. The atom Q1(n) appears in the query’s answer if the logical predicate
∃ u, e . User(4, n, e) ∧ User(u, n, e)
is satisfied by the current dataset and does not appear in the query’s answer otherwise.
Two queries are said to be equivalent if they return the same answer on every possible
dataset. Query equivalence is characterized by homomorphisms. A homomorphism maps
constants to themselves and maps variables to constants. A homomorphism also induces
a map on relational atoms by
ϕR(t1, t2, . . . , tm) = R(ϕt1, ϕt2, . . . , ϕtm)
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If Q and Q′ are queries then a homomorphism ϕ : Q → Q′ maps the head of Q to that
of Q′ and maps every body atom of Q to a body atom of Q′. We say that Q contains
Q′, written Q ⊇ Q′, if the tuples in the answer to Q form a superset of those for Q′ on
any possible dataset. The existence of a homomorphism from Q to Q′ is necessary and
sufficient to prove that Q ⊇ Q′. Hence, the existence of homomorphisms from Q to
Q′ and from Q′ to Q is necessary and sufficient to prove that Q and Q′ return the same
answer on any possible dataset.
The existence of homomorphisms is not always immediately obvious. For instance,
consider the query
Q2(n) :− User(4, n, e)
At first glance, Q2 appears to be very different from the query Q1 defined above. We
claim, however, that the two queries will always return the same answer. By the argument
above, it suffices to find homomorphisms ϕ : Q1 → Q2 and ϕ′ : Q2 → Q1. The following
homomorphisms will work:
ϕ = {n 7→ n, e 7→ e, u 7→ 4}
ϕ′ = {n 7→ n, e 7→ e}
The equivalence of Q1 and Q2 may at first be surprising. Intuitively, the reason is as
follows. Q1 emit the atom Q1(n) if (i) n is the name of user 4 and (ii) n is the name of at
least one user in the input dataset. But if condition (i) is satisfied then condition (ii) is
obviously also satisfied. Hence, the second atom of Q1, which corresponds to condition
(ii), contributes nothing to the query’s answer and can therefore be removed. The result
is identical to Q2.
We refer to the process of removing extraneous atoms from the body of a query as
folding. In the example above, Q2 is a folding of Q1 because both queries return the
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same answer but Q2 contains a proper subset of the body atoms of Q1. The process can
be repeated iteratively until no more body atoms can be removed. The result is a folded
query. Folding allows us to place conjunctive queries in a canonical form: if Q and Q′
are equivalent and contain a minimal number of body atoms then they must be the same
up to renaming of variables and reordering of body atoms. In this case we say that Q and
Q′ are isomorphic.
The problem of checking whether two queries are equivalent is known to be NP-
complete. However, the complexity is expressed in terms of the sizes of the query
definitions (which tend to be small) rather than the size of the input dataset (which tends
to be large). Consequently, query equivalence can usually be checked quickly in practice.
2.2.2 Finding Query Rewritings
We previously argued that views are typically used by DBMSs to help answer queries,
and this task is accomplished using rewritings. Rewritings are informally discussed here;
we refer the interested reader to the survey of Levy et al. [38] for a more extensive
discussion. An equivalent rewriting of a query Q using a set of views V is a query that
returns the same answer as Q but references views in V rather than base relations. For
example, define a view
V3(u, n) :− User(u, n, e)
and a query
Q4(n) :− V3(4, n)
It is possible to show that Q4 is an equivalent rewriting of Q2 using V3. Notice that Q4
is a deterministic function that takes the answer to V3 as its input and returns the same
answer as Q2 as its output. Consequently, the answer to V3 uniquely determines the
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answer to Q2 on any possible dataset. For conjunctive queries and views, the problem of
determining whether Q has an equivalent rewriting using V is known to be NP-complete
in the sizes of the query and view definitions [38]. A practical algorithm for performing
this check has been proposed by Compton [24].
In the context of security policy enforcement it is sometimes desirable to check
whether the answers to a set of views V determine the answer to a query Q on every
possible dataset. We argued above that the existence of an equivalent rewriting of Q
using V is sufficient to ensure determinacy. However, it is not necessary: it is possible
that V determines the answer to Q on any possible dataset but no suitable rewriting exists.
Unfortunately, checking determinacy directly appears to be very difficult. [41] For this
reason we use the existence of an equivalent rewriting as a practical but conservative
check for determinacy.
Our focus in this dissertation is on equivalent rewritings (which will often be referred
to simply as “rewritings”), which are discussed above. There is also a notion of contained
rewritings that has been widely studied by the database community but will not be used
here. A contained rewriting Q′ of Q using V is a rewriting using V that is only guaranteed
to return a subset of the tuples in the answer to Q. Q′ is said to be maximally contained
if it returns a superset of the tuples that appear in any other contained rewriting. A
discussion of maximally contained rewritings can be found in the survey of Halevy [33],
and a practical algorithm for finding maximally contained rewritings can be found in the
work of Pottinger et al. [44]
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2.2.3 Query Pricing
The notion of determinacy discussed above was dataset-independent: our aim was to
determine whether the answer to a query was uniquely determined by the answers to a set
of views on every possible dataset. In contrast, Koutris et al. [35] consider an instance-
based notion of view determinacy; their goal is to determine whether the answers to a set
of views determine the answer to a given query on a specific dataset. To understand the
distinction, consider the views
V5(u, n, e) :− User(u, n, e)
V6() :− User(u, n, e)
In general, the answer to V6 does not determine the answer to V5, since the latter reveals
information about all the columns of the User table whereas the former does not reveal
information about any of them. Suppose, however, that the User table is empty. In this
case determinacy does hold: by looking at the answer to V6 we can infer that the User
table is empty, and therefore the answer to V5 must also be empty.
Koutris et al. relate instance-based determinacy to the problem of pricing queries
in data markets. In this setting, a vendor defines a set of views V over a dataset and
assigns a price pi(V) to each view V ∈ V. Given a query Q, their goal is to find a subset
of the views in V that allows the answer to Q to be computed as cheaply as possible.
More precisely, they require that (i) the answer to the views in V uniquely determine the
answer to Q on the current dataset, and (ii) the sum of the prices of the views in V is as
small as possible. A naı¨ve realization of the second criterion would require a brute-force
search over all possible subsets of the views in V, but the check can often be performed
more efficiently in practice.
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2.3 Database Access Control
We now shift our attention to database access control mechanisms, which allow a trusted
administrator to restrict which parts of a database each principal can read and write; our
focus here is on mechanisms that can restrict the information that principals can read.
In an ideal world, every security principal in a system would be granted access to
some subset of the information in the database. The term “information” in this context
is ambiguous. We might regulate access to information at the granularity of tables in a
database. In this model, a principal can either read all the information in a given table or
cannot read any of it. This is the approach taken by the GRANT and REVOKE keywords in
the SQL standard. An administrator who wishes to grant a principal named Alice access
to the User table shown in Figure 2.1 will issue the following command:
GRANT SELECT ON User TO Alice
The administrator can revoke Alice’s access to the User table by typing
REVOKE SELECT ON User FROM Alice
Table-level access control mechanisms are relatively straightforward to reason about for
both humans and computers, and are widely adopted in practice. Support for the GRANT
and REVOKE keywords is provided by many database management systems (DBMSs),
including PostgreSQL [6], MySQL [7], Oracle Database [5], and MS SQL Server [8].
The main disadvantage of using table-level access control is its coarse granularity: it
is often desirable to grant a principal access to only a subset of the information in a table.
Row-Level access control mechanisms such as IBM’s Label-Based Access Control [9]
can be used to grant a principal access to a restricted subset of the rows in a table. For
instance, an administrator might wish to permit Alice to see information about herself
but not about any other users in the dataset. Similarly, Column-Level access control
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mechanisms can be used to grant a principal access to a column of the rows in a table.
For instance, we might permit Alice to see uids and names but not e-mail addresses. In
[20], Chaudhuri et al. propose an extension of the SQL GRANT and REVOKE keywords
that supports both row-level and column-level access control.
Both row-level security and column-level security are essentially subsumed by view-
based security. In the view-based security model, an administrator grants each principal
access to a set of views over a dataset. A principal is permitted to read the contents of the
views he is granted access to. Consequently, a principal can evaluate any query whose
answer is uniquely determine by these views.
View-based security mechanisms can simulate both row-level security and column-
level security. Row-level security constraints can be simulated by views with selection
conditions. For instance, we can grant Alice access to her own information (but nobody
else’s) with the view
CREATE VIEW V7 AS
SELECT * FROM User WHERE uid = 1
Similarly, column-level security constraints can be simulated by views with column
projections. For example, we can grant Alice access to the uid and name columns by
allowing her to read the view
CREATE VIEW V8 AS
SELECT uid, name FROM User
The SQL GRANT and REVOKE keywords permit a very simple version of view-based
security: a principal can be granted access to views as well as tables, and is permitted
to execute any query that references only view that he has been granted access to. A
principal who was granted access to the view V8 could execute the query
SELECT name FROM V8
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but would not be permitted to execute the query
SELECT name FROM User
even though both queries are guaranteed to return the same answer.
Security mechanisms based on view rewriting take this idea one step further. Rather
forcing a principal to write the query above in terms of V8 as the SQL GRANT keyword
does, such mechanisms can check for such rewritings automatically. Such mechanisms
can broadly be divided into two categories: Truman and non-Truman. In both cases, the
goal is to allow principals to execute authorized queries while preventing them from
executing unauthorized queries. More precisely, we strive to answer as many queries
as possible while ensuring that any information that a principal learns about the dataset
from the queries’ answers could have been inferred simply by looking at the views that
he was granted access to.
However, the two methods differ in their handling of unauthorized queries. A non-
Truman mechanism will either allow a query to be executed as written or will reject it
outright. In contrast, a Truman mechanism will semantically modify the query prior
to execution to ensure that its answer depends only on information that the principal is
permitted to access.1 We next discuss both approaches in greater detail. In the discussion
below we assume that the database schema is publicly known, whereas the actual contents
of the database are potentially sensitive and must be protected.
1The terminology is a reference to Truman Burbank, the title character of the 1998 movie The Truman
Show. [46] Truman is provided with the illusion of freedom, but his environment is carefully and
deliberately manipulated to ensure that he never leaves the island town where he lives. In a somewhat
tenuous analogy, a principal in the Truman model is provided with the illusion of unrestricted access to a
database, but its queries are carefully and deliberately manipulated to enforce an administrator-defined
security policy.
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2.3.1 Non-Truman View Rewriting
In the non-Truman model, a principal can be assured that he will either receive a correct
answer to his query or will not receive any answer at all. For example, we argued above
that if a principal who is granted access only to V8 issues the query
SELECT name FROM User
can safely be answered as is. After all, the answer to V8 determines the query’s answer
on any possible database. Using the language of Rizvi et al. [46], a query is said to be
unconditionally valid in this case. On the other hand, the query
SELECT * FROM User
usually cannot be answered using V8 alone, since it depends on all the columns of the
User relation whereas V8 only reveals information about uids and names. There is
one subtle but important exception to this rule: if the answer to V8 is empty then the
User relation must also be empty, so the answer to the query above must be empty
as well. In this case V8 does determine the query’s answer, at least on the current
dataset. In Rizvi’s terminology, a query is said to be conditionally valid in this case.
The distinction between unconditional and conditional validity mirrors the distinction
between dataset-independent and instance-based view rewriting from Section 2.2.3
A serious disadvantage of non-Truman view rewriting (at least in the form proposed by
Rizvi) is its apparent intractability. Determining whether a SQL query is unconditionally
valid is known to be undecidable [46], and we are not aware of any algorithms that can
decide whether a query is conditionally valid. Rizvi et al. provide inference rules that
are sound but not complete: every query that is answered will be conditionally valid, but
some conditionally valid queries might be rejected by the system. A second disadvantage
is that policy decisions can be opaque: when a query is rejected, it can be difficult for
users to understand why. [42]
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2.3.2 Truman View Rewriting
In the Truman model, a principal’s query’s will always be answered. However, queries
may be semantically modified prior to execution. For instance, in the model proposed by
Olson et al. [42] the query
SELECT * FROM User
would be silently rewritten as
SELECT uid, NULL AS name, NULL as email
prior to execution. The result will be a table containing three columns named “uid,”
“name” and “email.” However, the “name” and “email” columns will always be NULL.
Security mechanisms that semantically modify queries prior to execution have been
deployed in popular commercial DBMSs; notable examples include Oracle’s Virtual
Private Database [11] and IBM’s Label-Based Access Control [9]. There is also a
substantial body of academic research dedicated to Truman view rewriting, including
Olson et al.’s Reflective Database Access Control [42], the Predicated Grant model
proposed by Chaudhuri et al. [20], and LeFevre et al.’s proposal for access control in
Hippocratic databases [37].
Truman view rewriting offers the promise of separating security policy enforcement
from query formulation. A principal can issue queries as if he had unrestricted access
to the entire database, and the system will silently rewrite his queries to ensure that he
never learns more information than he is supposed to. However, the query that a principal
issues may be very different from the query that is finally answered by the DBMS, and
this discrepancy can lead to query answers that are misleading or blatantly wrong. [46] If
a principal who is only granted access to V7 tries to execute the query
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM User
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then his query will be silently rewritten to
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM User WHERE uid = 1
prior to execution and will therefore provide an absurdly low estimate of the number of
users in the database.
A principled treatment of Truman view rewriting is provided by Wang et al. [53],
who identify and formalize three desirable properties for reference monitors that employ
Truman view rewriting:
(i) Sound: The rewritten query should return only correct information.
(ii) Secure: The rewritten query should depend only on information that is permitted
by the security policy.
(iii) Maximum: The query should return as much information as possible.
They argue that Truman view rewriting should be and complete but, due to practical
considerations, should only strive to be maximal.
2.3.3 Inference Control
View-based security mechanisms typically place an upper bound on the information that
a principal is allowed to access. Any administrator defines a set of views that a principal
is permitted to read, and the system ensures that any information that the principal learns
by issuing queries could also have been learned by looking at the views he is granted
access to. In contrast, mechanisms for privacy-preserving data publishing place a lower
bound on the information that a principal will not learn by looking at a query’s answer.
In a typical setup, a hospital might wish to permit an academic researcher to issue
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aggregate queries over a sensitive medical dataset while preventing him from learning too
much information about any specific individual in that dataset. A number of techniques
for privacy-preserving data publishing have been proposed in the academic literature,
including k-anonymity [52], `-diversity [39], and -differential privacy [26]. However,
there is a very concrete sense in which privacy-preserving data publishing is more difficult
than access control: access control mechanisms typically do not make any assumptions
about a principal’s background knowledge, while privacy-preserving data publishing
must. [26, 34]
-differential privacy is a popular criterion that ensures that an adversary who is not
aware of any correlations between different tuples in a dataset will learn no more than
( · log2 e) bits of information about any single tuple by seeing the output of a published
query. [22] Differential privacy is often achieved by injecting random noise into a query
answer; a smaller value of  will lead to stronger privacy guarantees; however, these
guarantees will be typically achieved by making query answers noisier.
Differential privacy aims to limit the amount of information that is revealed about
any tuple in a dataset. Perfect privacy [40] differs from differential privacy in two ways.
First, it provides guarantees only for a distinguished subset of the tuples in the dataset.
And second, it ensures that a query will not reveal any information at all about the tuples
in this distinguished subset. Another form of inference control is proposed by Brodsky et
al. [18]. Their algorithm is able to infer a list of potentially sensitive facts that could be
learned from the answers to a collection of database queries.
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2.4 Security and Privacy Potpourri
We next discuss work from the security and privacy communities that is relevant to this
dissertation but is not targeted towards database systems in particular.
2.4.1 Programming Language Security
Both Truman and non-Truman view rewriting have parallels in the programming language
security literature. Non-Truman view rewriting can be thought of as a form of static
program analysis: in both cases, the goal is to determine through static analysis whether
a program is safe to run. Similarly, Truman view rewriting has parallels with Inlined
Reference Monitors, which rewrite untrusted programs into safe ones that are guaranteed
to satisfy certain security properties. For a discussion of both techniques we refer the
interested reader to the survey of Schneider et al. [49]
Another innovation from the programming language security literature that is relevant
to this dissertation is Landauer et al.’s lattice of information [36]. Roughly speaking,
they introduces a set of functions that map program states to an arbitrary output domain,
and orders these functions based on the amount of information that they reveal. These
functions induce a lattice. The top element of this lattice corresponds to the identity
function, which completely reveals a program’s current state. The bottom element of this
lattice corresponds to a constant function, which reveals no information about a program’s
current state. The order can formally be defined in terms of function composition: f  g
if there is a function h such that f = h ◦ g. In other words, any information that could
be learned by looking at the answer to f could also be learned by looking at the answer
to g and performing appropriate postprocessing. Although Landauer et al.’s formalism
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is closely related to results on disclosure lattices in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, their
results are primarily theoretical, while we aim to reason about information disclosure in
real query languages.
Lattice-based models can also be to encode and help enforce practical security
constraints. Roughly speaking, the goal of information flow security is to ensure that a
program which operates on both sensitive and non-sensitive information will not allow
sensitive inputs to impact publicly visible outputs. There is an extensive body of work
on the topic; we refer interested readers to the survey of Sabelfeld et al. [47] One key
difference from our technique is that the lattices used by information flow control systems
are typically not data-derived.
2.4.2 Reasoning about Security Policies
Most of the models discussed above assume that a security policy is defined by a single
entity. However, this will not always be the case. In practice, security policies in
distributed environments must balance the concerns of multiple entities with disparate
interests. A number of formalisms have been proposed to handle such cases.
Bonatti et al. [16] propose an algebra with a number of operations for composing
different access control policies. Authorization logics such as SecPAL [13] and NAL
[50] permit rich reasoning about security policy decisions.
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2.4.3 Usability of Security Permissions
The work we have discussed up until this point focuses the problem of enforcing security
policies. In practice, however, the humans who specify these policies can and do make
mistakes. In fact, much of the motivation for this dissertation is based on the assertion
that users and developers struggle to use complex permissions structures. We next review
two studies of Google’s Android by Felt al. [28, 29] that support this claim.
In [28], Felt et al. developed a tool that instrumented Android apps to determine what
API calls they made. They used these API calls to determine what permissions apps
made use of when they ran, and were able to identify permissions that apps requested
but never actually used. They ran their tool on 900 apps, and it identified 323 (35.8%)
as having erroneous permissions; however, they may have had a high false positive rate
due to limitations of their tool. In a sample of 40 apps that were reviewed by hand they
identified 17 out of the 18 apps flagged by their tool as true positives and the remaining
app as a false positives.
They identified a number of causes for overprivileged apps, some of which are
reviewed below:
(i) Permission name: Developers requested permissions that looked relevant to their
apps’ functionality but were not actually required. For instance, developers who
needed the ACCESS NETWORK STATE permission would frequently request the
ACCESS WIFI STATE even if it wasn’t used, and vice versa; they speculated that
this was because the permissions had similar-sounding names.
(ii) Deputies: One Android app can invoke another (the deputy) with a request to
perform a specific operation. For example, third-party apps can launch the Android
camera app as a deputy. In this case the CAMERA permission is needed by the
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camera app to snap pictures but is not needed by the third-party app; however,
developers sometimes requested it anyway.
(iii) Related Methods: Within a single API, some functions might require permissions
that others do not. This appeared to confuse some developers.
(iv) Buggy Documentation: Both the official documentation and unofficial message
boards can contain erroneous information about Android permissions, and devel-
opers who rely on these sources may request the wrong permissions as a result.
(v) Testing Artifacts: Developers sometimes requested certain permissions (such as
ACCESS MOCK LOCATION) that were only needed during testing but neglected to
remove them when their apps were released.
Do the problems that Felt et al. observed on the Android platform apply to other
systems? We don’t know for certain, but the causes of overprivileged apps listed above
are hardly unique to Android. For example, in Section 3.6.1 we show that the API that
Facebook exposes to third-party contains a large number of permissions, some of which
are confusingly named and some of which are poorly or incorrectly documented.
In a second study Felt et al. [29] attempted to gauge user comprehension of Android
permissions through the combination of a lab study and an Internet survey. Prior to
installing an app, Android presents the end user with a list of permissions that the app
must be granted before it can be run. However, Felt et al. found that users often paid
little attention to the permissions that apps requested. Furthermore, many users did not
understand what operations were enabled by specific permissions. However, a minority
of study participants demonstrated a good understanding of the Android permission
system. Such expert users can influence the behavior of others by writing app reviews in
which they point out suspicious permission requests.
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CHAPTER 3
DISCLOSURE LABELING
In this Chapter we introduce disclosure labeling, which provides a formal foundation
for reasoning about information disclosure in database systems that is data-derived,
semantically meaningful and expressive. Our notion of disclosure is based on the
idea of associating levels of disclosure with views over the database. Some views
disclose more information than others; this induces a hierarchy. For example, consider
a user Alice whose calendar and contacts data is shown in Figure 3.1 (a). The view V1
contains information from the full Meeting table, while V2 displays only the time slots
of appointments. Clearly V2 reveals less information than V1. 1
Although apps may ask arbitrary queries on the data, Alice can formulate a policy
based on a small set of security views such as those in Figure 3.1 (b). For example,
she may specify that she is happy to disclose V2 but not V1; therefore, any query that
can be answered using only information in V2 is permitted but queries requiring more
information are forbidden. To enforce this policy, every query Q is automatically
associated (“labeled”) with the set of security views that is required to answer Q but
reveals as little information as possible beyond that. For example, the label of Q1 in
Figure 3.1 (c) is {V1} and the label of Q2 is {V1,V3}. Policies are defined in terms of
labels; Alice can specify that any query whose label is just {V2} can be answered, but
queries with labels that are “above” (more informative than) V2 should be rejected. Both
Q1 and Q2 would be rejected under such a policy.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the full workflow. The user, perhaps with assistance by the
1Many app ecosystems, including the iOS and Android mobile platforms, contain such data, and this
type of data is typically considered sensitive by users [27, 30]. In fact, LinkedIn came under fire in 2012
for writing an iOS app that sent sensitive information extracted from users’ calendars back to LinkedIn’s
servers [43].
27
Meeting Contact
Time Person
9 Jim
10 Cathy
12 Bob
Person Email Position
Jim jim@e.com Manager
Cathy cathy@e.com Intern
Bob bob@e.com Consultant
(a) Dataset
V1(x, y) :− Meeting(x, y)
V2(x) :− Meeting(x, y)
V3(x, y, z) :− Contact(x, y, z)
(b) Security Views
Q1(x) :− Meeting(x, ’Cathy’)
Q2(x) :− Meeting(x, y) ∧ Contact(y,w, ’Intern’)
(c) Queries
Figure 3.1: Sample dataset, security views, and queries.
Figure 3.2: Disclosure control system model
platform developer and/or third party privacy watchdog groups, creates a base set of
security views. Upon this set of views, the user defines a security policy that specifies what
level of disclosure is permitted; again, other parties could help by pre-defining sensible
policies which users could adjust as desired. The disclosure restriction is enforced by a
reference monitor – a component that automatically computes the labels for all incoming
queries, and accepts or rejects queries to ensure that the security policy is never violated.
Figure 3.2 is a conceptual diagram rather than an architectural specification. In practice,
the reference monitor could be an independent system component or a part of the DBMS
or embedded within the untrusted app.
The rest of this Chapter is laid out as follows. We review relevant notation in Section
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3.1 and formalize the problem of disclosure labeling in Section 3.2. Our model of
information disclosure satisfies the desiderata identified in Chapter 1. It is data-derived
because the labeler associates each query directly with the information required to answer
it. And it is semantically meaningful because each query is labeled with a set of views
that concisely characterize the information that it discloses.
Next, in Section 3.3 and 3.4 we provide practical algorithms for labeling conjunctive
queries under set semantics. In Section 3.5 we describe a prototype system that we built
to evaluate our algorithms and discuss additional optimizations that were integrated into
the prototype. In contrast with many conventional view-based security mechanisms, our
prototype is able to support stateful policies such as Chinese Wall policies2 in which the
decision to answer or reject on the query may depend on the queries that a principal has
issued in the past.
Finally, in Section 3.6 we apply our framework to practical disclosure control sce-
narios. As a case study, we review Facebook’s hand-crafted permissions labeling of
FQL and Graph API queries and discover multiple inconsistencies and problems with
the documentation. We also show that our algorithms scale well on realistic workloads
(Section 3.6).
3.1 Problem Statement
The goal of disclosure labeling is to determine what information about the underlying
database is disclosed by answering an arbitrary set of queries Q. Labeling makes use of
2Chinese Wall security policies, which are prevalent in the commercial world, are used to mitigate
conflicts of interest that might arise if a firm has multiple clients with competing interests. For instance, we
might wish to prevent an analyst who has previously received confidential information about Microsoft
from subsequently consulting for a competitor such as Google. [17] In the context of database security, we
wish to prevent a principal whose queries have previously accessed sensitive information about Microsoft
from subsequently issuing queries that retrieve sensitive information about Google, and vice versa.
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a set S of security views that reveal known and semantically meaningful types of infor-
mation about the database. A disclosure labeler is a function that relates the information
revealed by Q to the information revealed by the security views in S. Specifically, it
identifies a subset of S which is sufficient to answer all the queries in Q, but otherwise
discloses as little additional information as possible.
Disclosure labelers provide a formal foundation for the disclosure control in app
ecosystems which is our ultimate goal. In addition, they highlight previously unexplored
connections between view-based security and order theory.
Defining disclosure labelers and providing labeling algorithms are both challenging. A
precise definition of disclosure labeling requires us to formalize the concept of disclosing
“as little information as possible” about the database. Existing theoretical work [36]
addresses this to an extent, but has limited practical applicability.
In the remainder of this section, we situate disclosure labeling within a broader
problem space; we present our solution to the above challenges starting in Section 3.2.
3.1.1 Notation and Terminology
We close this section by introducing a few additional pieces of terminology and notation.
Although Sections 3.2 and 3.3 do not assume any particular query language, we will later
restrict our attention to conjunctive queries over the schema of a fixed database D. A
conjunctive query has the form
H :− B
where H is a relational atom and B a conjunction of relational atoms over database
relations. H and B are the head and body of the query, respectively. Each atom may
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contain constants and variables. Any variables that appear in H must also appear in
B. Letters x, y, z etc. indicate variables and letters a, b, c etc. indicate constants. A
distinguished variable is one that appears in the head of the query, and an existential
variable is one that appears only in the body. We say that two queries are equivalent if
they return the same answer on every dataset.
Section 3.2 formalizes disclosure in terms of preorders and lattices. Given a set C, a
binary relation is a subset of C × C. A relation ∼ is reflexive if c ∼ c for all c ∈ C; it is
symmetric if c ∼ c′ if and only if c′ ∼ c; it is antisymmetric if c ∼ c′ and c′ ∼ c together
imply c = c′; and it is transitive if c ∼ c′ and c′ ∼ c′′ together imply c ∼ c′′. A preorder
is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive. An equivalence relation is a preorder
that is also symmetric. A partial order is a preorder that is also antisymmetric. If  is a
partial order, then C forms a lattice under  if every pair of elements from C has both a
least upper bound (LUB) and greatest lower bound (GLB). A bounded lattice contains a
least element ⊥ and a greatest element >; all lattices we consider are bounded.
3.2 Disclosure Labeling
This section introduces a formal framework for measuring and controlling disclosure
that draws on fundamental connections between view-based security and order theory.
Disclosure orders (Section 3.2.1) and disclosure lattices (Section 3.2.2) allow us to reason
about the amounts of information disclosed by different set of views. We formally define
disclosure labelers in Section 3.2.3. It turns out not every set of security views is suitable
for creating a disclosure labeler; we give conditions that guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of disclosure labelers. In Section 3.2.4, we explain the conceptual end-to-end
setup for the use of disclosure labeling in disclosure control, including a formal definition
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Notation Description
U universe of all possible queries
S set of security views, S ⊆ U
V,V1,V2 sets of views; V,V1,V2 ⊆ U
V,V1,V2 views; V,V1,V2 ∈ U
Q,Q1,Q2 queries (to be labeled); Q,Q1,Q2 ∈
U
 disclosure order
(⇓ V) set of all views below V under 
I elements of the disclosure lattice
over U induced by 
℘(U) power set of U, i.e. collection of all
subsets of U
F set of disclosure labels, where each
label is a set of views; F ⊆ ℘(U)
` a disclosure labeler
`(I) all elements of the lattice of disclo-
sure labels for `
P a security policy; can be represented
as a subset of `(I)
Table 3.1: Notation summary
of a security policy. Our notation is summarized in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Disclosure Orders
We now define disclosure orders, which formalize the notion that some sets of views
disclose more information than others. Assume all views are drawn from a finite universe
U. A disclosure order  ranks the relative information revealed by different sets of views.
Roughly speaking, V1  V2 means that all the information revealed by V1 is also revealed
by V2.
A natural candidate for such an order is based on view determinacy [41]. Under this
order, V1  V2 if and only if the answers to all the views in V1 are uniquely determined
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by the answers to the views in V2. Unfortunately, checking this criterion is highly
intractable for many classes of queries. Equivalent view rewriting provides a conservative
approximation to the determinacy ordering in which V1  V2 precisely when, for each
view W ∈ V1, there exists an equivalent rewriting of W in terms of the views in V2. In
contrast to determinacy, equivalent view rewriting is known to be tractable for many
classes of queries [38].
The choice of disclosure order will depend on multiple factors: required throughput,
sensitivity to false negatives, and the complexity of the query language under consider-
ation. Rather than restrict ourselves to one of the orders defined above, we develop a
more general framework that is applicable to any binary relation which satisfies three
basic properties. The first states that adding new elements to a set of views can only
increase the amount of information that it reveals about the database. The second is a
standard transitivity condition. The third allows us to derive meaningful upper bounds
on information disclosure even for adversaries who combine information from multiple
sources.
Definition 3.2.1. A disclosure order is a binary relation  on subsets of U such that
(i) If V1 ⊆ V2 then V1  V2.
(ii) If V1  V2 and V2  V3 then V1  V3.
(iii) If V1  V3 and V2  V3 then V1 ∪ V2  V3.
Both orders mentioned above are disclosure orders, but others exist too. One example
is the usual set order, where V1  V2 precisely when V1 ⊆ V2.
Disclosure orders need not be partial orders, as they are in general not antisymmetric.
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For example, consider the following two views on Meeting, abbreviated as M.
V1(x, y) :− M(x, y) V ′1(y, x) :− M(x, y)
V1 and V ′1 each disclose all of M, so {V1}  {V ′1} and {V ′1}  {V1} under determinacy and
equivalent view rewriting, but the two sets are clearly not equal. Despite being unequal,
{V1} and {V ′1} reveal equivalent information about M, since each set can be computed from
the other. We can show, however, that such sets induce an equivalence relation.
Proposition 3.2.2. The binary relation defined by V1 ≡ V2 if and only if V1  V2 and
V2  V1 is an equivalence relation.
Proof. We verify each of the properties of an equivalence relation in turn:
(i) Reflexivity: Follows immediately from the reflexivity of .
(ii) Symmetry: (V1 ≡ V2) ⇐⇒ (V1  V2 and V2  V1) ⇐⇒ (V2 ≡ V1).
(iii) Transitivity: Suppose V1 ≡ V2 and V2 ≡ V3. Then V1  V2  V3 and V3  V2 
V1. It follows that V1 ≡ V3. 
3.2.2 Disclosure Lattices
Before we move to labeling, there are two more foundational questions to address. First,
given two sets of views V1 and V2, what information is disclosed to someone who knows
both of them beyond what could have been inferred from just one of the two sets? This is
the classical problem of information combination. Second, what common information,
or overlap, is there in the information revealed by the two sets of views?
One might be tempted to use the union and intersection of V1 and V2 to answer the
above questions. However, intersection does not work as a measure of overlap. To see
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V1(x, y) :− Meeting(x, y)
V2(x) :− Meeting(x, y)
V4(y) :− Meeting(x, y)
V5() :− Meeting(x, y)
(a) Security views
⊥ = ∅
⇓ {V5}
⇓ {V2} ⇓ {V4}
⇓ {V2,V4}
> = ⇓ {V1}
(b) Disclosure lattice
Figure 3.3: Security views and corresponding disclosure lattice.
this, consider the views V2 and V4 in Figure 3.3(a). The sets {V2} and {V4} have an empty
intersection, but they do have some overlap. Given the answer to either V2 or V4, it is
possible to deduce whether Meeting is nonempty, i.e. to answer the query V5.
To define combination and overlap, we introduce a new operator (⇓ V) that returns
all the views in U whose answers can be inferred by observing a set of views V. This
more accurately represents all the information disclosed by V.
Definition 3.2.3. Let V ⊆ U. Then we define (⇓ V) to be {V ∈ U : {V}  V}.
We next prove some basic properties of (⇓ V).
Proposition 3.2.4. Let V1,V2 ⊆ U. The following are equivalent:
(i) V1  V2.
(ii) V1 ⊆ (⇓ V2).
(iii) (⇓ V1) ⊆ (⇓ V2).
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Proof. We prove each of the following implications in turn:
(i) implies (ii): Suppose V ∈ V1. Then {V} ⊆ V1, so that {V}  V1. Since V1  V2, and
 is transitive, it must be the case that {V}  V2. It follows that V ∈ (⇓ V2).
(ii) implies (i): Since V1 ⊆ (⇓ V2), we know that {V}  V2 for each V ∈ V1. It follows
that V1 =
⋃
V∈V1 {V}  V2.
(i) implies (iii): Take any V ∈ (⇓ V1). Then {V}  V1, and therefore {V}  V2 because 
is transitive. It follows that V ∈ (⇓ V2).
(iii) implies (i): Suppose V ∈ V1. Then {V} ⊆ V1, and therefore {V}  V1, so that
V ∈ (⇓ V1). This means that V ∈ (⇓ V2), so that {V}  V2. It follows that V1 =⋃
V∈V1 {V}  V2. 
Corollary 3.2.5. If V1 ⊆ V2 then (⇓ V1) ⊆ (⇓ V2).
Proof. If V1 ⊆ V2 then V1  V2, and therefore (⇓ V1) ⊆ (⇓ V2). 
Using the properties identified above, we can show that (⇓ V) is idempotent.
Corollary 3.2.6. If V ⊆ U then (⇓ (⇓ V)) = (⇓ V)
Proof. Let V1 = V2 = (⇓ V). Then (⇓ V1) ⊆ (⇓ V2) implies V1 ⊆ (⇓ V2), and therefore
(⇓ V) ⊆ (⇓ (⇓ V)).
On the other hand, if V ∈ (⇓ V) then {V}  V, and so (⇓ V) = ⋃V∈(⇓V) {V}  V. Let
V1 = (⇓ V) and let V2 = V. Then V1  V2 implies (⇓ V1) ⊆ (⇓ V2), and therefore
(⇓ (⇓ V)) ⊆ (⇓ V).
Since (⇓ V) ⊆ (⇓ (⇓ V)), and (⇓ (⇓ V)) ⊆ (⇓ V), the two must be equal. 
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We next verify that V and ⇓ V reveal the same information about the dataset.
Corollary 3.2.7. V ≡ ⇓ V.
Proof. V  V implies that V ⊆ (⇓ V), and therefore V  (⇓ V) as well. On the other
hand, {V}  V for each V ∈ (⇓ V), so that
(⇓ V) =
⋃
V ∈ ⇓V
{V}  V
It follows that V ≡ (⇓ V) as desired. 
If V1 and V2 reveal the same information about the dataset then ⇓ V1 and ⇓ V2 must
be equal. In this way, the ⇓ operator partitions U into equivalence classes; two sets are in
the same equivalence class if any view whose answer can be inferred from the first set
can also be inferred from the second set.
Corollary 3.2.8. V1 ≡ V2 if and only if (⇓ V1) = (⇓ V2).
Proof.
V1 ≡ V2
⇐⇒ V1  V2 and V2  V1
⇐⇒ (⇓ V1) ⊆ (⇓ V2) and (⇓ V2) ⊆ (⇓ V1)
⇐⇒ (⇓ V1) = (⇓ V2) 
The ⇓ operator now allows us to formalize information combination and overlap.
Given V1 and V2, the information that can be derived from both V1 and V2 taken together
is ⇓ (V1 ∪ V2), and the information overlap of V1 and V2 is (⇓ V1) ∩ (⇓ V2). We can
use these functions to construct a lattice structure that precisely captures the information
disclosed by each subset of U.
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Theorem 3.2.9. Let U be a set of views, and let  be a disclosure order for U. Define
I = {(⇓ V) : V ⊆ U}. Then (I,) is a lattice with details as follows:
(i) LUB: (⇓ V1) unionsq (⇓ V2) = ⇓ (V1 ∪ V2).
(ii) GLB: (⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2) = (⇓ V1) ∩ (⇓ V2).
(iii) Top element > = (⇓ U) = U, bottom element ⊥ = (⇓ ∅).
We call this lattice the disclosure lattice over U. It is a strict generalization of the Lattice
of Information [36].
Proof. For any pair of elements (⇓ V1) and (⇓ V2) in I we know that (⇓ V1)  (⇓ V2) if
and only if (⇓ (⇓ V1)) ⊆ (⇓ (⇓ V2)) if and only if (⇓ V1) ⊆ (⇓ V2). Rather than showing
that (I,) is a lattice, we prove the equivalent claim that (I,⊆) is a lattice. We verify
each of the properties of a lattice in turn:
(i) LUB: Let V3 be such that (⇓ V1) ⊆ (⇓ V3) and (⇓ V2) ⊆ (⇓ V3). Then V1  V3 and
V2  V3, so that (V1∪V2)  V3. It follows that ⇓ (V1∪V2) ⊆ (⇓ V3). In particular,
by setting (⇓ V3) = (⇓ V1) unionsq (⇓ V2) we see that ⇓ (V1 ∪ V2) ⊆ (⇓ V1) unionsq (⇓ V2).
On the other hand, V1  (V1 ∪ V2) implies (⇓ V1) ⊆ ⇓ (V1 ∪ V2). Similarly,
(⇓ V2) ⊆ ⇓ (V1 ∪ V2). It follows that (⇓ V1) unionsq (⇓ V2) ⊆ ⇓ (V1 ∪ V2).
(ii) GLB: Let V3 be such that (⇓ V3) ⊆ (⇓ V1) and (⇓ V3) ⊆ (⇓ V2). Then (⇓ V3) ⊆
(⇓ V1 ∩ ⇓ V2). In particular, by setting (⇓ V3) = (⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2) we see that
(⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2) ⊆ (⇓ V1 ∩ ⇓ V2).
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On the other hand,
⇓ (⇓ V1 ∩ ⇓ V2) ⊆ ⇓ (⇓ V1) = (⇓ V1)
and ⇓ (⇓ V1 ∩ ⇓ V2) ⊆ ⇓ (⇓ V2) = (⇓ V2)
together imply ⇓ (⇓ V1 ∩ ⇓ V2) ⊆ (⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2)
Combining this with the previous inequality, we find that
(⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2) ⊆ (⇓ V1 ∩ ⇓ V2) ⊆ ⇓ (⇓ V1 ∩ ⇓ V2) ⊆ (⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2)
and hence, equality must hold.
(iii) Top and bottom:
To show that > = (⇓ U) = U, we note that for any V ⊆ U we have ⇓ V ⊆ U. Since
U ⊆ (⇓ U) ⊆ U we conclude that ⇓ U = U is the top element of our lattice.
To show that ⊥ = (⇓ ∅), note that ∅ ⊆ V for any V ⊆ U, so that (⇓ ∅) ⊆ (⇓ V). 
As an example, consider the Meeting relation from Figure 3.1 and suppose our
universe U consists of the four views in Figure 3.3(a). Letting  be the equivalent view
rewriting ordering, the disclosure lattice for this U is shown in Figure 3.3. The GLB of
⇓ {V2} and ⇓ {V4} is ⇓ {V5}. Their LUB is not ⇓ {V1} but another properly lower element,
accurately reflecting the fact that it is impossible to reconstitute the Meeting relation
from the projections on its two attributes.
3.2.3 Disclosure Labelers
In this section we define disclosure labelers and explain under what conditions they
exist. We begin with a set of security views S, each of which reveals a known type of
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information about the dataset. A labeler ` is a function that expresses the information
revealed by an unknown set of queries Q in terms of the information revealed by a subset
S′ ⊆ S.
It would seem that ` should map subsets of U to subsets of S. For technical reasons,
we permit the labeler’s output to range over elements of an arbitrary set F , even if F
is not a power set. Furthermore, the output of ` does not need to be an element of F so
long as it is equivalent to an element of F .
We place three additional restrictions on ` in order to ensure that the labels it finds are
semantically meaningful. First, if V ∈ F then `(V) should reveal the same information
as V. This ensures that the labeler behaves correctly for “easy” inputs. It also means
that the elements in F are the fixpoints of `, which motivates our choice of notation F .
Second, the labeler should never underestimate the amount of information disclosed by a
set of queries. And third, ` should be monotonic – if one set of views reveals less than
another then the label of the first set of views should be below the label of the second.
Definition 3.2.10. Let F be a subset of ℘(U), the power set of U, and assume  is a
disclosure order. A disclosure labeler is a map ` : ℘(U)→ ℘(U) such that
(i) If V1 ⊆ U then `(V1) ≡ V2 for some V2 ∈ F .
(ii) If V ∈ F then `(V) ≡ V.
(iii) If V ⊆ U then V  `(V).
(iv) If V1,V2 ⊆ U and V1  V2 then `(V1)  `(V2).
We call F the set of disclosure labels for `. The axioms defined above mirror those
in the definition of an order-theoretic closure operator [25], defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.11. Given a lattice (I,), we say that a map c : I → I is a closure
operator if for all X,Y ∈ I,
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(i) X  c(X).
(ii) X  Y implies c(X)  c(Y).
(iii) c(c(X)) = c(X).
The next Proposition makes the connection between disclosure labelers and closure
operators explicit: every disclosure labeler induces a closure operator.
Proposition 3.2.12. The operator c that maps every X ∈ I to ⇓ `(X) is a closure
operator.
Proof. Suppose X,Y ∈ I. We verify each of the properties of a closure operator in turn:
(i) X  `(X) ≡ ⇓ `(X) = c(X).
(ii) Suppose X  Y . Then c(X) = ⇓ `(X) ≡ `(X)  `(Y) ≡ ⇓ `(Y) = c(Y).
(iii) The definition of a disclosure labeler implies that c(X) = ⇓ `(X) ≡ `(X) ≡ V
for some V ∈ F . We claim that c(c(X)) ≡ V. The definition of a disclosure labeler
implies that `(V) ≡ V. Since V ≡ c(X) implies V  c(X) we must have
c(X) ≡ V ≡ `(V)  `(c(X)) ≡ ⇓ `(c(X)) = c(c(X))
An analogous argument in the other direction shows that c(c(X))  c(X), so that
c(X) ≡ c(c(X)). It follows that c(X) = c(c(X)). 
Consider now the practical scenario where we start with a set of security views S and
would like to define a labeler where F = ℘(S), the powerset of S. Unfortunately, we
cannot always do this, as the following example shows.
Example 3.2.13. Consider V2 and V4 from Figure 3.3, and suppose we want to label
queries with ℘({V2,V4}). This gives the following F = {∅, {V2}, {V4}, {V2,V4}, {V1}}.3
3The disclosure labeler axioms imply that F contains the top element > = ⇓ {V1}.
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Suppose that, as in previous examples, U consists of the four views in Figure 3.3. It
turns out that there is no labeler for U using F as the set of disclosure labels. To see
this, suppose a labeler does exist and consider what `(V5) might be. Since {V5}  {V2},
we know that `({V5})  `({V2}) ≡ {V2}. Similarly, since {V5}  {V4}, we know that
`({V5})  `({V4}) ≡ {V4}. Since `({V5}) ∈ F , we are forced to conclude that `({V5}) = ∅.
However, {V5}  ∅, violating condition (iii) of Definition 4.3.4.
The conditions in Definition 4.3.4 are much stronger than they first appear. It is
not always possible to define a disclosure labeler for a given F ; however, when a
disclosure labeler does exist, it is unique up to equivalence. To formalize and prove this,
it is necessary to understand how labelers interact with the disclosure lattice defined in
Section 3.2.2.
If we apply a disclosure labeler ` to each element of I (the disclosure lattice of U),
we obtain a new lattice `(I). We call this lattice the lattice of disclosure labels. Roughly
speaking, each element in this lattice corresponds to the information revealed by an
element of F . More formally, it is possible to show that `(I) = {⇓ V : V ∈ F }. For
arbitrary V1,V2 ∈ F this lattice is guaranteed to contain the GLB (⇓ V1)u (⇓ V2). It will
also contain a suitable ⇓ V3, for V3 ∈ F , which can serve as a LUB. However, this new
LUB may be higher in the original disclosure lattice than (⇓ V1) unionsq (⇓ V2).
Theorem 3.2.14 (Labeling on the disclosure lattice). Define `(I) = {⇓ `(V) : V ∈ I}.
Then (`(I),) is a lattice, with GLB and LUB as follows.
(i) GLB: (⇓ V1) u` (⇓ V2) = (⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2).
(ii) LUB: (⇓ V1) unionsq` (⇓ V2) = ⇓ `((⇓ V1) unionsq (⇓ V2)).
We begin by proving the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2.15. If ` is a disclosure labeler and V1  `(V2) then `(V1)  `(V2).
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Proof. V1  `(V1)  `(`(V2)) ≡ `(V2). 
We are now ready to prove the Theorem 3.2.14.
Proof of Theorem. We handle each part of the theorem separately:
(i) Let V1,V2 ∈ F , and let V3 be such that (⇓ V3) = (⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2). We first note
that `(⇓ V3)  `(⇓ Vi) ≡ (⇓ Vi) for i = 1, 2, and therefore `(⇓ V3)  (⇓ V3). On
the other hand, (⇓ V3)  `(⇓ V3). It follows that (⇓ V3) ≡ `(⇓ V3), and therefore
⇓ V3 = ⇓ `(⇓ V3).
(ii) Let V3 be such that (⇓ V3) = (⇓ V1) unionsq (⇓ V2). Since (⇓ V1)  (⇓ V3) we know
that ⇓ V1 = ⇓ `(V1)  ⇓ `(V3). Similarly, ⇓ V2 = ⇓ `(V2)  ⇓ `(V3). It
follows that (⇓ V1 unionsq` ⇓ V2)  ⇓ `(⇓ V3).
On the other hand, (⇓ Vi)  (⇓ V1 unionsq` ⇓ V2) for each i = 1, 2, so that (⇓ V3)  (⇓
V1 unionsq` ⇓ V2). It follows that
⇓ `(⇓ V3)  ⇓ `(⇓ V1 unionsq` ⇓ V2) = (⇓ V1 unionsq` ⇓ V2)
and therefore ⇓ `(⇓ V3) = (⇓ V1 unionsq` ⇓ V2), as desired. 
Theorem 3.2.14 provides the insight to characterize when a set F can be used to
formulate a disclosure labeler. Existence is characterized using closure systems from
lattice theory.
Definition 3.2.16. We say that S ⊆ I is a closure system for a finite lattice (I,) if
(i) For each X1, X2 ∈ S , we have X1 u X2 ∈ S , and
(ii) S contains the (unique) maximal element of I.
43
The following Theorem shows that there is a bijective correspondence between
disclosure labelers and closure systems. A disclosure labeler is uniquely determined by
its fixpoints, and the fixpoints must form a closure system.
Theorem 3.2.17 (Labeler Existence). Let F ⊆ ℘(U), and assume  is a disclosure order.
Then IF = {⇓ V : V ∈ F } is a closure system if and only if there exists a disclosure
labeler ` with domain U and image F .
Proof. Theorem 3.2.9 implies that if ` is a disclosure labeler for (U,F ,) then {⇓ V :
V ∈ F } is closed under greatest lower bounds. Since U is a maximal element of (I,),
`(U) ≡ U, and therefore (⇓ U) ∈ S , It follows that (⇓ U), the (unique) maximal element
of I, is contained in S , so that {⇓ V : V ∈ F } is a closure system.
For the other direction, suppose IF = {⇓ V : V ∈ F } is a closure system. Define
`(V) =

{⇓ V′ ∈ F : V  V′}
We claim that ` is a disclosure labeler. Since IF induces a closure system, ⇓ `(V) ∈ IF
for all possible V. Furthermore, if V ∈ F then by construction, V ≡ `(V). Next, `(V) is
a GLB of elements V′ such that V  V′, and therefore V  `(V). If V1  V2 then
`(V1) =

{⇓ V′ ∈ F : V1  V′} 

{⇓ V′ ∈ F : V2  V′} = `(V2)
and therefore `(V1)  `(V2). Hence, ` is a disclosure labeler for F , as desired. 
Intuitively, F can be used to formulate a disclosure labeler if the corresponding set it
induces in the disclosure lattice is both closed under GLB and contains >. If a labeler
does exist, it is unique up to equivalence:
Proposition 3.2.18. If `1 and `2 are both disclosure labelers for (U,F ,) then `1(V) ≡
`2(V) for all V ⊆ U.
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Proof. For any V ⊆ U we have V  `2(V), so that `1(V)  `2(V) by Lemma 3.2.15.
Similarly, V  `1(V), so that `2(V)  `1(V) by Lemma 3.2.15. It follows that `1(V) 
`2(V)  `1(V), and therefore `1(V) ≡ `2(V). 
This allows us to formulate the following definition:
Definition 3.2.19 (Inducing labelers). Let F ⊆ ℘(U). We say F induces a disclosure
labeler on U if it satisfies the condition in Theorem 3.2.17. We call the labeler ` from
Theorem 3.2.17 the labeler induced by F .
If F induces a disclosure labeler, the following algorithm is a naı¨ve but correct
implementation of that labeler. It assumes that no two distinct elements of F are
equivalent. The algorithm sorts the elements of F in order of increasing disclosure (Lines
2–3) and finds the first element in the new order that reveals at least as much information
as V (Lines 4–8).
1: procedure Naı¨veLabel(F ,V)
2: Let F [1], . . . ,F [n] be the elements of F .
3: Sort F so that if F [i]  F [ j] then i ≤ j.
4: for i← 1, 2, . . . , n do
5: if V  F [i] then
6: return F [i]
7: end if
8: end for
9: return >
10: end procedure
We now verify that Naı¨veLabel is in fact a disclosure labeler.
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Proposition 3.2.20. If F induces a closure system then Naı¨veLabel is a disclosure
labeler for (U,F ,).
Proof. We verify each of the disclosure labeler axioms in turn. By construction, ev-
ery element in ℘(U) is mapped to an element of F . The check on line 5 ensures
that Naı¨veLabel(F ,V)  V. In the special case where V ∈ F , we must show that
Naı¨veLabel(F ,V) ≡ V; this is true because the algorithm performs a topological sort
on the elements of F (Line 3) before iterating through them. Finally, we must show
that if V1  V2 then Naı¨veLabel(F ,V1)  Naı¨veLabel(F ,V2); this is true because  is
transitive and the elements of F are checked in topological order (Lines 4-8). 
This completes our presentation of disclosure labelers. Note that the output of a
labeler satisfies our desiderata: It is a data-derived measure of disclosure because it is
a mathematical function of the data needed to answer the queries. The output is also
semantically meaningful, as it expresses disclosure by relating it to security views that
the user understands, and the model is expressive due to the ability to choose a large and
complex F .
3.2.4 From Labelers to Security Policies
We have defined disclosure labelers which allow us to restate the information revealed
by an unknown set of queries in terms of the information revealed by a much smaller,
known, set of security views. Labelers are useful because they allow the formulation of
semantically meaningful security policies; we explain this now in more detail.
As we saw, the information associated with the disclosure labels for a given labeler
can be represented as a lattice `(I). Conceptually, a security policy is a cut in this lattice:
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a set of queries whose label is below the cut can be answered, but a set of queries whose
label falls above the cut cannot. We can formally represent a security policy as the set of
elements in the lattice that are below the desired cut.
Definition 3.2.21 (Security policy). A security policy P for labeler ` is a subset of the
elements in the lattice of disclosure labels for `.
For example, let U contain the four views in Figure 3.3, and let ` be a trivial disclosure
labeler that maps every subset of U to itself. P = {⊥, ⇓ {V5}, ⇓ {V2}, ⇓ {V4}} represents
a policy in which either the first or the second attribute of Meeting may be disclosed, but
not both. This is an example of a Chinese Wall policy [17] and shows that our framework
is powerful enough to express fairly complex policies cleanly.
An important restriction is that policies must be internally consistent in the sense that
if V  V′ and ⇓ V′ ∈ P then ⇓ V ∈ P. In our running example, a principal who can view
the entirety of the Meeting relation should also be permitted to view the projections on
each attribute.
In practice, we assume queries arrive in the system one at a time. A reference monitor
is an algorithm that inspects each query and accepts or rejects it to ensure the policy is
never violated. A simple algorithm for enforcing a security policy P while answering a
set of queries Q is given below.
1: Ltotal ← ∅
2: for Q ∈ Q do
3: Lnew ← `(Q ∪ Ltotal)
4: if (⇓ Lnew) ∈ P then
5: answer Q
6: Ltotal ← Lnew
7: else
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V3(x, y, z) :− C(x, y, z) V9(x) :− C(x, y, z)
V6(x, y) :− C(x, y, z) V10(y) :− C(x, y, z)
V7(x, z) :− C(x, y, z) V11(z) :− C(x, y, z)
V8(y, z) :− C(x, y, z) V12() :− C(x, y, z)
Figure 3.4: All relational projections of Contact.
8: refuse Q
9: end if
10: end for
The algorithm processes incoming queries in Q one at a time (Line 2). It first
computes the total information disclosed if the query would be answered (Line 3). If such
disclosure is permitted by the policy (Line 4), the query is answered and the cumulative
disclosure Ltotal is updated (Lines 5 and 6). This completes our presentation of disclosure
labelers. We now show how they can be made practical.
3.3 Generating labelers
The naı¨ve disclosure labeling algorithm proposed in Section 3.2.3 runs in time that is
linear in the size of the set F . Unfortunately, F can easily become very large, since it
generally contains all possible subsets of a set of security views S. In fact, as the next
example demonstrates, even S itself can grow quite large.
Example 3.3.1. Consider a generalization of the example used in Figure 3.3. Suppose
we have an n-attribute relation R and wish to label each query over R with the set of
relational projections on R that is required to answer it. There are 2n possible projections
on R – Figure 3.4 shows all of them for the three-attribute relation Contact from Figure
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3.1, where the relation name is abbreviated as C. The set F would need to account for all
possible subsets of these projections, for a total size that is doubly-exponential in n.
It is clearly impractical to work with such a large F . Fortunately, we do not need
to represent all of F explicitly. We can instead work with a smaller subset of F and in
some sense materialize any remaining elements as they are needed. This section focuses
on the problem of finding a suitable subset of F which is as small as possible.
We assume the existence of two black-box algorithms that depend on  and on U.
The first takes as input subsets V1 and V2 of U, and determines whether V1  V2 in the
disclosure order. The second, written GLB(V1,V2), finds a set of views V3 such that
(⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2) = (⇓ V3). GLB generalizes to handle an arbitrarily large number of
input arguments in the obvious way. Section 3.4 contains a concrete instantiation of these
algorithms for the case of equivalent view rewriting on conjunctive queries under set
semantics.
3.3.1 Downward Generating Sets
Suppose we have a set F that induces a labeler. This means it is closed under the GLB
operation. Therefore, some elements of F are “redundant” in the sense that they can be
computed by taking GLBs of other elements. Such redundant elements can be removed
to yield a smaller Fd that can replace F for practical purposes.
Definition 3.3.2 (Downward generating set). Given a set F , we call Fd ⊆ F a downward
generating set for F if for every V ∈ F there exist V1,V2, . . . ,Vn ∈ Fd such that
V ≡ GLB(V1,V2, . . . ,Vn).
Every F that induces a labeler has a unique minimal downward generating set.
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Theorem 3.3.3. If F induces a labeler then there exists a downward-generating set Fd
for F which is minimal under the usual set ordering. The elements of Fd are uniquely
determined up to equivalence.
Proof. Observe that F must have at least one downward generating set: itself. Since F
is finite by assumption, it must have a downward generating subset Fd of minimal size;
this subset must also be minimal under set semantics. It remains for us to show that Fd is
unique up to equivalence.
Let us suppose that Fd and F ′d are both downward generating subsets of F that are
minimal under set semantics. We will show that each V ∈ Fd is equivalent to an element
V′ ∈ F ′d . Since Fd ⊆ F , each V ∈ Fd is equivalent to (V′1 u V′2 u . . . u V′m), where
V′1, . . . ,V
′
m ∈ F ′d . Similarly, each V′i ∈ F ′d can be expressed as a greatest lower bound
(Vi,1 u Vi,2 u . . . u Vi,ni) of elements in Fd. Writing this out, we see that
V = (V1,1 u . . . u V1,n1) u . . . u (Vm,1 u . . . u Vm,nm)
By construction, V  V′i and V′i  Vi, j for each i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , ni. There
are now two cases. In the first case, V is equivalent to some V′i , in which case we’re
done. In the second case, V is not equal to any V′i . In the latter case, none of the Vi, j can
be equal to V. However, in this case, Fd cannot be minimal because the set difference
Fd − {V} is GLB-dense in F . Hence, we have a contradiction. 
Given F , a minimal downward generating set can be computed by iteratively re-
moving elements of F that are equivalent to the GLB of a subset of the elements still
left.
Example 3.3.4. Continuing with Example 3.3.1, let  be the equivalent view rewriting
ordering. A downward generating set for the original F is ℘({V3,V6,V7,V8}). The reason
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for this will become clearer in Section 3.4 when we explain how GLB is computed for
the equivalent view rewriting order. It turns out that
GLB({V6}, {V7}) ≡ {V9}
GLB({V6}, {V8}) ≡ {V10}
GLB({V7}, {V8}) ≡ {V11}
GLB({V6}, {V7}, {V8}) ≡ {V12}
This should provide intuition as to why we removed the last four views in Figure 3.4.
Note that the size of Fd is still exponential in the number of attributes of Contact.
Given a downward generating set Fd, the procedure GLBLabel defined below shows
how to use it for query labeling. The algorithm iterates over all elements of Fd (Line 3)
and computes a running GLB of those elements that disclose at least as much information
as V (Lines 4-6).
1: procedure GLBLabel(Fd,V)
2: L← >
3: for V′ ∈ Fd do
4: if V  V′ then
5: L← GLB(L,V′)
6: end if
7: end for
8: return L
9: end procedure
We next verify the correctness of this updated procedure.
Theorem 3.3.5. If F induces a closure system and Fd is GLB-dense in F then GLBLabel
is a disclosure labeler for (U,F ,).
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Proof. We verify each of the disclosure labeler properties in turn:
(i) If V1 ⊆ U then GLBLabel(Fd,V1) ≡ V2 for some V2 ∈ F .
The output of the algorithm above is equal to the GLB of a subset of the elements
of Fd. By assumption, every element of Fd is equivalent to an element of F . Since
F is a closure system, we can show that the GLB of any subset of the elements
of F is equivalent to another element of F by induction on the size of the subset,
say n. When n = 0, the output is >, which is equivalent to an element of F by
definition. When n = 1, we map an element of F to itself. When n > 1,
X1 u . . . u Xn−1 u Xn = (X1 u . . . u Xn−1) u Xn
where (X1 u . . . u Xn−1) and Xn are equivalent to elements of F , and therefore
(X1 u . . . Xn−1 u Xn) is also equivalent to an element of F .
(ii) If V ∈ F then GLBLabel(Fd,V) ≡ V.
Since Fd is GLB-dense in F , there is a subset V′ of the elements of Fd whose
GLB is equivalent to F . Every element of V′ is above V in the disclosure lattice,
and therefore will be included in the GLB computed by the algorithm above. It
follows that GLBLabel(Fd,V)  V. On the other hand, every element in the
GLB computed by GLBLabel is above V in the disclosure lattice, and therefore
V  GLBLabel(Fd,V). Equivalence follows.
(iii) If V ⊆ U then V  GLBLabel(Fd,V).
Every element in the GLB computed by GLBLabel is above V in the disclosure
lattice, and therefore V  GLBLabel(Fd,V). If there are no elements in V that are
above V then the labeler’s output will be >, which is above V by definition.
(iv) If V1,V2 ⊆ U and V1  V2 then GLBLabel(Fd,V1)  GLBLabel(Fd,V2).
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If V1  V2 then every element of Fd that is above V2 in the disclosure lattice will
also be above V1. This means that the elements whose GLB is returned as the
output of GLBLabel(Fd,V2) form a subset of those whose GLB is returned as the
output of GLBLabel(Fd,V1), and therefore
GLBLabel(Fd,V1)  GLBLabel(Fd,V2)
as desired. 
Last but not least, downward generating sets obviate the problem of checking whether
a given collection of sets of security views induces a labeler. It turns out that we can
extend any set G to one that induces a labeler by closing it under the GLB operation.
Theorem 3.3.6. If G is a collection of sets of views that contains the top element (⇓ U)
then there is a set F ⊇ G such that (i) F induces a disclosure labeler and (ii) G is a
downward generating set for F . The elements of F are unique up to equivalence.
Proof. We let F be a minimal collection of sets such that
(i) F ⊃ G,
(ii) U ∈ F , and
(iii) If V1,V2 ∈ F then there is some V3 ∈ F such that (⇓ V1) u (⇓ V2) = (⇓ V3).
Then IF = {⇓ V : V ∈ F } is a closure system and every element of F is equivalent to a
GLB of zero or more elements of G. Hence G is a downward generating set for F .
Now suppose that there is some other closure system F ′ that satisfies the required
conditions. Any V′ ∈ F ′ can be expressed as a GLB of elements in F , so that V′ is
equivalent to an element of F . It follows that IF ′ ⊆ IF . An analogous argument shows
that IF ⊆ IF ′ , and therefore IF = IF ′ . 
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This is in some sense the converse of Theorem 3.3.3 and in practice removes the need
for checking whether G induces a labeler. If it does not, we know we can extend it to one
that does. In fact, we are free to work directly with G since it is a downward generating
set for that labeler.
3.3.2 Generating Sets
Although the reduction in size from F to Fd is substantial, Example 3.3.4 demonstrates
that the size of Fd can still be exponential in the number of attributes in the database
schema. The question arises whether we can find a smaller subset of Fd and use that for
labeling instead. The answer is yes; however, we must place two key restrictions on F
and U. First, F must be precise in the following sense:
Definition 3.3.7 (Precise labeler). Suppose F contains ∅, and additionally if (⇓ V1) ∈ F
and (⇓ V2) ∈ F then ⇓ (V1 ∪ V2) ∈ F . We say F induces a precise labeler.
This definition states that F – or rather, its extension to the disclosure lattice on
U – is closed under the lattice LUB operator. The intuition for the term precise is the
following. Return to Figure 3.3 and suppose F = {∅, {V5}, {V2}, {V4},>}, U is the set of
all conjunctive queries over Meeting and  is the equivalent view rewriting order. F
induces a labeler ` over U, but it is not precise. Specifically, `({V2,V4}) = >, which
is properly higher in the disclosure order than {V2,V4}, so the labeler exhibits some
imprecision on this set of views.
The second restriction we need relates to the universe U under the ordering . In-
tuitively, we want to ensure that if the answers V1 are determined by V2 and V3 jointly
then they must either be determined by V2 alone or by V3 alone.
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Definition 3.3.8 (Decomposability). We say a set U is decomposable under  if for every
V1,V2 ⊆ U and every {V}  V1 ∪ V2 we have either {V}  V1 or {V}  V2.
The following Theorem is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4 of Landauer’s
1993 paper A Lattice of Information [36].
Theorem 3.3.9. If U is decomposable under  then the corresponding disclosure lattice
(I,) is distributive.
Assume now that U is decomposable under  and F induces a precise labeler. We can
define the concept of a (full) generating set Fgen for F . As before, a set Fgen generates F
if F can be obtained by closing Fgen under both GLBs and LUBs. If U is decomposable
then it suffices to ensure that every element of F is a LUB of GLBs of elements of Fgen;
this fact follows immediately from distributivity.
Definition 3.3.10 (Generating set). We say that Fgen is a generating set for F if every
element of F is equivalent to the union of GLBs of elements of Fgen.
Given a generating set Fgen, we can use it for query labeling. The following algorithm
processes V one view at a time (Line 3) and computes a running union of the labels for
the views (Line 4).
1: procedure GenLabel(Fgen,V)
2: result ← ∅
3: for each V ∈ V do
4: result ← result ∪ GLBLabel(Fgen, {V})
5: end for
6: return result
7: end procedure
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We now verify the correctness of this procedure.
Theorem 3.3.11. Suppose that (i) F induces a precise closure system, (ii) Fgen is a
generating subset of F , and (iii) U is decomposable. Then GenLabel is a disclosure
labeler for (U,F ,).
Proof. Fix a set V, and let V1,V2, . . . ,Vn be the distinct elements of V. Then
GenLabel(Fgen,V) =
n⋃
i=1
GLBLabel(Fgen, {Vi})
We verify each of the disclosure labeler axioms in turn:
(i) If V ⊆ U then GenLabel(Fgen,V) ≡ V′ for some V′ ∈ F .
The proof of correctness for GLBLabel shows that each GLBLabel(Fgen, {Vi}) is
equivalent to a GLB of elements of Fgen. Since Fgen is a generating set for F , we
conclude that GenLabel(Fgen,V) is equivalent to an element of F .
(ii) If V ∈ F then GenLabel(Fgen,V) ≡ V.
We will show that V  GenLabel(Fgen,V) and GenLabel(Fgen,V)  V. The first
direction is covered by part (iii) below; we still need to verify the second direction.
Recall that
GenLabel(Fgen,V) =
n⋃
i=1
GLBLabel(Fgen, {Vi})
It therefore suffices to show that GLBLabel(Fgen, {Vi})  V for each Vi ∈ V. Fix
Vi ∈ V. Since U is decomposable and {Vi}  V, there must be some V′ ∈ F
such that {Vi}  V′  V and V′ is equivalent to a GLB of elements in Fgen, say
Fi,1, Fi,2, . . . , Fi,mi . Now {Vi}  {Fi, j} for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,mi, so that
GLBLabel(Fgen, {Vi})  GLBLabel(Fgen, {Fi, j}) ≡ {Fi, j}
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for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,mi and therefore
GLBLabel(Fgen, {Vi}) 
mi
j=1
GLBLabel(Fgen, {Fi, j}) ≡
mi
j=1
{Fi, j} ≡ V′  V
(iii) If V ⊆ U then V  GenLabel(Fgen,V).
For i = 1, 2, . . . , n we have
{Vi}  GLBLabel(Fgen, {Vi})  GLBLabel(Fgen,V)
and therefore
V =
n⋃
i=1
{Vi} 
n⋃
i=1
GLBLabel(Fgen,V) = GenLabel(Fgen,V)
(iv) If V,V′ ⊆ U and V  V′ then GenLabel(Fgen,V)  GenLabel(Fgen,V′).
For each Vi ∈ V there exists V ′i ∈ V′ such that {Vi}  {V ′i } because F is decompos-
able. It follows that {Vi}  {V ′i }  GLBLabel(Fgen, {V ′i })  GenLabel(Fgen,V′) for
each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and therefore
GenLabel(Fgen,V)
=
n⋃
i=1
GLBLabel(Fgen, {Vi})

n⋃
i=1
GLBLabel(Fgen, {V ′i })
 GenLabel(Fgen,V′) 
Analogues of Theorems 3.3.3 and 3.3.6 hold for generating sets. Given a set F that
induces a precise labeler, a minimal generating set for F always exists, and is guaranteed
to be unique up to equivalence. Conversely, we can extend any set G to an F that induces
a precise labeler and for which G is a generating set. Fgen is generally much smaller than
either F or Fd, although of course it only exists under the two restrictions we outlined
above.
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Example 3.3.12. Continuing with Example 3.3.4, suppose U is decomposable under
the equivalent view ordering ; this is true for instance if we takeU to be the set of all
single-atom queries over Contacts. In this case, the set Fgen = {{V3}, {V6}, {V7}, {V8}} is
a generating set for a F that induces a precise labeler overU. The size of Fgen is now
only linear in the number of attributes of Contacts.
The takeaway is that if U is decomposable and we desire a precise labeler, it is easy
to label queries using a set of security views S. We can simply use the set {{S i} | S i ∈ S},
consisting of singleton sets containing each view in S, as our Fgen and run algorithm
GenLabel to perform a labeling.
3.4 Labeling Conjunctive Queries
We now use the theory and results from Sections 3.2 and 3.3 and show how to label a
particular class of queries. We focus on labeling conjunctive queries under set semantics.
Our disclosure order is based on equivalent view rewriting. We restrict our attention to
single-atom security views due to technical limitations that will be discussed in Section
3.4.2. Although not all of the security views that would be useful for real-world systems
can be modeled without joins, a large fraction can.
We write Uatom to denote the set of single-atom conjunctive views defined over a
given database schema, and Ucv to denote the set of all conjunctive views. Let  be the
equivalent view rewriting order, and assume we have a set of single-atom security views
S. We explain how to label arbitrary conjunctive queries with subsets of S.
The results of this section rely heavily on the observation that equivalent view
rewriting induces a disclosure order. We verify this fact before proceeding further.
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Proposition 3.4.1. Equivalent view rewriting induces a disclosure order.
Proof. We verify each of the disclosure order axioms in turn.
(i) If V ⊆ V′ then V  V′.
This is trivial, as each view in V can be rewritten using itself.
(ii) If V  V′ and V′  V′′ then V  V′′.
Let V ∈ V. Then there must be a rewriting R using V′ whose expansion R+ is
homomorphic to V . Similarly, each view V ′ ∈ V′ that is referenced by R must have
a rewriting R′ using V′′ whose expansion R′+ is homomorphic to V ′. By replacing
each body atom of R with the body of the corresponding R′ and performing an
appropriate substitution on distinguished variables, we obtain a rewriting of V
using V′′, so that {V}  V′′. Since this holds for all V ∈ V, it follows that
V =
⋃
V∈V
{V}  V′′
as desired.
(iii) If V  V′′ and V′  V′′ then V ∪ V′  V′′.
By hypothesis, each view in V can be rewritten using V′′, and each view in V′ can
also be rewritten using V′′. It follows that any view in V ∪ V′ can be rewritten
using V′′, and therefore V ∪ V′  V′′ as well. 
We find it useful to work with a modified representation of conjunctive queries
where we associate each query with a list of its body atoms and discard the head.
To keep track of which of the variables are distinguished and which are existential,
we tag them accordingly. For example, the query Q2 from Figure 3.1 is represented
as [M(xd, ye), C(ye,we, ’Intern’)], where the subscripts e and d denote existential and
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distinguished variables respectively and M and C abbreviate Meeting and Contact
respectively.
We present the process of labeling in two stages. First, we explain how sets of
single-atom queries may be labeled. We then extend the process to sets of multi-atom
queries.
3.4.1 Single-Atom Case
We will show in this section that Uatom is decomposable. Consequently, the discussion and
labeling algorithm from Section 3.3.2 apply directly. The set {{S i} | S i ∈ S}, composed
of singleton sets containing each of the security views, serves as a generating set for
the labeler. For a complete end-to-end labeling algorithm, we only need to define
implementations of the two subroutines introduced at the beginning of Section 3.3. The
first determines, given V,V′ ⊆ Uatom, whether V  V′. The second computes the GLB
function – that is, given V,V′ it finds a V′′ such that (⇓ V) u (⇓ V′) = (⇓ V′′).
Determining whether V  V′ can be done using standard techniques from the
literature on equivalent view rewriting, such as Compton’s algorithm [24]. When V is a
set of single-atom views, the following criterion is both necessary and sufficient.
Theorem 3.4.2 (Ordering Single-Atom Views). V  V′ precisely when, for each V ∈ V,
there exists V ′ ∈ V′ such that there is a homomorphism θ such that (a) θV ′ = V, (b) θ
maps existential variables to existential variable, (c) if x is an existential variable and
y , x then θy , θx, and (d) θ maps constants to themselves.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. Suppose V  V′. Then for every single-atom view V ∈ V there
exists a conjunctive rewriting R′ over the views in V′ whose expansion R′+ is equivalent
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to V , with homomorphisms θ : V → R′+ and θ′ : R′+ → V . Since V is a single-atom query
which is homomorphic to R′+, we may assume without loss of generality (by eliminating
redundant body atoms) that R′ is a single-atom query as well, and therefore there is a
single-atom view V ′ ∈ V′ such that {V}  {V ′}.
We now know that, by performing a substitution on the distinguished variables of V ′,
we can obtain a query R′+ that is homomorphic to V . Such a substitution cannot force an
equality constraint between an existential variable of R′+ and any other variable, so (b)
and (c) must hold. Every variable that is distinguished in R′ must also be distinguished in
R′+, so constraint (a) is also satisfied. And finally, a substitution on distinguished variables
cannot affect the constants of R′+, so that constraint (d) holds.
On the other hand, query obtained by performing a substitution on the distinguished
variable of R′+, and which therefore leaves the remaining variables unchanged, immedi-
ately satisfies conditions (a), (b), and (d). Condition (c) immediately follows from the fact
that substitution is defined in a manner that prevents capture of existential variables. 
Given single-atom views V and V ′, there is only one possible choice of θ that maps
the unique body atom of V ′ to that of V . To determine whether {V}  {V ′}, it suffices to
check whether θ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.4.2; this can be done linear time.
More generally, if V and V′ are sets of single-atom views then the preceding Theorem
tells us that V  V′ if and only for every V ∈ V there is some V ∈ V′ such that {V}  {V ′};
this check can be performed in O(|V| · |V′|) time.
We next turn our attention to the problem of computing Greatest Lower Bounds, or
GLBs. Our approach is based on a procedure GLBSingleton for computing the GLB of
two singleton sets of views {V} and {V ′}; this can be extended to multi-element sets of
views in a manner to be explained shortly.
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GLBSingleton is based on the idea of unification. It begins by computing a general-
ized Most General Unifier [12], or MGU, of the the bodies of V and V ′. This is computed
by a subroutine called GenMGU, which differs from a standard MGU computation in
three ways. First, if the algorithm attempts to unify a constant with an existential variable,
the unification fails. Second, if the algorithm attempts to unify an existential variable with
an existential or distinguished variable, the result is an existential variable. Third, if the
algorithm attempts to unify two distinguished variables, the result is another distinguished
variable. We explain these differences using some examples.
First, we show why the unification of a constant with an existential variable must fail.
Example 3.4.3. Consider the following Boolean views:
V13() :− M(9, ’Jim’) V14() :− M(x, y)
The first view tests whether Meeting contains a particular tuple and the second checks
whether it contains any tuples at all. The standard MGU of the body atoms is equal to the
first atom, but the actual GLB of the views should be ⊥. There is no single-atom query
that can be rewritten in terms of V13 and also in terms of V14. This is a consequence of
conditions (b) and (d) in Theorem 3.4.2.
Next, we illustrate the reasons for our handling of existential and distinguished
variables.
Example 3.4.4. Consider views V6 and V7 from Figure 3.4:
V6(x, y) :− C(x, y, z) V7(x, z) :− C(x, y, z)
In our new representation they become [C(xd, yd, ze)] and [C(xd, ye, zd)] respectively. Their
GenMGU is [C(xd, ye, ze)], i.e. V9 from Figure 3.4. This makes intuitive sense as V9, the
projection on the first attribute of Contact, accurately represents the overlap between
V6 and V7, i.e. the information that can be computed from either V6 or V7 in isolation.
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Once GenMGU is available, an extra check is needed to rule out some corner cases
as shown in the next example.
Example 3.4.5. Consider the following Boolean views:
V14() :− M(x, y) V15() :− M(z, z)
The GenMGU of the body atoms is [M(we,we)], but the GLB should be ⊥ by the same
reasoning as in example 3.4.3. This is a consequence of condition (c) of Theorem 3.4.2.
The check to eliminate such cases is conceptually straightforward. It involves finding
situations where computing GenMGU forces a new equality constraint on two values in
the same original atom, and where at least one of these values was an existential variable.
If we find such a situation or if GenMGU fails, GLBSingleton returns ⊥; otherwise it
returns the output of GenMGU.
We next verify the correctness of the process outlined above.
Theorem 3.4.6. VS = GLBSingleton(V,V ′) satisfies ⇓ {V} u ⇓ {V ′} = ⇓ {V ′′}.
Proof Sketch. GLBSingleton attempts to compute the Most General Unifier of V and
V ′. However, it prevents each existential variable in V from being unified with any other
variable or constant. This ensures that VS can be obtained by performing a substitution
on the distinguished variables in V , and therefore {VS }  {V}, so that ⇓ {VS }  ⇓ {V}.
An analogous argument shows that ⇓ {VS }  ⇓ {V ′}. It follows that
⇓ {VS }  ⇓ {V} u ⇓ {V ′}
For the other direction, suppose that {V ′′}  {V} and {V ′′}  {V ′} for some V ′′ ∈ Uatom.
Then there must be a substitution on the distinguished variables in V (resp. V ′) that yields
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an atom that is isomorphic to V ′′. In particular, if there is a constant or existential variable
at some position in the body of V (resp. V ′) then there must be a constant or existential
variable at the same position in V ′′. Similarly, if the terms at two different positions are
equal in V (resp. V ′) then the terms at the same positions in V ′′ must also be equal.
This means that VS and V ′′ are isomorphic on the existential variables and constants of
VS . The remaining variables in VS are all distinguished, so by performing a substitution
on the distinguished variables of VS , we can obtain a view that is isomorphic to V ′′, and
therefore {V ′′}  {VS }. It follows that
⇓ {V} u ⇓ {V ′}  ⇓ {VS }
and therefore the two must be equal, completing the proof. 
GLBSingleton can be extended to non-singleton sets for a complete implementa-
tion of GLB(V,V′). We simply compute the pairwise GLBSingleton of singleton sets
containing each pair of views V ∈ V,V ′ ∈ V′ and union all the results together. This
completes the description of GLB, giving us the last tool we need to label queries using
the techniques from Section 3.3.2.
Given V,V′ ⊆ Uatom, a set V′′ ⊆ Uatom such that (⇓ V) u (⇓ V′) = (⇓ V′′) can be
computed as follows:
1: procedure GLB(V,V′)
2: V′′ ← ∅
3: for each view V ∈ V do
4: for each view V ′ ∈ V′ do
5: if GLBSingleton(V,V ′) , ⊥ then
6: V′′ ← V′′ ∪ {GLBSingleton(V,V ′)}
7: end if
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8: end for
9: end for
10: return V′′
11: end procedure
In order to verify the correctness of this procedure, we must first show that Uatom is
decomposable, in the sense discussed above.
Proposition 3.4.7. Suppose that {V}  V ∪ V′, where V ∈ Uatom and V,V′ ⊆ Uatom. If
{V}  V ∪ V′ then either {V}  V or else {V}  V′.
Proof. Suppose {V}  V ∪ V′. Then there must be a rewriting R using the views in
V ∪ V′ that is homomorphic to V . Since V contains exactly one body atom, we may
assume WLOG (by folding R+ if needed) that the expansion R+ of R contains exactly one
body atom. If this body atom originates from V then {V}  V. On the other hand, if the
body atom originates from V′ then {V}  V′. 
We next verify the correctness of the GLB procedure shown above.
Theorem 3.4.8. GLB(V,V′) returns a set VS such that (⇓ V) u (⇓ V′) = (⇓ VS ).
Proof. VS is a set of views of the form GLBSingleton(V,V ′) where V ∈ V and V ′ ∈ V′.
For each pair of views we have
{GLBSingleton(V,V ′)}  {V}  V  ⇓ V
and {GLBSingleton(V,V ′)}  {V ′}  V′  ⇓ V′
so that
{GLBSingleton(V,V ′)}  (⇓ V) u (⇓ V′)
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Hence
⇓ VS ≡
⋃
V∈V,V′∈V′
⇓ {GLBSingleton(V,V ′)}  (⇓ V) u (⇓ V′)
In the other direction, suppose V′′  (⇓ V) u (⇓ V′), and let V ′′ ∈ V′′. Then
{V ′′}  (⇓ V), so there must be some V ∈ V such that {V ′′}  {V} because Uatom is
decomposable. Similarly, {V ′′}  (⇓ V′), so there must be some V ′ ∈ V′ such that
{V}  {V ′}. It follows that {V ′′}  {GLBSingleton(V,V ′)}  (⇓ VS ). Taking the union
over all V ′′ ∈ V′′, we conclude that
V′′ =
⋃
V′′∈V′′
{V ′′}  (⇓ VS )
and therefore VS is a greatest lower bound, as required. 
3.4.2 Multi-Atom Case
The set Ucv of arbitrary conjunctive queries is not in general decomposable; therefore, we
are unable to use the same techniques as above. However, because we have restricted the
set S to contain single-atom views only, we can perform labeling efficiently by solving
the problem in two steps. To label a set of queries Q ⊆ Ucv, we first convert each Q ∈ Q
into a set of single-atom queries using the Dissect algorithm described below. In the
second step, we compute the disclosure label of the resulting set of single-atom views
using the algorithm discussed in the previous subsection.
The Dissect algorithm begins by computing a folding [19] of Q, which intuitively
removes “redundant” atoms from Q. Next, it splits up the folding of Q into its constituent
atoms, except that any existential variable that appears in at least two atoms is promoted
to a distinguished variable.
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Example 3.4.9. Consider query Q2 from Figure 3.1, i.e. [M(xd, ye), C(ye,we, ’Intern’)].
The result of running Dissect on this query is a set that contains two single-atom queries:
[M(xd, yd), C(yd,we, ’Intern’)].
Intuitively, the reason we need to promote existential variables to distinguished ones
is that we are labeling with single-atom views. Recall that the set of single-atom views in
a query’s disclosure label must contain enough information to uniquely determine the
query’s answer. Any set of single atom security views that allows a join to be computed
must reveal the values of the join attributes.
We can show that Dissect is a disclosure labeler with domain ℘(Ucv) and image
℘(Uatom). As the composition of two labelers is also a labeler, we can create a disclosure
labeler for multi-atom conjunctive queries by combining Dissect with our single-atom
labeling procedure.
Proposition 3.4.10. Dissect is a disclosure labeler.
Proof. We verify each of the disclosure labeler axioms in turn:
(i) If V ⊆ Ucv then Dissect(V) ≡ V′ for some V′ ∈ Uatom.
The last step of Dissect ensures that the procedure always returns a set of single-
atom queries as its output.
(ii) If V ⊆ Uatom then Dissect(V) ≡ V.
For each view V ∈ V, the Dissect procedure folds V , promotes any existential
variable that appears in two distinct body atoms to a fresh distinguished variable,
and then generates a single-atom view for each body atom of V . If V ∈ Uatom then
each of these steps leaves V unchanged. This means that each element if V is
equivalent to an element of Dissect(V) and vice versa.
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(iii) If V ⊆ Ucv then V  Dissect(V).
For each view V ∈ V, folding V yields a view V ′ such that {V} ≡ {V ′}, and therefore
{V}  {V ′}. Promoting existential variables to distinguished variables yields a new
view V ′′, and by performing a substitution on the distinguished variables of V ′′,
we can obtain a view that is isomorphic to V ′. This means that {V ′}  {V ′′}. The
final step yields a set of single-atom views V′′′; by joining together all the views in
V′′′, we can obtain a view that is isomorphic to V ′′, and therefore
{V}  {V ′}  {V ′′}  V′′′  Dissect(V)
It follows that
V =
⋃
V∈V
{V}  Dissect(V)
as desired.
(iv) If V,V′ ⊆ Ucv and V  V′ then Dissect(V)  Dissect(V′).
Let V ∈ V, so that {V}  V′. By folding V we obtain a view V ′ such that {V} ≡ {V ′}.
Then {V ′}  {V}  V′, so there must be a rewriting R using V′ whose expansion R+
is homomorphic to V ′. Since V ′ is folded, any existential variable that appears in
two distinct atoms of V ′ must also appear in two distinct atoms of R+, and therefore
the corresponding variables in V′ are either distinguished or else appear in multiple
atoms of the corresponding view in V′; in the latter case, they will be promoted
to fresh distinguished variables. In either case, the updated V ′ can be answered
using the updated V′. This means that each atom in the body of the updated V ′ is
isomorphic to an atom of a view in the updated V′ (after performing an appropriate
substitution on distinguished variables), and therefore Dissect({V})  Dissect(W′).
It follows that
Dissect(V) =
⋃
V∈V
Dissect({V})  Dissect(V′)
as desired. 
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3.5 Implementation
At this point, we have introduced our new notion of a disclosure labeler that is data-
derived, semantically meaningful and expressive, and we have presented practical algo-
rithms for labeling conjunctive queries. In this section, we describe two key optimizations
that allow us to efficiently manage complex security policies for regulating the cumula-
tive disclosure of information over time. First, we store disclosure labels in a heavily
compressed format that makes comparisons between different disclosure labels very
fast. And second, we represent security policies in a way that allows us to make policy
decisions without ever needing to refer back to a list of previously executed queries.
3.5.1 Representing Disclosure Labels
We begin by revisiting the GLBLabel disclosure labeling algorithm from Section 3.3.1.
In its simplest form GLBLabel takes as input a set of security views Fgen and a singleton
set {V} whose disclosure label we wish to find, and returns the GLB of the following
collection of singleton sets:
{{Vi} : Vi ∈ Fgen and {V}  {Vi}}
In practice, however, computing the GLB is completely unnecessary. Instead, we compute
`+({V}) = {Vi ∈ Fgen : {V}  {Vi}}
Roughly speaking, this is the set of all security views that uniquely determine the answer
to V . If we know `+({V}), we can compute `({V}). Furthermore, we can now efficiently
compare the disclosure labels of two different points `({V} and `({V ′}) in the lattice of
disclosure labels:
`({V})  `({V ′}) if and only if `+({V}) ⊇ `+({V ′})
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We provide an example in order to solidify this idea:
Example 3.5.1. Continuing Example 3.3.12, let
Fgen = {{V3}, {V6}, {V7}, {V8}}
The disclosure label for {V9} is GLB({V3}, {V6}, {V7}), and consequently, `+({V9}) =
{V3,V6,V7}. Similarly, the disclosure label for {V12} is GLB({V3}, {V6}, {V7}, {V8}), so that
`+({V12}) = {V3,V6,V7,V8}. Examining these two sets, it is clear that `+({V12}) ⊇ `+({V9}),
and we therefore conclude that `(V12)  `(V9).
In practice, these subsets of Fgen can be represented as bit vectors; we use bit mask
operations to determine whether one subset contains another. Since {V1}  {V2} only if V1
and V2 are views over the same base relation, we can further optimize this representation.
In our current implementation, the low 32 bits of a 64-bit integer track which base relation
a view corresponds to, and the remaining 32 bits represent the elements of Fgen that are
associated with that relation. In this way, a single 64-bit integer can store a disclosure
label for a disclosure lattice with up to 232 distinct relations, each of which is associated
with 32 distinct elements from Fgen. There is nothing special about the number 32, and
the representation can easily be generalized to any number of bits.
We extend this representation to multi-atom disclosure labels by using arrays of
single-atom disclosure labels. For instance, in Example 3.5.1, the disclosure label of
{V6,V7} can be stored as a two-element array whose first element is `+({V6}) and whose
second element is `+({V7}).
Complexity Analysis: Let n denote the number of atoms in the input query, and
m denote the number of security views. The Dissect algorithm from Section 3.4.2
relies on query folding as a subroutine. Query folding is known to be NP-hard, and our
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current implementation uses a brute-force search that runs in time that is exponential in n.
Dissection yields a set of at most n single-atom views, and in the worst case, the labeler
must determine whether each of the n views returned by Dissect can be rewritten in terms
of each of the m security views, for a total of O(n · m) comparisons. Each comparison
can be performed in expected linear time relative to the total size of its two input atoms.
Once they have been computed, the disclosure labels of an r-atom query and an s-atom
query can be compared in time O(r · s).
3.5.2 Representing Security Policies
Formally, a security policy is defined in Section 3.2.4 as a subset of the elements in
a labeler’s disclosure lattice. However, as we have already noted, disclosure lattices
can become enormous even for small databases; storing security policies explicitly is
therefore impractical. In this section, we discuss a different representation of security
policies that drastically reduces space consumption. As an added bonus, we are able to
track and restrict cumulative disclosure with very little space or computational overhead.
We restrict our discussion to a system with a single principal; a generalization to multiple
principals is straightforward.
Let us first consider the simpler problem of enforcing a stateless security policy.
When a principal issues a query Q, a reference monitor decides whether to answer or
refuse the query based solely on the query’s disclosure label and on the security policy
itself. In this model, a security policy can be represented as a set V of disclosure labels
for single-atom views; a query is answered if its disclosure label is below V, and is
refused otherwise.
We now discuss a variant of this algorithm that limits cumulative information dis-
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closure over time. When a principal issues a query Qn, a reference monitor looks at
both Qn and the list of previously answered queries Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qn−1. In the case where
{Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qn}  V, the query is answered. Otherwise, the query is refused.
Crucially but perhaps counterintuitively, the two models described above are actually
equivalent for stateless policies. Formally, the first model ensures that {Qi}  V for
each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The second model ensures that {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qn}  V. Equivalence
follows immediately from the definition of a disclosure order (Definition 5.1.6).
What this means in practice is that even a stateless reference monitor can restrict
cumulative information disclosure. Unfortunately, this guarantee comes at a cost: it is no
longer possible to represent stateful security policies, such as the Chinese Wall policies
required by many business applications, with this model. In order to support such policies,
we represent a security policy as a collection of sets of single-atom disclosure labels, say
{V1,V2, . . . ,Vk}. We enforce the invariant that if Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qn are the queries that have
been answered so far then {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qn}  Vi must hold for some Vi. We refer to each
Vi as a partition of the security policy.
Example 3.5.2. Consider the security policy {V1,V2} in which V1 = {V1} and V2 =
{V3}. This policy encodes the constraint that a principal may access either Meeting or
Contact, but not both. If the principal Alice issues query V6, this query will be accepted,
since {V6}  V2. If she next issues the query V7, this query will also be accepted, since
{V6,V7}  V2. However, if she then issues the query V2, this query will be refused, since
{V6,V7,V2}  V1 and {V6,V7,V2}  V2.
A naı¨ve implementation of this scheme would require us to search through a prin-
cipal’s entire query history whenever we make a policy decision for a new query. For-
tunately, this is not necessary. In fact, we only need to keep track of which of the Vi
are consistent with all the queries answered so far; we can do so with a bit vector that
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Attribute FQL Permissions Graph API Permissions Correct La-
beling
pic (“picture” in
Graph API)
none any for pages with whitelist-
ing/targeting restrictions, oth-
erwise none
FQL
timezone any Available only for the current
user
Graph API
devices any any; only available for friends
of the current user
Graph API
relationship status any user relationships or
friends relationships
Graph API
quotes user likes or
friends likes
user about me or
friends about me
FQL
profile url (“link”
in Graph API)
any none FQL
In the table above, “any” means any nonempty set of permissions and “none” means no
permissions are required
Table 3.2: Inconsistencies between the FQL and Graph API permissions labeling
of User attributes.
contains one bit for each partition of the policy.
Example 3.5.3. In Example 3.5.2, the reference monitor’s bit vector is initially 〈1, 1〉,
which indicates that ∅  V1 and ∅  V2. After answering V6, the bit vector becomes
〈1, 0〉 because the {V6}  V1 but {V6}  V2. The bit vector is left unchanged after the
second query. If the third query was answered, the bit vector would become 〈0, 0〉 to
indicate that {V6,V7,V2} is not below either V1 or V2 in the lattice of disclosure labels.
However, the reference monitor will instead refuse the query and leave the bit vector as
〈1, 0〉.
3.6 Labeling in Practice
In this section, we showcase the practical applicability and usefulness of our labeling-
based disclosure control techniques. We begin by presenting results of a manual review
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of an existing labeling-based disclosure control system – the permissions structure
associated with Facebook’s Graph API and FQL. Next, we present experimental results
from an implementation of our labeling algorithms. We conclude by evaluating the
throughput of the policy checker described in Section 3.5.2.
3.6.1 Reviewing Facebook’s APIs
Facebook provides two APIs through which apps can query user data: the Graph API and
FQL. They also define a set of permissions such as user likes and friends likes,
each of which grants an app access to a particular view over the data. Before an app
can issue an API query, it must request access to a specific set of permissions. In our
terminology, a set of permissions corresponds to a disclosure label, and each Facebook
app is effectively a different principal.
Facebook’s developer documentation specifies the minimal set of permissions needed
to execute different API queries. In other words, it provides a hand-generated disclosure
label for each of these queries. We hypothesized that as the APIs grow larger and more
complex, manual labeling becomes error-prone. We identified 42 different views over
the User table accessible through both APIs and compared the respective permissions
as given in the documentation. That is, we identified pairs of corresponding queries in
both APIs where both queries selected a particular attribute of the User table. We then
compared the required permissions listed in the documentation for each pair of queries.
We found discrepancies in the permissions needed for six of the 42 views; details
are shown in Figure 3.2. This illustrates the difficulty of manually labeling queries.
Our findings are consistent with previous studies of human-generated query labels in a
different setting, namely Android apps [30].
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For each of the six Facebook views mentioned above, we issued appropriate queries in
both APIs to determine which permissions were really required. In all six cases, we found
that the same query in both APIs required the same permissions, as shown for each query
in the last column of Figure 3.2. Thus, the inconsistencies were in the documentation
only. Nonetheless, such errors are alarming. Tracking complex permission structures by
hand is challenging, and the chances that developers will select the wrong permissions
for their apps are compounded if they rely on inaccurate documentation.
3.6.2 Experimental evaluation
We implemented and evaluated two key systems: a disclosure labeler for multi-atom
queries, and a mechanism that makes policy decisions based on the labeler’s output.
The disclosure labeler, which emphasized scalability but not raw performance, was
implemented in Java, and was tested with the Java 1.7 VM. The policy mechanism
was implemented in C and compiled with GCC 4.2. All our tests were conducted on a
laptop with a 2.9GHz Intel Core i7 processor running Mac OS X 10.8. Our benchmarks
measured process rather than wall time.
Our test database contained eight different relations that captured core functionality
from the Facebook API. The largest of these was the User relation, which contained 34
distinct attributes. Each of the remaining relations contained between 3 and 10 attributes.4
For each relation, we selected a set of security views that could support the confiden-
tiality policies described in Facebook’s developer documentation. The most complex
relation, the User relation, required us to define a generating set Fgen with 16 distinct
4In preliminary tests on synthetic data, we tried increasing the total number of relations to 1,000 while
keeping the number of security views per relation constant; the total number of relations did not have any
appreciable impact on the hash-based disclosure labelers’ throughput.
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security views; most of the other relations we considered could be modeled using just
three views. The main difficulty that we encountered was that some of the permissions
that Facebook uses require a notion of joins. For instance, there is a permission that
allows a Facebook app to see the birthdays of all of a user’s Facebook friends. Formally,
this can be modeled using a join between the User relation and the Friend relation. The
implementation we used did not support security views with joins in them. We dealt with
this issue by adding an extra column to each relation that indicated whether the owner of
a given tuple was friends with the principal executing the query. Since the list of a user’s
friends is available to any app running on behalf of that user, this denormalization did
not affect the accuracy of our model.
After examining a number of sample Facebook applications, we decided to use a
workload of queries that were randomly generated with the following process:
(i) Select a random relation from the schema.
(ii) Select a random subset of its attributes.
(iii) Randomly request these attributes for either (i) the current user, (ii) friends of the
current user, (iii) friends of friends of the current user, or (iv) a non-friend.
In Step (3) above, we note that Option (ii) involved a join with the Friend relation,
and Option (iii) involved two joins with the Friend relation. Hence, each query contained
between one and three body atoms. In order to stress-test our algorithm, we extended
our workload to generate (unrealistically) complex queries; we did this by repeating the
process above between one and five times, and joining the resulting subqueries on the
uid (User ID) attribute, which appeared in all the relations we considered.
We used this workload to evaluate the performance of three different versions of our
disclosure labeling algorithm. The first version, which we used as a baseline, was a
straightforward adaptation of the LabelGen algorithm from Section 3.3.2. The second
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Figure 3.5: Disclosure labeler performance.
version used a hashtable to partition views based on the relation they referenced. The
third version made use of both hashtable partitioning and the bit vector optimization from
Section 3.5.1. In a fourth experiment, we considered only the time needed to randomly
generate parsed queries but not to label them.
Results are shown in Figure 3.5. The labeler that only incorporated hashing generally
outperformed the baseline by a small margin. The labeler that additionally made use of
the bit vector optimization consistently outperformed both of them by a factor of 3x to
4x – it was able to process a million queries, each with between 1 and 3 body atoms, in
slightly more than 2 seconds.
We hypothesized that the optimizations from Section 3.5 would make it possible
to reason about complex security policies very efficiently once the disclosure label for
a query was known. To verify this hypothesis, we wrote a simple policy checker that
maintained information about the security policies of between 1,000 and 1,000,000
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distinct principals. Each principal’s security policy was randomly generated. The
maximum number of partitions per policy was set to either 1 (a stateless security policy)
or 5 (a fairly complex Chinese Wall policy). However, the actual number of partitions per
policy could vary between principals, reflecting the intuition that some principals would
require more complex policies than others. Similarly, we allowed the maximum number
of elements (i.e., single-atom views) per partition to vary between 5 and 50. Intuitively,
we should expect the number of security views to increase as users define fine-grained
policies to control how their data is shared.
We ran our experiment on a collection of 10 million disclosure labels output by the
previous experiment. Each labeled query contained between one and three body atoms.
Queries were randomly assigned to principals, and the appropriate policy was enforced
for each principal.
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The results are shown in Figure 3.6. For relatively simple policies, the analysis time
for a million queries was between 0.04 and 0.15 seconds, depending on the number
of principals in the system. Throughput decreased very gradually as the number of
principals in the system increased. This decrease was likely due to issues with cache
locality: as the number of principals grew larger, it became increasingly improbable that
the metadata for a randomly selected principal would reside in an on-chip cache. For a
million principals, our system was able to analyze a million disclosure labels in about
0.57 seconds on the most complex policies we tested.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCLOSURE LABELING ON MULTIPLICITY-SENSITIVE QUERIES
In Chapter 3 we proposed a theory of disclosure labeling that provided a formal founda-
tion for reasoning about the information needed to answer a database query. The basic
idea was to measure the information needed to answer a given query in terms of a set of
security views that were defined by a human administrator and revealed known types of
information about the dataset.
In this Chapter we generalize the results of Chapter 3 to a language that supports
bag, bag-set, and set semantics. The difference between the three can be summarized as
follows: bag semantics preserve duplicate elements in both a query’s input and its output,
while set semantics ignore duplicates in a query’s input and eliminate duplicates from a
query’s output. Bag-set semantics preserve duplicate elements in a query’s output but
eliminate duplicates from input relations as an initial preprocessing step.
For example, consider the query
Q(n) :− User(u, n)
Under the set semantics used in Chapter 4, any name can appear at most once in the
query’s answer, no matter how many times it appears in the input database. These
semantics can be achieved in SQL using the DISTINCT keyword as follows:
SELECT DISTINCT name FROM User
The input database might contain ten different users named “John Doe,” but the tuple
(’John Doe’) will appear only once in the answer to Q when evaluated under set
semantics. However, it will appear ten times if Q is instead evaluated under bag semantics
Evaluation of Q under bag semantics corresponds to the SQL query
SELECT name FROM User
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User Friend
UID Name
1 Babbage, Charles
2 Church, Alonzo
3 Lovelace, Ada
4 Turing, Alan
UID1 UID2
1 3
3 1
2 4
4 2
Figure 4.1: Sample dataset based on the Facebook Apps schema.
Finally, queries evaluated under bag-set semantics retain duplicate tuples in the query an-
swer but not in the input database. If Q is evaluated under bag-set semantics on a database
that contains two copies of the tuple (1, ’John Doe’) then the tuple (’John Doe’) will
once in the query’s answer. However, if Q is evaluated on a database that contains the
tuples (1, ’John Doe’) and (2, ’John Doe’) then (’John Doe’) will appear twice in
the query’s answer. Evaluation of Q under bag-set semantics corresponds to the following
SQL query:
SELECT name FROM User GROUP BY uid, name
Finally, there are SQL queries such as
SELECT name FROM User WHERE uid IN
(SELECT uid2 FROM Friend WHERE uid1 = 4)
that use a mix of bag, bag-set, and set semantics. The outer query in the example above is
evaluated under bag semantics, while the inner subquery is evaluated under set semantics.
The remainder of the Chapter is laid out as follows. In Section 4.1 we define a
language that generalizes conjunctive queries under set, bag-set, and bag semantics. In
Section 4.2 we show how to check for equivalent rewritings of queries using views in this
language. Finally, in Section 4.3 we show how to compute disclosure labels for queries
in this new language.
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4.1 Core Query Language: Definition and Formal Semantics
We begin by defining a query language that generalizes conjunctive queries under set,
bag-set, and bag semantics. The language is similar to one proposed by Cohen [23],
but with three key changes. First, we tweak Cohen’s definition in order to ensure that
conjunctive queries map datasets to datasets; this allows us to use the output of one
query as the input to another. Second, we restrict Cohen’s language to ensure that the
composition of two conjunctive queries can itself be expressed as a conjunctive query in
the same language. Third, we model the distinction between bag-set and bag semantics
using a slightly different formalism than Cohen. This allows us to capture certain nuances
of query equivalence that Cohen’s formalism does not. For instance, the query
SELECT U1.name FROM User U1
returns the same answer as the query
SELECT U1.name FROM User U1
WHERE U1.uid IN (SELECT U2.uid FROM User U2)
on every dataset. Intuitively, the reason is that every tuple that appears in U1 also appears
in U2, so the WHERE clause of the second SQL query is always satisfied. Our formalism
makes it possible to prove this equivalence; Cohen’s does not.1 Taken together, these
changes provide us with a language that captures many crucial nuances of real SQL
queries but also retains the properties that make efficient disclosure labeling possible
under set semantics.
1Formally, the issue is that Cohen’s formalism would model U1 as a copy atom and U2 as a relational
atom. Query homomorphisms in Cohen’s model, which are used to characterize equivalence, cannot map
relational atoms to copy atoms.
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4.1.1 Datasets and Queries
We use x, y, z and i, j, k to denote variables. The former range over constants in the
dataset, whereas the latter range over copy numbers. For this reason, we call the former
regular variables (or simply variables for short) and we call the latter copy variables.
We use c, d to denote constants. A term, denoted as s, t, is either a variable or a constant.
A relational atom has the form A(s1, . . . , sn), where A is a predicate of arity n. A dataset
D is a multiset containing atoms of the form A(c1, . . . , cn) where A is a predicate of arity
n and each ci is a constant.
We add an extra copy variable i to each atom in a query’s body; this variable allows us
to keep track of duplicate tuples in the input dataset. The resulting atoms are referred to
as copy atoms. Formally, a copy atom has the form A(s1, . . . , sn; i) where A is a predicate
of arity n. We will use the notations A(s) and A(s; i) to denote relational and copy atoms
respectively, where s standards for a sequence of terms s1, . . . , sn.
Definition 4.1.1. A query is a non-recursive expression of the form
Q(t) :− A1(t1; i1) ∧ . . . ∧ An(tn; in),M
where each Ak(tk; ik) is a copy atom, M is a set of variables, and the following hold:
• Every variable in t appears as an ordinary variable in some tk.
• Every element of M appears in some tk and does not appear in t.
• All the copy variables are distinct, and no copy variable appears in t or in any tk.
We refer to variables that appear in the head of a query as distinguished variables, and
call variables that only appear in the query body non-distinguished variables. Non-
distinguished variables can be divided into multiset variables that appear in M and
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set variables that do not. A query which contains only multiset and distinguished
variables will be evaluated under bag semantics, while a query that contains only set
and distinguished variables will be evaluated under set semantics. A query whose non-
copy variables are multiset variables and whose copy variables are set variables will be
evaluated under bag-set semantics. Many real queries combine elements of both bag and
set semantics. In our running example, the query
SELECT name FROM User
would be expressed as
Q1(n) :− User(u, n; i), {u, i}
whereas the query
SELECT DISTINCT name FROM User
would be expressed as
Q2(n) :− User(u, n; i), ∅
The variables u and i are multiset variables in the former (and therefore retain duplicates)
and are set variables in the latter (and therefore ignore duplicates). The SQL query
SELECT U1.name FROM User U1
WHERE U1.uid IN (SELECT U2.uid FROM User U2)
would be translated as
Q3(n1) :− User(u, n1; i1) ∧ User(u, n2; i2), {u, n1, i1}
Notice that all the existential variables that appear in the query’s first body atom are
multiset variables; this ensures that duplicate tuples from the first atom will be retained.
On the other hand, the remaining existential variables are all set variables; this ensures
that duplicate entries in the second atom will be ignored.
Evaluation semantics are based on satisfying assignments, which we define next.
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UID Name
1 John Doe
1 John Doe
2 Jane Roe
(a) Sample User table
with duplicate tuples.
UID Name Copy
1 John Doe 1
1 John Doe 2
2 Jane Roe 1
(b) Table that distinguishes between
duplicate tuples using copy variables.
Figure 4.2: Effect of copy variables on query evaluation.
Definition 4.1.2. Let γ be a mapping of the terms in a query Q to constants. We say that
γ is a satisfying assignment of Q with respect to the datasetD if the following hold:
(i) γ is the identity mapping on constants.
(ii) For each body atom A(t; i) in Q, γi ∈ N+ andD contains at least γi copies of A(γt).
The copy variables allow us to distinguish between duplicate tuples in a table. In-
tuitively, condition (ii) means that if D contains N > 0 copies of the atom A(γt) then
γi can be mapped to any of the integers 1, 2, . . . ,N. Query evaluation behaves as if a
table containing duplicate tuples, as in Figure 4.2 (a) is transformed into a table without
duplicates, as in Figure 4.2 (b) as a preprocessing step.
Let Γ(Q,D) denote the set of satisfying assignments of Q with respect toD, and let
γ be an assignment of the multiset and distinguished variables in Q, denoted M(Q), to
constants. We say that γ is satisfiably extendable if there is an assignment γ′ ∈ Γ(Q,D)
such that γ and γ′ coincide on all terms for which γ is defined. We write ΓM(Q,D) to
denote the set of satisfiably extendable assignments of M(Q) with respect toD.
For the query Q1 defined above and the User table in Figure 4.2 (a), there are three
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satisfying assignments in Γ(Q1,D):
{u 7→ 1, n 7→ ’John Doe’, i 7→ 1}
{u 7→ 1, n 7→ ’John Doe’, i 7→ 2}
{u 7→ 2, n 7→ ’Jane Roe’, i 7→ 1}
The satisfying assignments in Γ(Q2,D) are the same as those in Γ(Q1,D). However, the
satisfiably extendable assignments in ΓM(Q1,D) are
{u 7→ 1, n 7→ ’John Doe’, i 7→ 1}
{u 7→ 1, n 7→ ’John Doe’, i 7→ 2}
{u 7→ 2, n 7→ ’Jane Roe’, i 7→ 1}
whereas the satisfiably extendable assignments in ΓM(Q2,D) are
{n 7→ ’John Doe’}
{n 7→ ’Jane Roe’}
The difference stems from the fact that u and i are multiset variables in Q1 but are set
variables in Q2.
We now define evaluation semantics for our query language. Our semantics are based
on the ones proposed by Cohen. [23]
Definition 4.1.3 (Combined semantics). Let Q be a query with head Q(t), and letD be
a dataset. The result of applying Q toD under combined semantics, is defined as
Res(Q,D) = {{ Q(γt) | γ ∈ ΓM(Q,D) }}
We can generalize this to a set of queries Q as follows:
Res(Q,D) =
⊎
Q∈Q
Res(Q,D)
where
⊎
is used to denote multiset union.
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In our running example Res(Q1,D) is the dataset
{{ Q1(’John Doe’),Q1(’John Doe’),Q1(’Jane Roe’) }}
whereas Res(Q2,D) is the dataset
{{ Q1(’John Doe’),Q1(’Jane Roe’) }}
In general, Res(Q,D) will contain exactly one tuple for each element of ΓM(Q,D).
4.1.2 Equivalence, Homomorphisms and Foldings
Under what circumstances can we infer that two queries return the same answer on every
possible dataset? We provide a criterion based on query homomorphisms [19, 23].
Definition 4.1.4 (Multiset-homomorphism). Let Q(t) :− R,M and Q′(t′) :− R′,M′ be
queries, and let ϕ be a mapping from terms of Q to terms of Q′. We apply ϕ to atoms in
the obvious way, i.e., ϕ(A(t; i)) = A(ϕt;ϕi) for each atom A(t; i) in R. We say that ϕ is a
multiset-homomorphism from Q to Q′ if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) ϕt = t′.
(ii) ϕ is the identity mapping on constants.
(iii) ϕR ⊆ R′.
(iv) ϕM ⊆ M′ and ϕy , ϕy′ for every two distinct variables y, y′ ∈ M.
If Q and Q′ only have set and distinguished variables (but not multiset variables) then
the existence of a homomorphism ϕ : Q→ Q′ implies that Res(Q,D) ⊇ Res(Q′,D) on
any datasetD. In other words, if Res(Q′,D) contains n copies of a tuple t then Res(Q,D)
must contain at least n copies. This well-known result is due to Chandra and Merlin.
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[19] In general, the criterion is not guaranteed to hold for other types of queries. [21]
However, it does hold if ϕ is bijective on multiset variables. The proof of the following
Theorem is identical to that of Cohen’s Theorem 3.4. [23]
Theorem 4.1.5. Let ϕ : Q→ Q′ be a homomorphism that is a bijection from the multiset
variables of Q onto those of Q′. Then Res(Q,D) ⊇ Res(Q′,D) on any datasetD.
Two queries are said to be multiset-homomorphic, or homomorphic for short,
denoted as Q ≡ Q′, if and only if there are multiset-homomorphisms from Q to Q′ and
from Q′ to Q. Queries that are homomorphic return the same answer on every dataset.
Corollary 4.1.6. If Q ≡ Q′ then Res(Q,D) = Res(Q′,D) on every datasetD.
Proof. Let ϕ : Q→ Q′ and ϕ′ : Q′ → Q be homomorphisms. Since ϕ and ϕ′ are injective
on multiset variables, Q and Q′ must have the same number of multiset variables, and
therefore ϕ is a bijection on multiset variables. The previous Theorem implies that
Res(Q,D) ⊇ Res(Q′,D). An analogous argument in the other direction shows that
Res(Q,D) ⊆ Res(Q′,D), and therefore Res(Q,D) = Res(Q′,D). 
It is easy to verify that ≡ is an equivalence relation, so that the following hold:
(i) Reflexivity: Q ≡ Q.
(ii) Symmetry: If Q ≡ Q′ then Q′ ≡ Q.
(iii) Transitivity: If Q ≡ Q′ and Q′ ≡ Q′′ then Q ≡ Q′′.
We now demonstrate an application of these results. Earlier we argued intuitively that
SELECT U1.name FROM User U1
returns the same answer as the query
88
SELECT U1.name FROM User U1
WHERE U1.uid IN (SELECT U2.uid FROM User U2)
on every possible dataset. We can prove that the corresponding conjunctive queries
Q1(n) :− User(u, n; i1), {u, i1}
and Q4(n1) :− User(u, n1; i1) ∧ User(u, n2; i2), {u, i1}
return the same answer on every dataset. Define ϕ : Q1 → Q4 and ϕ′ : Q4 → Q1 by
ϕ = {u 7→ u, n 7→ n1, i1 7→ i1}
ϕ′ = {u 7→ u, n1 7→ n, i1 7→ i1.n2 7→ n, i2 7→ i1}
It is straightforward to verify that ϕ and ϕ′ are homomorphisms, and therefore equivalence
follows from Corollary 4.1.6.
We now consider the complexity of checking whether Q and Q′ are homomorphic.
In general, the problem is NP-hard in the number of body atoms of Q and Q′. However,
since real queries typically do not have many body atoms, the check can generally be
performed quite fast in practice.
Proposition 4.1.7. Given Q and Q′, the problem of determining whether Q ≡ Q′ is
NP-complete w.r.t. the number of body atoms in Q and Q′.
Proof. Given a homomorphism ϕ : Q→ Q′ (or ϕ′ : Q′ → Q), we can check whether ϕ
satisfies the properties from Definition 4.1.4 in polynomial time. Hence, the problem
is in NP. Theorem 11 of Chandra and Merlin [19] tells us that the problem is NP-hard
for conjunctive queries under set semantics. Since our language generalizes conjunctive
queries under set semantics, it must be at least NP-hard for queries in our language. 
A special case occurs when there is a homomorphism ϕ from Q to Q′ whose inverse
is also a homomorphism. In this case, we say that Q and Q′ are isomorphic.
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Definition 4.1.8. Queries Q and Q′ are isomorphic if there exists a bijective map ϕ from
the terms in Q to the terms in Q′ such ϕ and ϕ−1 are both homomorphisms.
Our definition of query homomorphisms implies that isomorphic queries are identical
up to reordering of body atoms and renaming of variables. Furthermore, if ϕ is an iso-
morphism then ϕ and ϕ−1 are homomorphisms, and therefore queries that are isomorphic
are homomorphic as well.
We next define foldings for queries in our language; our results generalize classical
results for conjunctive queries under set semantics. [19] Recall the queries
Q1(n) :− User(u, n; i1), {u, i1}
and Q4(n1) :− User(u, n1; i1) ∧ User(u, n2; i2), {u, i1}
from our running example. The two queries are homomorphic (and therefore return the
same answer on every dataset), but Q1 contains strictly fewer body atoms then Q4. In
this case, Q1 is said to be a folding of Q4.
Definition 4.1.9. Let Q,Q′ be conjunctive queries that have the same head variables.
Q′ is a folding of Q if (i) Q′ contains a subset of the body atoms of Q, and (ii) Q ≡ Q′.
Given a query Q, it is always possible to find a minimal folding of Q, i.e., a folding
with a minimal number of body atoms. For example, Q1 is a minimal folding of Q4. The
next Theorem shows that the minimal folding is always unique up to isomorphism.
Theorem 4.1.10. Let Q ≡ Q′. Let QF be a minimal folding of Q, and let Q′F be a minimal
folding of Q′. Then QF is isomorphic to Q′F .
Proof. Since ≡ is transitive, QF ≡ Q ≡ Q′ ≡ Q′F . Hence, there exist query homomor-
phisms ϕ : QF → Q′F and ϕ′ : Q′F → QF . This means that ϕ′ ◦ ϕ maps every body atom
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of QF to a body atom of QF . We claim that ϕ′ ◦ ϕ is a bijection on the atoms of QF
atoms (and therefore on the terms of QF as well). Suppose not. Then QF is homomorphic
to (ϕ′ ◦ ϕ)(QF), which has the same head as QF but strictly fewer body atoms. This
contradicts our assumption that QF is minimal.
Since (ϕ′ ◦ ϕ) is bijective, it induces a permutation of the terms of QF . Hence, there
must be some n ≥ 1 such that (ϕ′ ◦ ϕ)n(QF) = QF . This means that ϕ is a bijection from
the atoms (resp. terms) of QF to those of Q′F , with inverse ϕ
−1 = (ϕ′ ◦ ϕ)n−1 ◦ ϕ′. The
conditions of Definition 4.1.4 ensure that ϕ maps the head of QF to that of Q′F , and maps
each constant in QF to a constant in Q′F . It maps constants to themselves, which means it
must define a bijection between variables in QF and Q′F . Furthermore, it maps multiset
variables to multiset variables, which means that it also maps set variables to set variables.
It follows that ϕ is an isomorphism, completing the proof. 
A proof and accompanying algorithm developed by Gottlob and Fermu¨ller [32] can
be adapted to show that finding a minimal folding of a query Q is co-NP-complete w.r.t.
the number of body atoms in Q. Fortunately, few real queries have more than a handful
of body atoms, and so this can usually be done quickly in practice.
4.1.3 Equality Predicates
It is reasonable to ask whether the expressive power of our query language could be
increased by adding built-in support for equality predicates of the form (x = y). It
turns out that such predicates are redundant: variable unification serves exactly the same
purpose as equality predicates do. Consider a query that checks for users who are friends
with themselves.
Q5(u1) :− Friend(u1, u2; i) ∧ (u1 = u2), ∅
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This query can be written without equality predicates as follows:
Q6(u) :− Friend(u, u), ∅
For this reason we can accept database queries containing explicit equality predicates but
will remove such predicates before applying the algorithms discussed elsewhere in this
Chapter (such as searching for homomorphisms between queries).
Formally, we can model equality predicates by adding to the database schema a binary
relation R= whose contents consist of the multiset {{ (c, c) | c is a constant }}. We refer to
an atom over R= as an equality atom. If we wish to be pedantic, the query Q5 defined
above should be written as follows:
Q5(u1) :− Friend(u1, u2; i1) ∧ R=(u1, u2; i2), ∅
However, we will frequently abuse notation by abbreviating R=(u1, u2; i2) as (u1 = u2).
We begin by grouping the terms in Q into equivalence classes. If the atom R=(e1, e2; i)
appears as a body atom in Q then e1 and e2 are in the same equivalence class. In the query
Q5, the variables u1 and u2 belong to the same equivalence class. Equivalence classes are
closed under transitivity, and that every variable in Q appears in exactly one equivalence
class. If there is an equivalence class that contains two distinct constants then we say that
Q is unsatisfiable; otherwise, we say Q is satisfiable. For example, the query
Q7() :− Friend(u1, u2; i1) ∧ (u1 = 3) ∧ (u1 = 4)
is unsatisfiable because the constants 3 and 4 appear in the same equivalence class. This
makes sense: u1 cannot be equal to both 3 and 4 at the same time.
Proposition 4.1.11. If Q is not satisfiable then Res(Q,D) = ∅ for every datasetD.
Proof. We will show the contrapositive: if Res(Q,D) is nonempty for some dataset
D then Q is satisfiable. It suffices to show that if Res(Q,D) is nonempty and c and
92
procedure RemoveEquality(Q)
if Q does not have any equality atoms then
return Q
else
Let Q′ be a copy of Q
Let R=(e1, e2; i) be an equality atom in Q′
Remove R=(e1, e2; i) from the body of Q′
e3 ← GetUnifier(e1, e2)
Replace all occurrences of e1 and e2 in Q′ with e3
return Q′
end if
end procedure
procedure GetUnifier(e1, e2)
if e1 or e2 is a constant c then
return c
else if e1 or e2 is distinguished then
return a fresh distinguished variable
else if e1 or e2 is multiset-existential then
return a fresh multiset-existential variable
else
return a fresh set-existential variable
end if
end procedure
Figure 4.3: Removing equality predicates through variable unification.
c′ are constants in the same equivalence class then c = c′. Since c and c′ are in the
same equivalence class, there must be terms e1, . . . , en such that Q contains the body
atoms R=(e1, e2), . . . ,R=(en−1, en) and c = ei, c′ = e j for some i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. This
means that R=(e1, e2), . . . ,R=(en−1, en) are all satisfied, and therefore e1 = e2 = . . . = en;
it follows that c = c′. 
For the remaining cases, we rely on the RemoveEquality procedure in Figure 4.3.
Each time RemoveEquality is called, it will either leave Q unchanged (if Q does not
contain any equality atoms) or will generate a new query Q′ with one less equality atom
than Q. We can therefore apply RemoveEquality repeatedly until we are left with a query
93
that has no equality atoms. It remains to show that the resulting query is homomorphic to
Q. Correctness if this procedure is based on the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.1.12. Let Q be a satisfiable query, and let Q′ = RemoveEquality(Q).
Then Res(Q,D) = Res(Q′,D) for every datasetD.
Proof. When Q does not contain any equality atoms, Q′ = Q, and the result follows
immediately. Otherwise, fix a datasetD and an element tc in the codomain of Res(Q,D).
It suffices to show that tc has the same multiplicity in Res(Q′,D). We will provide a
bijection between elements γ ∈ ΓM(Q,D) which satisfy γ(t) = tc and elements γ′ ∈
ΓM(Q′,D) which satisfy γ′(t) = tc.
Suppose we are given γ ∈ Γ(Q,D); we must construct suitable γ′ ∈ Γ(Q′,D). Let
R=(e1, e2; i) be the unique atom of Q that does not appear in Q′. On terms in Q other
than e1, e2, and i, we set γ′(t) = γ(t). We extend γ′ by setting γ′(e3) = γ(e1), so that
γ′(e3) = γ(e2) as well. Let A be a body atom of Q, and let A′ be the corresponding body
atom of Q′. Then γ′(A′) = γ(A) by construction, and therefore γ′ ∈ Γ(Q′,D).
For the other direction, let γ′ ∈ Γ(Q′,D). Then we can construct a corresponding
γ ∈ Γ(Q,D). We let γ coincide γ′ on all terms other than e3. We then extend γ by setting
γ(e1) = γ(e2) = γ′(e3) and i = 1. (The fact that Q is satisfiable ensures that constants in γ
and γ′ are mapped to themselves.)
The argument above gives us a bijection between γ ∈ Γ(Q,D) and γ′ ∈ Γ(Q′,D).
We claim that its restriction to distinguished and multiset-existential variables gives us
a bijection between γM ∈ Γ(Q,D) and γ′M ∈ ΓM(Q′,D). By the previous argument,
γM ∈ ΓM(Q,D) is satisfiably extendable with γM(t) = tc if and only if γ′M ∈ ΓM(Q′,D) is
satisfiably extendable with γ′M(t) = tc. We must now consider several cases. (Some cases
are omitted because they are redundant; these cases can be handled by swapping t1 and t2
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in the argument below.)
• If neither t1 nor t2 is multiset-existential then γ′M = γM, and we’re done.
• If t1 is multiset-existential and t2 is set-existential then our bijection sets γ′M(t3) =
γM(t1), and keeps the remaining multiset and distinguished variables the same.
• If t1 is multiset-existential and t2 is distinguished or constant then t3 is distinguished
or constant as well. In this case, for any assignment γ defined on the distinguished
variables other than t1 there is exactly one possible assignment of γ(t1) that is satisfiably
extendable and which satisfies γ(t) = tc.
• If t1 and t2 are both multiset-existential then we reuse the previous bijection, which took
assignments γ such that γ(t1) = γ(t2) to assignments γ′ such that γ′(t3) = γ(t1). 
4.2 Query Rewritings
Under what circumstances can we say that a set of views V = {V1,V2, . . . ,Vn} reveals
as much information as a query Q? Formally, we would like to ensure that there is a
deterministic function f that computes the answer to Q from the answers to the views
in V on every dataset D. In this case, it is safe to say that the views in V represent an
upper bound on the information disclosed by Q: any information that could be learned
by looking at the answer to Q could also be learned by looking at the views in V.
Unfortunately, it is not known whether the problem of checking whether an appropri-
ate f exists is tractable in general; in fact, we don’t even know whether it is decidable in
a setting that is closely related to the one considered here. [41] We impose two practical
restrictions in order to ensure tractability. First, rather than allowing f to range over
arbitrary functions we restrict our attention to functions f that can be expressed as con-
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junctive queries under combined semantics. And second, rather than checking whether f
and Q return the same answer on every possible dataset we perform a conservative check
based on the existence of certain query homomorphisms. Under these restrictions, f is
referred to as a homomorphic rewriting of Q using V; the existence of such a rewriting is
sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure determinacy.
4.2.1 Rewritings and Expansions
Informally, a rewriting Q is a conjunctive query whose predicates are views in V rather
than base relations. The result of Q on a datasetD, denoted Res(Q,D), is obtained by (i)
evaluating views in V onD to obtain a new datasetD′ and then (ii) evaluating Q on this
new datasetD′. This is formalized as follows.
Definition 4.2.1 (Evaluation of rewritings). Let Q be a rewriting using V. Then
Res(Q,D) = Res(Q,D′) whereD′ = Res(V,D).
For example, consider the views
V8(u, n) :− User(u, n; i1) ∧ Friend(4, u; i2), {i1}
V9(u1, u2) :− Friend(u1, u2; i), {u1, u2, i}
The first view lists the UIDs and names of User 4’s friends, while the second lists all the
friendships in the dataset. What follows is a rewriting using {V8,V9}:
Q10(n, u2) :− V8(u1, n; i1) ∧ V9(u1, u2; i2), {u1, i1, i2}
Suppose we wish to evaluate Q10 on the dataset from Figure 4.1. We first evaluate
V = {V8,V9} on this dataset to obtain a new dataset:
D′ = {{ V8(2, ’Church, Alonzo’),V9(1, 3),V9(3, 1),V9(2, 4),V9(4, 2) }}
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We then evaluate Q10 onD′ to obtain the final answer:
Res(Q10,D′) = {{ Q10(’Church, Alonzo’, 4) }}
An important property of our query language is that rewritings are closed under com-
position in the following sense: Suppose Q is a rewriting using V. We can efficiently
compute a conjunctive query Q+ defined directly overD such that Q and Q+ return the
same answer on every dataset; we refer to Q+ as the expansion of Q. The expansion is
computed as follows:
Definition 4.2.2 (Query Expansion). Let
Q(t) :− A1(t1; i1) ∧ . . . ∧ Am(tm; im),M
be a rewriting using V = {V1,V2, . . . ,Vn}. We define Q+(t) to be the query obtained by
replacing each Ak(tk; ik) with the body of the corresponding query Vk ∈ V. We replace
each variable in the head of Vk with the corresponding variable in tk, and rename the
remaining variables of Vk as needed to avoid capture. M′ contains the regular multiset
variables in M. It also contains the multiset variables of every body atom Ak(tk; ik) such
that ik ∈ M.
In our running example, Q10 has the following expansion:
Q10+(n, u2) :− User(u1, n; i1) ∧ Friend(4, u1; i2) ∧ Friend(u1, u2; i3), {u1, i1, i3}
The first two body atoms of Q10+ come from V8, while the third comes from V9. We next
verify the correctness of the expansion process described above. Formally, we must show
that Q yields the same answer as Q+ on every datasetD.
Theorem 4.2.3. Res(Q,D) = Res(Q+,D) for every datasetD.
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Proof. Fix a datasetD. We will provide a bijection between elements of γ ∈ ΓM(Q,D)
which satisfy γ(t) = tc and elements of γ+ ∈ ΓM(Q+,D) which satisfy γ′(t) = tc. The key
insight is that for each atom Vk(tk; ik) we can fix a bijection βk(γk) between assignments
γk of the multiset variables in the view Vk and assignments of the copy variable ik.
Choose any γ+ ∈ ΓM(Q+,D) that is satisfiably extendable to γ′+ ∈ Γ(Q+,D). We will
construct a corresponding assignment γ′ ∈ Γ(Q,D). First, let γ′ coincide with γ′+ on
all the ordinary variables of Q. For the remaining variables of Q (which are all copy
variables) let γ′(ik) = βk(γ′k), where γ
′
k is the restriction of γ
′
+ to multiset variables in Vk.
Now γ′ is defined on all the variables in Q. Furthermore, γ′ ∈ Res(Q,D) because
of the way we defined Q+. Moreover, γ′(t) = tc because γ′ and γ′+ coincide on all the
ordinary variables of Q, including those in t. Define γ to be the restriction of γ′ to multiset
variables of Q, and notice that γ+ is the restriction of γ′+ to multiset variables of Q+. This
gives us a correspondence between elements of γ ∈ ΓM(Q,D) which satisfy γ(t) = tc and
elements of γ+ ∈ ΓM(Q+,D) which satisfy γ+(t) = tc. In fact, the correspondence is a
bijection. The reason is that γ and γ+ coincide on all multiset variables common to Q
and Q+, and the cross product β1 × . . . × βm induces a bijection between the remaining
multiset variables of Q and Q+ respectively. 
We now provide a criterion for checking whether the answers to a set of views
determine the answer to a given query. As discussed above, our criterion is a conservative
approximation to view determinacy. It generalizes a well-known criterion for conjunctive
queries under set semantics; for details, we refer the interested reader to the survey of
Levy et al. [38]
Definition 4.2.4 (Homomorphic rewriting). Let Q be a query and let V be a set of views.
We say a query Q′ is a homomorphic rewriting of Q using V if (i) Q′ is a rewriting using
V, and (ii) Q′+ is homomorphic to Q.
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If Q′ is a homomorphic rewriting of Q using V then the answer to Q is uniquely
determined by the answers to the views in V on any possible dataset, and therefore V
represents an upper bound on the information needed to answer Q. In the example above,
Q10 is a rewriting of Q10+ using {V8,V9}. Hence, {V8,V9} represents an upper bound on
the information needed to answer Q10+.
4.2.2 Finding Rewritings
In the previous section, we showed that the existence of a rewriting implies determinacy,
and proposed the use of rewritings as a conservative approximation to determinacy.
However, rewritings are only useful if we can efficiently check whether the answers to
a set of queries determines the answer to a given view. In this section we show that
performing this check is an NP-complete problem. Since the complexity depends only
on the sizes of the query and view definitions and not on the underlying database, this is
essentially a positive result – at least when the number of views is not too large.
Our proof is based on the following property: if a query Q has a rewriting using V
then it must have a rewriting that is small in the sense that it does not have too many body
atoms. This makes it feasible (although not necessarily efficient) to perform a brute-force
search over the space of possible rewritings.
Theorem 4.2.5. Let Q be a query with n body atoms, and let V be a set of arbitrary
(possibly multi-atom) views. The following are equivalent:
(i) There exists a rewriting of Q using V.
(ii) There exists a rewriting of Q using V that contains at most n body atoms.
Proof.
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(ii) implies (i): Trivial.
(i) implies (ii): Suppose (i) holds. Then there must exist a rewriting QR of Q using V.
Let QR+ denote the expansion of Q
R. By definition, there must exist homomorphisms
ϕ : Q→ QR+ and ϕR : QR+ → Q. In particular, ϕ must map each body atom Bi of Q onto
some body atom Ai of QR+. Let Q
S be a query with the same head as QR whose body
consists of the conjunction of every atom in QR that is associated with some Ai. This
query is well-formed: our choice of ϕ ensures that every distinguished variable in the
body of QR also appears in the body of QS . Moreover, ϕ maps each body atom of Q to a
body atom of QS+, and ϕ
R maps each body atom of QS+ to a body atom of Q. It follows that
Q and QS+ are homomorphic, and therefore Q
S is a rewriting of Q using V. Furthermore,
QS contains no more body atoms than Q and therefore satisfies condition (ii). 
With the help of the preceding Theorem, we now show that determining whether a
query Q has a rewriting using a set of views V is an NP-complete problem.
Corollary 4.2.6. Given a query Q and a set of views V, the problem of determining
whether there exists a homomorphic rewriting of Q using V is NP-complete.
Proof. Results from previous work (e.g., Theorem 3.7 of Levy et al. [38]) demonstrate
that the problem is NP-hard even when we restrict our attention to conjunctive queries
under set semantics. Given a rewriting QR of Q using V and homomorphisms ϕ : Q→ QR+
and ϕR : QR+ → Q, we can verify in polynomial time that (i) QR+ is the correct expansion
of Q and (ii) the homomorphisms ϕ and ϕR are valid. Hence, the problem is in NP. 
The problem is much easier when Q and each view in V contains exactly one body
atom. In this case, we can check for rewritings in linear time.
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Proposition 4.2.7. Let Q be a single-atom query, and let V be a set of single-atom views.
We can determine in linear time whether there exists a rewriting of Q using V.
Proof. From Theorem 4.2.5 above, we know that if there is a rewriting of Q using V then
there must be a rewriting that contains exactly one body atom. If QR is such a rewriting
then QR+ must be isomorphic to Q because both Q and Q
R
+ are single-atom conjunctive
queries and are therefore minimal folding.
Consequently, it suffices to check whether there exists a single-atom rewriting QR
of Q using V. If such a rewriting exists, the unique body atom of QR must reference
some view V ∈ V. Observe that QR+ and Q must be isomorphic even when we restrict our
attention to variables that are distinguished in V , and there is (up to isomorphism) only
one choice of QR that has a chance of satisfying this criterion. And since Q and QR+ are
single-atom queries, we can check whether there are valid homomorphisms from Q to
QR+ and from Q
R
+ to Q in linear time.
Hence, we can check for a rewriting of Q using {V} in linear time. We can repeat this
check for each V ∈ V to determine whether Q has a rewriting using V. 
4.3 Disclosure Labeling under Combined Semantics
Earlier in this section we defined rewritings for queries under combined semantics, and
discussed the complexity of rewriting queries using views. We now integrate these results
with the theory of Disclosure Labeling introduced in Chapter 3 in order to provide a
formal framework for reasoning about the information needed to answer queries under
combined semantics. The results in this section generalize previous results for conjunctive
queries under set semantics from Chapter 3.
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4.3.1 An Order Based on Equivalent Rewritings
We begin by reviewing some basic definitions from Chapter 3. We assume that all the
views under consideration are drawn from some finite universe U. Recall that a disclosure
order is a binary relation on sets of views which satisfies three properties:
(i) If V1 ⊆ V2 then V1  V2.
(ii) If V1  V2 and V2  V3 then V1  V3.
(iii) If V1  V3 and V2  V3 then V1 ∪ V2  V3.
Intuitively, V1  V2 means that V2 reveals more information about the dataset than
V1. The first axiom says that adding new elements to a set of views can only increase
the amount of information that it reveals about the dataset. The second is a standard
transitivity condition. The third ensures that upper bounds on information disclosure
remain meaningful even when information is combined from multiple views.
We might be tempted to say that V1  V2 if and only if the answers to V2 uniquely
determine the answers to V1 on any possible dataset. However, we have already argued
that this interpretation – although attractive in theory – is computationally infeasible. We
are not aware of any algorithms that can perform this check efficiently, and it is an open
question whether a closely related formulation of the problem is even decidable. [41]
Instead, we adopt a conservative approximation to determinacy that is based on query
rewritings. Under this interpretation, V  V′ if every V ∈ V has an equivalent rewriting
using V′. The definition comes with an intuitive interpretation: V  V′ if and only if we
can prove that the answers to the queries in V′ uniquely determine the answers to the
queries in V on every possible dataset. It is straightforward to show that this defines a
disclosure order:
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Proposition 4.3.1. The binary relation defined above, which is based on query rewritings,
is a disclosure order.
Proof. We verify each of the axioms of a disclosure order.
(i) If V ⊆ V′ then V  V′: This follows immediately from the fact that every element
of V can be rewritten in terms of itself.
(ii) If V  V′′ and V′  V′′ then V ∪ V′  V′′: If V ∈ V ∪ V′ then V ∈ V or V ∈ V′;
assume without loss of generality that V ∈ V. By assumption, V  V′′, and
therefore V has an equivalent rewriting using V′′.
(iii) If V  V′ and V′  V′′ then V  V′′: Each element of V has an equivalent
rewriting using V′. We replace each body atom in this rewriting with the rewriting
of the corresponding element of V′ using V′′ using Theorem 4.2.3 above. 
In Section 3.3.2 we provided efficient algorithms for reasoning about information
disclosure under the assumption that sets of views were decomposable. Intuitively, this
means that if the answer to a query Q is determined by a set of views then it must be
determined by one of the views on its own.
Definition 4.3.2 (Decomposability). Decomposable holds if for every set of views V1,V2
and every V such that {V}  V1 ∪ V2 we have either {V}  V1 or {V}  V2.
Although this property does not hold for conjunctive queries in general, it does hold
in the special case where Q is a single-atom query. This result for queries under combined
semantics generalizes earlier results for queries under set semantics from Section 3.4.
Proposition 4.3.3. Suppose that Q is a single-atom query and let V and V′ be sets of
(arbitrary) views under combined semantics. If {Q}  V ∪ V′ then {Q}  V or {Q}  V′.
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Proof. Suppose that {Q}  V ∪ V′. By Theorem 4.2.5, there exists a rewriting QS of Q
using V∪V′ such that QS contains exactly one body atom and QS+ ≡ Q. The unique body
atom of QS must originate from either V or V′. If it originates from V then QS  V, as
desired. Analogously, if it originates from V′ then QS  V′. 
4.3.2 Labeling Single-Atom Queries under Combined Semantics
We next review the theory of disclosure labeling from Section 3.2, which allows us to
represent the information needed to answer a query Q in terms of the information revealed
by a set of security views V. The security views are defined by a human administrator
and reveal known types of information about the dataset.
Formally, a disclosure labeler ` relates the information revealed by an unknown set of
queries to a set of fixpoints F . For our purposes, F consists of all possible subsets of V,
together with a maximal element > that reveals all the information in the entire dataset.
Definition 4.3.4. A disclosure labeler is a map ` : ℘(U)→ ℘(U) such that
(i) If V1 ⊆ U then `(V1) ≡ V2 for some V2 ∈ F .
(ii) If V ∈ F then `(V) ≡ V.
(iii) If V ⊆ U then V  `(V).
(iv) If V1,V2 ⊆ U and V1  V2 then `(V1)  `(V2).
For single-atom queries and views, the algorithm defined in Section 3.3.2 provides
us with a way to compute disclosure labels efficiently. This observation generalizes the
results for conjunctive queries under set semantics from Section 3.4.1.
The results mentioned above rely on two black-box algorithms. The first computes
the information that is common to two sets of views, while the second computes the
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combined information from two sets of views. Under set semantics, it is possible to
represent the information that is common to two single-atom conjunctive as another
single-atom conjunctive query. For instance, define
V11(u1) :− Friend(u1, u2; i), ∅
V12(u2) :− Friend(u1, u2; i), ∅
Then the view
V13() :− Friend(u1, u2; i), ∅
represents the information common to V11 and V12, in the sense that, for any set of queries
Q, we have Q  {V13} if and only if Q  {V11} and Q  {V12}. In fact, Section 3.4.1
contains a general procedure for computing the information common to two single-atom
views under set semantics. Computing the combined information from two sets of views
is even easier: we simply take the union of the two sets.
Unfortunately, we encounter a combinatorial explosion when we try to generalize
these results to conjunctive queries under combined semantics. For instance, to represent
the information common to the views
V14(u1) :− Friend(u1, u2; i), {u2}
V15(u2) :− Friend(u1, u2; i), {u1}
we would need four views, defined as follows:
V16() :− Friend(u1, u2; i), {u1, u2}
V17() :− Friend(u1, u2; i), {u1}
V18() :− Friend(u1, u2; i), {u2}
V13() :− Friend(u1, u2; i), ∅
V13 is redundant, as its answer can be computed by removing duplicates from the answer
to any of the other three views. However, the remaining three views are all mutually
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incomparable. V16 reveals the number of distinct pairs (u1, u2) that appear in Friend,
V17 reveals the number of distinct values of u1 that appear in Friend, and V18 reveals
the number of distinct values of u2. In general, we may need to construct a set with
2n − 1 distinct elements in order to represent the information that is common to n distinct
single-atom views.
We address this problem by representing disclosure labels symbolically in disjunctive
normal form. Instead of evaluating the GLB above, we store the unevaluated expression
(⇓ V14) u (⇓ V15), which represents the information common to V14 and V15 using the
notation introduced in Section 3.2.2. The symbolic representation is preferred for two
reasons. First, it is easy to compute disclosure labels in this form using the algorithm
derived in Section 3.3.2. And second, all of the relevant lattice-theoretic operations
can be performed in polynomial time. More precisely, given inputs I1 and I2 whose
representations have size m and n respectively, I1 unionsq I2 can be computed in O(m + n) time,
I1 u I2 can be computed in O(m · n) time, and I1  I2 and I1 = I2 can be checked with
O(m · n) comparisons between pairs of single-atom views. Additional optimizations are
discussed in Section 3.5.
4.3.3 Query Dissection
The analysis above permits us to efficiently compute a disclosure label for Q with respect
to V whenever Q and each V ∈ V contains exactly one body atom. In practice, however,
relational queries frequently contain multiple body atoms, and so this result is of limited
use. In this section, we discuss a disclosure labeler that maps a multi-atom query Q under
combined semantics to a set of single-atom queries Q′. The queries in Q′ contain enough
information to determine the answer to Q on any possible dataset. Since the composition
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of two disclosure labelers is itself a disclosure labeler, this map can be composed with
the algorithm for single-atom conjunctive queries discussed in Section 4.3.2 to define a
disclosure labeler that handles arbitrary conjunctive queries but only single-atom security
views. This algorithm generalizes one for single-atom conjunctive queries under set
semantics from Section 3.4.2.
The transformation from a multi-atom query Q to a set of single-atom queries Q′ is
handled by a procedure called Dissect(Q) which operates as follows:
(i) Compute a minimal folding QF of Q.
(ii) Replace each set or multiset variable that appears in two or more distinct body
atoms of Q with a fresh distinguished variable.
(iii) For each body atom Ak of QF we define a query Qk whose body consists of the
atom Ak and whose head is obtained by restricting the head of QF to variables that
appear in Ak.
(iv) The algorithm’s output contains a single-atom Qk for each body atom Ak in QF .
For sets of queries, the algorithm can be generalized by dissecting each query individually
and taking the union of all the resulting sets of single-atom queries. Formally,
DissectAll(V) =
⋃
{Dissect(Q) : Q ∈ V}
It remains for us to show that DissectAll induces a disclosure labeler. In order to
prove this fact, we need to prove two basic properties. The first guarantees that the output
of DissectAll(V) reveals at least as much information about the dataset as the input. The
second guarantees that the output of DissectAll does not disclose any more information
about the dataset than necessary.
Lemma 4.3.5. The following properties hold of DissectAll:
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(i) Q  DissectAll(Q) for any set of queries Q.
(ii) Suppose that Q is an arbitrary set of queries and V is a set of single-atom views.
Then Q  V implies DissectAll(Q)  V.
Proof. We prove each property in turn:
(i) First suppose that Q consists of a single query Q. In this case, it suffices to show
that {Q}  Dissect(Q). We will show that each step of the algorithm above can
only increase information disclosure. In Step (i), QF ≡ Q by construction. In Step
(ii), replacing existential variables with distinguished variables can only increase
information disclosure. We can perform a multi-way join on the set of queries
produced by Steps (iii) and (iv) to reconstruct the query generated in Step (ii).
We now generalize the result to sets of queries:
V =
⋃
{Q : Q ∈ V} 
⋃
{Dissect(Q) : Q ∈ V} = DissectAll(V)
(ii) First suppose that Q consists of a single query Q and that {Q}  V. In this case, it
suffices to show that Dissect(Q)  V. Let Q′ be an equivalent rewriting of Q using
V, and let Q′+ denote the expansion of Q′. Let QF be the folding of Q obtained in
Step (i) of the Dissect procedure. Then there is an isomorphism between QF and a
subset of the body atoms of Q′+. Every distinguished variable that appears in an
atom of QF must also be distinguished in the respective atom of Q′+. Moreover,
every variable that appears in two distinct atoms of QF must also appear in two
distinct atoms of Q′+, and therefore must be bound to distinguished variables in
the corresponding views in V. Putting these observations together, we conclude
that for each atom A ∈ Dissect(Q) there must be a single-atom view V ∈ V such
that {A}  {V}  V. Taking the union over all such atoms, we conclude that
Dissect(Q)  V, as desired.
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We now prove the claim in its full generality. Suppose Q  V. Then {Q}  V for
each Q ∈ Q, and therefore Dissect(Q)  V by the previous argument. Hence,
DissectAll(Q) =
⋃
{Dissect(Q) : Q ∈ Q}  V 
We are now ready to formally state and prove that DissectAll induces a disclosure
labeler. Let Usingle denote the set of all single-atom views under combined semantics,
and let Ucon j denoted the set of arbitrary views under combined semantics. Then we
will show that Dissect is a disclosure labeler that maps a set of views in Ucon j to a set of
views in Usingle.
Theorem 4.3.6. DissectAll is a disclosure labeler.
Proof. It now suffices to verify each of the disclosure labeler axioms in turn. Unless
otherwise stated, Q and Q′ are assumed to be arbitrary sets of conjunctive queries.
(i) Q  DissectAll(Q).
This is an immediate consequence of Part (i) of the preceding Lemma.
(ii) Q  Q′ implies DissectAll(Q)  DissectAll(Q′).
It suffices to show that Q  Q′ implies DissectAll(Q)  DissectAll(Q′). Since
Q  Q′  DissectAll(Q′) and DissectAll(Q′) is a set of single-atom queries, this
follows immediately from Part (ii) of the preceding Lemma.
(iii) If Q is a set of single-atom queries then DissectAll(Q) ≡ Q.
It suffices to show that if Q is a single-atom query then Dissect(Q) = {Q}. In Step
(i) of the Dissect algorithm, any single-atom query Q is a minimal folding, and so
QF = Q. In Step (ii), no variable can appear in two distinct atoms of Q (because Q
just contains one body atom), and so the query is unchanged. In Steps (iii) and (iv),
109
we will generate a single query whose head is the same as that of Q and whose
unique body atom is the same as the unique body atom of Q.
(iv) If Q  Q′ then DissectAll(Q)  DissectAll(Q′).
The preceding Lemma implies that Q  Q′  DissectAll(Q′), and therefore
DissectAll(Q)  Q′ as well. 
The take-away for this theorem is that by composing DissectAll with the single-atom
disclosure labeling algorithm from the previous section, we can efficiently compute
the disclosure labels for arbitrary conjunctive queries with respect to collections of
single-atom security views. The result demonstrates that practical disclosure labeling
algorithms exist for conjunctive queries under set, bag-set, and bag semantics, as well as
under more realistic query languages that combine aspects of all three.
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CHAPTER 5
TOWARDS PRACTICAL DISCLOSURE LABELING
In Chapter 3 we introduced a formal foundation for reasoning about information
disclosure that was applicable to any query language – at least in principle. The basic
idea was to express the information needed to answer an unknown query in terms of
the information revealed by an administrator-defined set of security views that disclosed
known types of information about the dataset. In Chapter 4, we extended this algorithm
to a richer language that generalized conjunctive queries under bag, bag-set, and set
semantics. Even in this case, however, we provided practical algorithms for reasoning
about information disclosure only for a very restricted query language and an even more
restricted class of security views. In this Chapter we show how the same principles can
be applied to reason about information disclosure for a substantial fragment of the SQL
query language and a class of security views that is rich enough to capture a diverse set
of real-world security constraints.
The fragment of SQL that we deal with – which supports NULL values, negation,
correlated subqueries, and disjunction – is rich enough that we do not try to reason
about it directly. Instead, we translate SQL queries into an intermediate representation
called filter-project queries, and then reason about the information disclosed by those
intermediate filter-project queries. Filter-project queries are intended to hit a sweet spot
between tractability and expressivity – they are rich enough to express a diverse set
of security constraints, but are still restricted enough that we can reason about them
efficiently and with strong theoretical guarantees.
The translation from SQL to filter-project queries is not lossless. Filter-project queries
are defined in a restricted language that supports selections, projections, and semijoins,
but not NULL values, negation, or disjunction. We guarantee that the filter-project queries
111
User Friend
UID Name Hobby
1 Babbage, Charles math
2 Church, Alonzo math
3 Lovelace, Ada music
4 Turing, Alan chess
5 von Neumann, John history
UID1 UID2
1 3
3 1
2 4
4 2
4 5
5 4
Figure 5.1: Sample database schema.
we generate contain enough information to answer the original SQL queries on any
possible dataset. Consequently, we can overestimate the information needed to answer a
SQL query, but will never underestimate the information that is needed.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we define
the language of filter-project queries and identify theoretical properties that allow us
to efficiently reason about queries in this language. In Section 5.2 we define formal
semantics for a fragment of SQL that includes correlated subqueries, negation, disjunction,
and NULL values. In Section 5.3 we describe and prove the correctness of a procedure for
translating queries in this fragment of SQL into filter-project queries. Finally, in Section
5.4 we provide an alternate formulation of the translation algorithm and informally
discuss how it can be generalized to a much broader class of SQL queries.
We employ a running example inspired by the Facebook Query Language, or FQL,
a SQL-like query language that can be used to access user data in the Facebook Apps
developer API. [4] Our example schema (show in Figure 5.1) has two relations: a User
relation that stores a User ID (UID), a name, and a hobby for each user, and a Friend
relation that keeps track of friendship relations between users.
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5.1 Filter-Project Queries
We now define the language of filter-project queries, which combine aspects of con-
junctive queries under bag and set semantics. Every filter-project query has a head that
represents the query’s output, a body atom that is evaluated under bag semantics, and
zero or more filter atoms that are evaluated under set semantics.
Consider the schema shown in Figure 5.1. We define two filter-project views. The
first view reveals the UIDs and names of all the users in the database, while the second
view reveals information about User 4’s friends.
V1(u, n) :− User(u, n, h)
V2(u, n) :− User(u, n, h) n Friend(4, u)
This example illustrates a crucial point: in Facebook’s security model, it is important to
distinguish between a query that reveals information about arbitrary users (such as V1)
and a query that only reveals information about friends of a particular user (such as V2).
This is not an isolated occurrence – normalization provides a natural way to represent
access control policies. Access to information stored in one relation (User) is controlled
by the contents of a different relation (Friend). Access control policies can then be
specified using semijoins, as in the example above.
With this intuition in place, we are ready to formalize the language of filter-project
queries. We use x, y, z to denote variables, and c, d to denote constants. A term, denoted
as s, t, is either a variable or a constant. An atom takes the form A(s1, . . . , sn) where A is
a predicate of arity n. We will write A(s) as shorthand for A(s1, . . . , sn). A datasetD is a
multiset containing atoms of the form A(c1, . . . , cn) where each A is a predicate of arity n
and each ci is a constant.
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Definition 5.1.1. A filter-project query is a non-recursive expression of the form
Q(t) :− A1(t1) n A2(t2) ∧ . . . ∧ An(tn)
where each Ai(ti) is an atom, and the following conditions hold:
(i) Every variable in t appears in t1, and
(ii) The existential variables in t1 are disjoint from those in t2, . . . , tn.
We refer to Q(t) as the query head, A1(t) as the query body, and A2(t2), . . . , An(tn) as
the query’s filter. Variables that appear in the head are distinguished, while the remaining
variables are existential.
Definition 5.1.1 imposes two restrictions on filter-project queries. These restrictions
are not necessary to ensure the correctness of the queries’ evaluation semantics, but will
prove very useful later in this section when we develop algorithms for reasoning about
information disclosure in filter-project queries. Condition (i) ensures that only variables
that appear in the query’s body can appear in the query head. For instance,
Q3(u2) :− User(u1, n, h) n Friend(u1, u2)
is not a valid filter-project query because the distinguished variable u2 does not appear in
the query body. Condition (ii) ensures that a query’s body atom interacts through its filter
atoms only through distinguished variables. For instance,
Q4() :− User(u1, n, h) n Friend(u1, u2)
is not a valid filter-project query because the existential variable u1 appears in both the
body and the filter of the query. On the other hand,
Q5(u1) :− User(u1, n, h) n Friend(u1, u2)
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is a valid filter-project query because u1 is distinguished.
We do not define evaluation semantics for filter-project queries from scratch. Instead,
we provide a translation of filter-project queries into the language of conjunctive queries
under combined semantics defined in Chapter 4. The head of the conjunctive query is
the same as the head of the filter-project query. We add a fresh copy variable to each
of the query’s body atoms. Existential variables that appear in the query’s body atom
become multiset-existential, while existential variables in the query’s filter atoms become
set-existential. The view V1 and V2 defined above are translated as follows:
V6(u, n) :− User(u, n, h; i1), {h, i1}
V7(u, n, h) :− User(u, n, h; i1) ∧ F(4, u), {i1}
We write BodyCond(Q) to refer to the result of this transformation on the query Q. In the
example above, V6 = BodyCond(V1) and V7 = BodyCond(V2). Evaluation of a query Q
is performed by (i) computing BodyCond(Q) and (ii) evaluating the resulting conjunctive
query on the current dataset.
Performing this translation allows us to reuse many of the results derived in Chapter 4.
For instance, two filter-project queries are said to be homomorphic if their corresponding
conjunctive representations are homomorphic. For instance, the view
V8(u, n) :− User(u, n, h) n User(u′, n′, h′)
has the conjunctive query representation
V9(u, n) :− User(u, n, h; i1) ∧ User(u′, n′, h′; i2), {h, i1}
It is straightforward to show that V6 is homomorphic to V9; this means that the corre-
sponding filter-project queries V1 and V8 return the same answer on every dataset.
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It will be useful to define another function Body(Q) that denotes a translation which
is the same as BodyCond(Q) on the head and body of Q but ignores any filter atoms in Q.
In the example above, Body(V1) is the same as Body(V1), and BodyCond(V2) is
V10(u, n) :− User(u, n, h; i1), {i1}
5.1.1 Rewritings of Conjunctive Queries
We next define rewritings for filter-project queries. Traditionally, a rewriting using V is a
query whose body atoms reference views in V instead of referencing base relations. The
intuition is that a rewriting can be evaluated using only information revealed by the views
in V. For filter-project queries we adopt a different interpretation: although the body
atom of a rewriting must reference a view in V, the filter atoms can reference arbitrary
base relations.
Definition 5.1.2. A rewriting using V is a query
Q(t) :− B n F
whose body atom references a view in V and whose filter atoms reference base relations.
For reasons that will become clear later in this section, our goal is to place an upper
bound on the information revealed by a query’s body atom, without any concern for the
information revealed by the query’s filter atoms. Filter atoms remove rows from a query’s
output, and therefore can only decrease the amount of information revealed about the
query’s main body atom.
Consider the following query, which is a rewriting using {V1}.
Q11(u, n) :− V1(u, n) n Friend(4, u)
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Q11 reveals information about only a subset of the rows of V1: whereas V1 reveals
information about arbitrary users, Q11 only reveals information about friends of User
4. Apart from this distinction, the definition of rewritings for filter-project queries is
analogous to the one used for ordinary conjunctive queries.
We next define query expansions. The expansion of a query Q is a new query Q+ that
returns the same answer as Q on any possible dataset, and whose body references a base
relation rather than a view in V. For instance, the expansion of Q11 above is
Q11+(u, n) :− User(u, n, h) n Friend(4, u)
Formally, the expansion of a query Q is obtained by taking the body atom V(t1, . . . , tm)
of Q and replacing each distinguished variable in V with the corresponding ti. After
performing the body atom of V becomes the body atom of Q, while the filter atoms of V
become filter atoms of Q. Variables that are existential in V are renamed as needed to
avoid capture.
We next argue for the correctness of the query expansion procedure defined above.
If Q is a filter-project query whose body atom references a view V then BodyCond(Q)
will be a conjunctive query combined semantics. The atom associated with V will
be evaluated under bag semantics, while the remaining atoms will be evaluated under
set semantics. Computing BodyCond(V), we obtain a view under combined semantics
whose body atom is evaluated under bag semantics and whose filter atoms are evaluated
under set semantics. Taking the expansion BodyCond(Q)+ of a query under combined
semantics, as defined in Section 4.2, replaces the atom of BodyCond(Q) that is associated
with V with the body of BodyCond(V), so that the body atom of V is evaluated under bag
semantics and the remaining atoms (which correspond to the filter atoms of Q and of V)
are evaluated under set semantics.
We now define a rewriting of a query Q using a set of views V. As for ordinary
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conjunctive queries, a rewriting QR of Q using V is a has the same answer as Q on any
possible dataset. We check the latter by determining whether Q ≡ QR. This criterion,
which is based on the existence of query homomorphisms, is discussed in greater detail
in Section 4.1.2.
Definition 5.1.3. We say that QR is a rewriting of Q using V if (i) QR is a rewriting using
V, and (ii) BodyCond(Q) ≡ BodyCond(QR+).
In our running example, Q11 is a rewriting of V2 using V1. This captures the intuition
that V1 reveals more information about it main body atom than V2, since V1 reveals
information about arbitrary users, whereas V2 only reveals information about friends of
the current user.
With this definition in place, we next shift our attention to the problem of determining
whether a query Q has a rewriting Q′ using V. When searching for a rewriting, it is not
immediately clear what filter atoms Q′ should contain. The following Lemma allows us
to circumvent this problem. It shows that we do not need to know up front what filter
atoms should appear in Q′. Removing filter atoms from Q′ will never cause condition
(ii) to be violated, so we might as well assume when searching for queries satisfying
condition (ii) that Q′ does not contain any filter atoms.
Theorem 5.1.4. Let Q be a filter-project query, and let V be a set of filter-project views.
The following are equivalent:
(i) There exists a rewriting Q′ using V such that BodyCond(Q) ≡ BodyCond(Q′+).
(ii) There exists a rewriting Q′ using V such that there are homomorphisms from
Body(Q) to Body(Q′+) and from BodyCond(Q
′
+) to BodyCond(Q).
Proof.
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(i) implies (ii): Suppose (i) holds. Then there exists a rewriting Q′ using V such that
BodyCond(Q) ≡ BodyCond(Q′+). Hence, we can find homomorphisms
ϕ : BodyCond(Q)→ BodyCond(Q′+)
and ϕ′ : BodyCond(Q′+)→ BodyCond(Q)
Then ϕ maps Body(Q) to Body(Q′+) and ϕ
′ maps BodyCond(Q′+) to BodyCond(Q), so
that condition (ii) is satisfied.
(ii) implies (i): Assume WLOG (by renaming variables as needed) that the heads of Q
and Q′ contain the same list of terms t. Let Q′′ be a query that contains the body of Q
and the filter atoms of both Q and Q′. The distinguished variables of Q and Q′ are the
same, while the existential variables of Q are assumed to be disjoint from those of Q′.
We claim that BodyCond(Q) ≡ BodyCond(Q′′+). Since Condition (ii) holds, there is a
homomorphism ϕ from Body(Q) to Body(Q′+). Since Q
′′
+ has the same head and body
as Q′+, ϕ is also a homomorphism from Body(Q) to Body(Q
′′
+). By extending ϕ so that it
maps every existential variable in the filter of Q to itself, we obtain a homomorphism
from BodyCond(Q) to BodyCond(Q′′+).
In the other direction, Condition (ii) implies the existence of a homomorphism ψ′ from
BodyCond(Q′+) to BodyCond(Q). By extending ψ
′ to map every existential variable in the
filter of Q to itself, we obtain a homomorphism from BodyCond(Q′′+) to BodyCond(Q),
and therefore BodyCond(Q) ≡ BodyCond(Q′′+), as desired. 
Theorem 5.1.4 provides a practical method for checking whether there is a rewriting
of a query Q using a single view V . First, we search for a rewriting Q′ of the single-atom
conjunctive query Body(Q) using V; in Section 4.3.2, we argued that this task can be
performed quite efficiently. (See Proposition 4.2.7 for details.) If such a rewriting is found,
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we check whether there is a homomorphism from BodyCond(Q′+) to BodyCond(Q).
It is straightforward to generalize the algorithm to check for rewritings of a query Q
using a set of views V: we check, for each V ∈ V, whether there is a rewriting of Q using
V . A filter-project query can only have one body atom, so if Q has a rewriting using V
then it must have a rewriting using V for some view V ∈ V.
We next consider the complexity of checking for rewritings.
Corollary 5.1.5. Given a filter-project query Q and a set of filter-project views V, the
problem of determining whether there exists a rewriting of Q using V is NP-complete.
Proof. Given a rewriting QR of Q using V we assume WLOG (using the previous Theo-
rem) that the size of QR is polynomial in the sizes of Q and V. Given homomorphisms
ϕ : BodyCond(Q)→ BodyCond(QR+)
ϕR : BodyCond(QR+)→ BodyCond(Q)
we can verify in polynomial time that (i) BodyCond(Q) and BodyCond(QR+) are computed
correctly and (ii) both of the homomorphisms defined above are valid. This means that
the problem is in NP.
We now show that the problem is NP-hard. The proof is a reduction from the problem
of checking the equivalence of conjunctive queries under set semantics, which is known
to be NP-Hard. [19] Let
Q(t) :− A1(t1) ∧ . . . ∧ An(tn)
and Q′(t′) :− A′1(t′1) ∧ . . . ∧ Am(tm)
be conjunctive queries under set semantics, and assume WLOG that t has the same arity
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as t′. Define filter-project queries
Q∗(t) :− B(t) n A1(t1) ∧ . . . ∧ An(tn)
and Q′∗(t′) :− B(t′) n A′1(t′1) ∧ . . . ∧ Am(tm)
where B is a fresh relation with the same arity as t and t′. There is a trivial corre-
spondence between multiset homomorphisms ϕ : BodyCond(Q) → BodyCond(Q′)
and set homomorphisms ϕ∗ : Q∗ → Q′∗: the homomorphisms agree on all com-
mon terms. Similarly, there is a correspondence between multiset homomorphisms
ϕ′ : BodyCond(Q′) → BodyCond(Q) and set homomorphisms ϕ′∗ : Q′∗ → Q′. Hence,
BodyCond(Q) and BodyCond(Q′) are homomorphic if and only if Q∗ and Q′∗ are homo-
morphic; NP-hardness follows. 
5.1.2 Measuring Disclosure for Filter-Project Queries
We now show that the algorithms for disclosure labeling that we first introduced in
Chapter 3 are applicable to filter-project queries. We begin by reviewing the definition of
a disclosure order from Section 3.2.1. A disclosure order is a binary relation on sets of
views. If V and V′ are sets of filter-project queries then V  V′ means that the views in
V′ reveal more information about their main body atoms than the views in V.
Definition 5.1.6. A disclosure order is a binary relation  on subsets of U such that
(i) If V1 ⊆ V2 then V1  V2.
(ii) If V1  V2 and V2  V3 then V1  V3.
(iii) If V1  V3 and V2  V3 then V1 ∪ V2  V3.
If V1 and V2 are sets of filter-project views then we say that V1  V2 if each element
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of V1 has a homomorphic rewriting using V2. Before proceeding any further, we must
verify that this is actually a disclosure order.
Proposition 5.1.7. The binary relation  defined above is a disclosure order.
Proof. We verify each of the disclosure order properties in turn:
• If V ⊆ V′ then V  V′:
This follows immediately from the fact that each element of V can be rewritten in
terms of itself.
• If V  V′′ and V′  V′′ then (V ∪ V′)  V′′:
If V ∈ V ∪V′ then V ∈ V or V ∈ V′; assume without loss of generality that V ∈ V. By
assumption, V  V′′, and therefore V has an equivalent rewriting using V′′.
• If V  V′ and V′  V′′ then V  V′′:
Each element of V has a rewriting using V′. We replace each body and condition in
this rewriting with the rewriting of the corresponding element of V′ using V′′. 
In earlier Chapters we motivated disclosure orders using view determinacy: V  V′
meant that the answers to the views in V′ determined the answers to the views in V on
any possible dataset. That interpretation is not valid here. For instance, given the views
V1(u, n) :− User(u, n, h)
V2(u, n) :− User(u, n, h) n Friend(4, u)
we previously noted that
Q11(u, n) :− V1(u, n) n Friend(4, u)
is a rewriting of V2 using {V1}. However, the answer to V2 is not always determined by
the answer to V1, since V2 depends on the contents of the Friend relation and V1 does
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not. Instead,  compares the information revealed about the main body atom of V2 to the
information revealed about the main body atom of V2. In the example above, V1 reveals
information about all the users in the dataset, whereas V2 just reveals information about
User 4’s friends.
V  V′ does not generally imply that the views in V′ determine the answers to the
views in V. If the views in V and V′ do not any contain filter atoms, however, then by
Theorem 5.1.4, checking for rewritings of filter-project queries degenerates to checking
for rewritings of conjunctive queries under bag semantics. In this case, the views in V′
do determine the answers to the views in V. This observation agrees with our intuition
that sets of views are ordered based on the amount of information they reveal about their
main body atoms.
More generally, if V  V′ then each view V ∈ V has a rewriting using V. Any such
rewriting contains the same columns of V and contains a superset of the rows. We next
formalize this observation.
Proposition 5.1.8. Suppose V  V′. For each V ∈ V there is a rewriting V ′ using V′
such that Res(BodyCond(V),D) ⊆ Res(BodyCond(V ′),D) on all datasetD.
Proof. Fix V ∈ V. By Theorem 5.1.4, there must exist a rewriting V ′ using V′ and ho-
momorphisms ϕ : Body(V) → Body(V ′+) and ϕ′ : BodyCond(V ′+) → BodyCond(V).
Now ϕ maps the unique body atom of BodyCond(V) to the unique body atom of
BodyCond(V ′). Hence, ϕ is bijective when restricted to terms in Body(V); its inverse
is ϕ′. Since multiset variables can only appear in the body atoms of BodyCond(V)
and BodyCond(V ′+), ϕ must be bijective on multiset variables. By Theorem 4.1.5, we
conclude that Res(BodyCond(V ′+),D) ⊇ Res(BodyCond(V),D) on all datasetD. 
We now show that filter-project queries are decomposable, so that {Q}  V ∪ V′
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implies {Q}  V or {Q}  V′. This permits the use of efficient disclosure labeling
algorithms that are discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2.
Corollary 5.1.9. Suppose that Q is a filter-project query and that V and V′ are sets of
filter-project queries. If {Q}  V ∪ V′ then {Q}  V or {Q}  V′.
Proof. Suppose that {Q}  V ∪ V′. Then there exists a rewriting QS of Q using V ∪ V′,
and the unique body atom of QS must originate from either V or V′. If it originates from
V then {Q}  V, as desired. Analogously, if it originates from V′ then {Q}  V′. 
5.2 SQL Query Language and Semantics
We now define a fragment of SQL that includes support for correlated subqueries,
conjunction, disjunction, negation, and NULL values. In the discussion below, it will be
useful to distinguish between relations (also referred to as tables) and table instances.
Relations are query-independent and belong to the underlying dataset. Table instances,
on the other hand, originate in the FROM clauses of SQL queries. Thus, a query containing
a self-join has two table instances yet references just one relation. The query
SELECT U.uid, U.name FROM User U, Friend F
WHERE U.uid1 = 4 AND F.uid2 = U.uid
has two table instances: U and F.
5.2.1 Terms, Formulas, and Queries
We begin by defining a language that captures an interesting subset of the features of
SQL. Constants are drawn from a finite set C that contains at least one elements. We also
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assume the existence of a distinguished constant NULL that does not appear in C. A value
v is an element of C ∪ {NULL}. A term t is either a value or a fully qualified table column
name of the form T.Col, where T is a table instance and Col is a column within that table.
t ::= v | T.Col
A formula ϕ is either an equality comparison between two terms, the conjunction or
disjunction of two formulas, the negation of a formula, or an EXISTS block that takes a
correlated subquery Q as an argument.
ϕ ::= (t = t) | (ϕ AND ϕ) | (ϕ OR ϕ) | NOT (ϕ) | EXISTS (Q)
Fix an arbitrary constant c ∈ C. We write TRUE as shorthand for the formula (c = c), and
we write FALSE as shorthand for NOT (c = c). A query takes the form
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
WHERE ϕ
where R1, . . . ,Rm are base relations, T1, . . . ,Tm identify table instances, ϕ is a formula,
and A1, . . . , An are terms. We assume for the sake of simplicity that m, n ≥ 1. The
following is an example of a query in our language:
SELECT U.name AS myName, U.email AS myEmail
FROM User AS U
WHERE EXISTS (SELECT 1 AS one FROM Friend AS F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4)
In order to avoid issues related to variable capture when performing query evaluation,
we additionally assume that every Ti is globally unique within a query. For example, the
following query is not permitted in our fragment of SQL
SELECT U.name AS User U
WHERE EXISTS (SELECT U.uid AS uid FROM User U)
The reason is that there are two different table instances that are both named U.
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[[v]]DE = v
[[T.Col]]DE = E(T.Col),where T.Col ∈ dom(E)
Evaluation semantics for terms.
[[x = y]]DE =

unknown, if [[x]]DE is null or [[y]]
D
E is null
true, if [[x]]DE and [[y]]
D
E are both non-null and equal
false, if [[x]]DE and [[y]]
D
E are both non-null and not equal
[[ψ AND η]]DE = [[ψ]]
D
E AND [[η]]
D
E
[[ψ AND η]]DE = [[ψ]]
D
E OR [[η]]
D
E
[[NOT ψ]]DE = NOT [[ψ]]
D
E
[[EXISTS Q]]DE =
true, if [[Q]]DE is not emptyfalse, otherwise
Evaluation semantics for formulas
Figure 5.2: Evaluation semantics for SQL terms and formulas.
5.2.2 Query Evaluation
Evaluation of terms, formulas, and queries, is parameterized on an environment E and a
datasetD. An environment E maps fully qualified table column names to values, while a
dataset maps relation names to multisets of tuples.
Every term evaluates to a value, whereas every formula evaluates to one of the
constants true, false, or unknown, which are interpreted under a three-valued Boolean
logic. Evaluation semantics for terms and formulas are shown in Figure 5.2. The
semantics for formulas rely on the definitions of AND, OR, and NOT in three-valued logic
shown in Figure 5.3.
A relational atom has the form A(s1, . . . , sn), where A is a predicate of arity n and
each si is a (possibly NULL) constant. A datasetD is a multiset containing atoms of the
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F F F F
U U F U
T F U
T T T T
F T F U
U T U U
T F
F T
U U
AND OR NOT
Figure 5.3: Truth tables for three-valued Boolean logic.
uid name email
4 Zuck zuck@fb.com
10 Marcel marcel@fb.com
12347 Lucja lucja@cornell.edu
uid1 uid2
4 10
10 4
User Friend
Figure 5.4: Sample dataset based on Facebook Apps.
form A(c1, . . . , cn) where A is a predicate of arity n and each ci is a constant. We assume
the existence of a schema that associates a unique name with each column i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
For instance, consider the sample dataset shown in Figure 5.4. Formally, this dataset
consists of a multiset of tuples
{{ User(4,Zuck, zuck@fb.com),
User(10,Marcel,marcel@fb.com),
User(12347,Lucja, lucja@cornell.edu),
Friend(4, 10),
Friend(10, 4) }}
together with the schema (uid, name, email) for the User relation and the schema
(uid1, uid2) for the Friend relation.
Given a relation name R, we write D(R) to denote the multiset containing all the
tuples inD that are associated with the relation R. In the example above, we have
D(Friend) = {{ (4, 10), (10, 4) }}
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Given an environment E and a tuple τ we write E[T 7→ τ] to denote the environ-
ment obtained by extending E with a fully qualified (column name, value) pair for each
argument of τ. Let E be the environment
{ F.uid1 7→ 4, F.uid2 7→ 10 }
and let τ be the tuple
(4,Zuck, zuck@fb.com)
from the User relation. Then E[U 7→ τ] is the environment
{ U.uid 7→ 4, U.name 7→ Zuck, U.email 7→ zuck@fb.com,
F.uid1 7→ 4, F.uid2 7→ 10 }
When we evaluate a database query, the result is a table. We refer to it as a virtual table
in order to distinguish it from a base table such as User or Friend that appears in the
database schema. Evaluating a query of the form
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
WHERE ϕ
yields a virtual table with schema (N1, . . . ,Nn). The table’s rows are computed as follows:
(i) We evaluate the FROM clause by iterating all τ1 ∈ D(R1), . . . , τm ∈ D(Rm). For
each assignment of τ1, . . . , τm we extend E with a new (key, value) pair for every
argument of each τi to obtain a new environment E′.
(ii) We evaluate the query’s WHERE clause predicate under E′. If it evaluates to false or
undefined then we do nothing. If it evaluates to true then we evaluate A1, . . . , An to
obtain values v1, . . . , vn, and then emit the tuple (v1, . . . , vn).
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Evaluation semantics for the process described above are formalized as follows:
[[Q]]DE = {{ ([[A1]]DE′ , . . . , [[An]]DE′)
| τ1 ∈ R1, . . . , τm ∈ Rm,
E′ = E[T1 7→ τ1, . . . ,Tm 7→ τm],
[[ϕ]]DE′ is satisfied }}
We now present an example to illustrate how query evaluation works. Let Q be the query
SELECT U.name AS myName, U.email AS myEmail
FROM User AS U
WHERE EXISTS (SELECT 1 AS one FROM Friend AS F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4)
Suppose we wish to evaluate Q against an empty environment and the dataset shown in
Figure 5.4. We begin by iterating over tuples τU ∈ D(User). For each such τU we set
E′ = ∅[U 7→ τU]. For the first tuple in User we end up with the environment
E′ = { U.uid 7→ 4, U.name 7→ Zuck, U.email 7→ zuck@fb.com }
We then evaluate the WHERE clause predicate under E′. To do so, we must recursively
evaluate the subquery under E′. We iterate over atoms τF ∈ D(Friend) and create a new
environment E′′ = E[F 7→ τF] for each one. For the first tuple in Friend we have
E′′ = { U.uid 7→ 4, U.name 7→ Zuck, U.email 7→ zuck@fb.com,
F.uid1 7→ 4, F.uid2 7→ 10 }
We next evaluate the subquery’s WHERE clause predicate (U.uid = F.uid1 AND
F.uid2 = 4) under E′′. In our running example, U.uid evaluates to 4 and F.uid1
evaluates to 4, so (U.uid = F.uid1) evaluates to true. Similarly, F.uid2 evaluates to
10, so (F.uid2 = 4) evaluates to false. Hence, the predicate is not satisfied, and no
tuple is emitted for this assignment of τF . Similarly, no tuple is emitted when τF is set to
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be the second tuple in the Friend relation. The subquery’s answer is therefore empty
when evaluated under the environment E′, so the EXISTS predicate evaluates to false.
Consequently, the outer query does not emit anything when τU is the first tuple in User.
We next set τU to be the second tuple of the User relation and update E′ accordingly.
We then evaluate the subquery against this updated E′. This time, we find that setting
E′′ = E′[F 7→ τU] causes the subquery’s WHERE clause to be satisfied when τF is the
second tuple of the Friend relation. The final answer of the subquery is a multiset
containing a single tuple: {{ (1) }}. The outer query’s EXISTS clause evaluates to true
because the subquery’s answer is non-empty, so the outer query emits the tuple
(Marcel,marcel@fb.com)
Query evaluation proceeds in this manner. The EXISTS clause is not satisfied when τU is
the third tuple in the User relation, so the outer query’s final answer is the multiset
{{ (Marcel,marcel@fb.com) }}
which contains a single tuple.
5.2.3 Free Variables and Safety
Query evaluation can fail if a query tries to access a table column that isn’t in defined by
the environment. For instance, attempting to evaluate the query
SELECT 1 AS one FROM Friend AS F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4
against an empty environment will fail. More specifically, our attempt to evaluate
the predicate (U.uid = F.uid1) will fail because the environment under which it is
evaluated does not associate a value with U.uid.
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f v(v) = ∅
f v(T.Col) = T.Col
Free variables in terms.
f v(x = y) = f v(x) ∪ f v(y)
f v(ψ AND η) = f v(ψ) ∪ f v(η)
f v(ψ OR η) = f v(ψ) ∪ f v(η)
f v(NOT ψ) = f v(ψ)
f v(EXISTS Q) = f v(Q)
Free variables in formulas.
Figure 5.5: Rules for computing free variables in terms and formulas.
In order to prevent such situations, we permit a query Q to be evaluated against an
environment E only when the domain of E, denoted dom(E), contains bindings for all
the free variables in Q, denoted f v(Q). Rules for computing free variables for terms and
formulas are shown in Figure 5.5. For a query Q of the form
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
WHERE ϕ
we compute f v(Q) as follows:
f v(Q) = ( f v(ϕ) ∪ f v(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ f v(An)) − (T1.* ∪ . . . ∪ Tm.*)
In other words, we first find all the free variables in ϕ and each Ai, and then remove all
the columns of each Ti (denoted as Ti.*). For example, if Q is the example query defined
above then f v(Q) = { U.uid }.
The evaluation of a query Q against an environment E is said to be safe if it never
requires us to compute E(T.Col) unless T.Col is in the domain of E. We now present a
criterion that is sufficient to ensure that query evaluation is safe.
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Proposition 5.2.1. Let E be an environment, and let X be a query, term, or formula. If
f v(X) ⊆ dom(E) then [[X]]DE is safe for any datasetD.
Proof. The proof is by induction on terms, formulas, and queries. Consider a term t. If t
is a value v then [[v]]DE does not depend on E, so we’re done. If t is a column reference of
the form T.Col then f v(T.Col) = {T.Col}, so T.Col ∈ dom(E) by hypothesis.
Consider a formula of the form (x = y). By construction, the domain of E contains
f v(x) and f v(y), so [[x]]DE and [[y]]
D
E are safe by induction. These two values are sufficient
to compute [[x = y]]DE , so we’re done. Analogous arguments can be applied for the
remaining kinds of formulas.
Finally, consider a query Q of the form outlined above. In this case, ϕ and each
Ai is evaluated against the environment E′ = E[T1 7→ τ1, . . . ,Tm 7→ τm] for tuples
τ1 ∈ R1, . . . , τm ∈ Rm. Hence, the domain of E′ contains dom(E) in addition to all the
columns of each Ti. It therefore contains f v(ϕ), as well as each f v(Ai). Hence, [[ϕ]]DE′ and
[[Ai]]DE′ are safe by induction, and this is sufficient to compute [[Q]]
D
E . 
5.3 Query Generalization
Given a SQL query Q, our goal is to find a set of filter-project views V1,V2, . . . whose
answers jointly determine the answer to Q on every possible dataset. This is done in two
passes. In the first pass, we replace each relation referenced in User with a filter-project
view. The transformation is performed in such a way that the updated query Q′ will
return the same answer as the original query Q on any possible dataset. If Q is
SELECT U.name AS name, F.uid2 AS uid2
FROM User AS U, Friend AS F
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WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4
then one possible choice for Q′ is
SELECT U.name AS name, F.uid2 AS uid2
FROM VU AS U, VF AS F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4
where VU and VF are defined as follows:
VU(U.uid, U.name, U.email) :− User(U.uid, U.name, U.email)
VF(F.uid1, F.uid2) :− Friend(F.uid1, F.uid2)
The transformation given in the example above is not particularly interesting: VU reveals
the entirety of the User relation and VF reveals the entirety of the Friend relation.
However, it is possible to choose VU and VF more intelligently by projecting out columns
that are never referenced within the body of Q. In the example above, we could instead
define VU as
VU(U.uid, U.name) :− User(U.uid, U.name, U.email)
Notice that this new VU reveals less information about the dataset than the old one: the
old VU revealed information about all the columns of the User table, whereas the new
one only reveals information about the uid and name columns but not the email column of
the User table. This corresponds to the standard query optimization heuristic of pushing
project as far down into a query evaluation tree as possible, and will not be discussed
further in this section.
After performing this transformation, it is easy to show that the answers to all the
views referenced by Q′ and its correlated subqueries uniquely determine the answer to
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Q′ (and therefore to Q as well) on any possible dataset. In the example above, the views
VU(U.uid, U.name) :− User(U.uid, U.name, U.email)
VF(F.uid1, F.uid2) :− Friend(F.uid1, F.uid2)
uniquely determine the answer to Q on any possible dataset. We refer to {VU ,VF}
as generalization of Q, since the set represents a conservative upper bound on the
information needed to answer Q.
Definition 5.3.1 (Query Generalization). A generalization of a SQL query Q is a set of
filter-project queries V that determine the answer to Q on any possible dataset.
Notice that there are some important facets of the original query Q that VU and VF do
not capture. VU reveals information about all the users in the dataset, whereas Q only
reveals information about friends of User 4. Similarly, VF reveals information about
arbitrary friendships, whereas Q only reveals information about friendships of User 4.
Such distinctions are essential to Facebook’s security model. However, they are not
captured by the views VU and VF shown above.
The basic problem is that although VU and VF tell us which columns of the User
and Friend tables are needed to answer Q, they tell us nothing about which rows of
these tables are needed. Generating filter-project queries that have column projections is
straightforward. However, the orthogonal problem of determining what row selection
predicates or filter atoms a filter-project query should have is far more challenging.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the problem of finding “good” selection
predicates and filters for queries.
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5.3.1 Predicate Generalization
We start by considering the problem of determining which rows of a relation are needed
to answer a given SQL query. For a running example, we will continue to use the SQL
query Q defined as
SELECT U.name AS name, F.uid2 AS uid2
FROM User AS U, Friend AS F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4
In the previous section we rewrote Q as
SELECT U.name AS name, F.uid2 AS uid2
FROM VU AS U, VF AS F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4
where VU and VF had the bodies
User(U.uid, U.name, U.email)
and
Friend(F.uid1, F.uid2)
respectively. We can do better by adding new filter atoms to VU and VF to get
User(U.uid, U.name, U.email) n Friend(F.uid1, F.uid2)
∧ (U.uid = F.uid1) ∧ (F.uid2 = 4)
Friend(F.uid1, F.uid2) n User(U.uid, U.name, U.email)
∧ (U.uid = F.uid1) ∧ (F.uid2 = 4)
Rather than revealing the entirety of the User and Friend relations, VU only reveals a
subset of the tuples in U. Similarly, VF reveals information about only a subset of the
tuples in F.
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We now argue that this rewriting is correct, in the sense that Q′ still returns the same
answer as Q on any possible dataset. A tuple τU ∈ D(User) can only affect the answer
to Q if there is a corresponding tuple τF ∈ D(Friend) such that E[U 7→ τU , F 7→ τF]
satisfies the SQL predicate
(U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4)
In this case, the environment E[U 7→ τU , F 7→ τF] also satisfies the filter predicate
Friend(F.uid1, F.uid2) ∧ (U.uid = F.uid1) ∧ (F.uid2 = 4)
of VU , so the answer to VU will contain a row for τU . Hence, VU contains a row for every
tuple in U whose presence or absence can affect the answer to Q. An analogous argument
applies to F.
One subtlety in the argument above is that equality involving NULL values is handled
differently for filter-project queries than it is for SQL queries. In SQL, (NULL = NULL)
evaluates to unknown. Filter-project queries treat NULL just like any other constant, so that
(NULL = NULL) evaluates to true. The translation we proposed works because equality in
SQL implies equality in the filter-project query language: if (NULL = NULL) under SQL
semantics then it is also true under filter-project semantics. The converse need not hold.
The same idea approach can be applied to arbitrary select-project-join query blocks
with the help of the following Proposition. Given a table instance Ti we write Ti to denote
the list of fully qualified column names that appear in Ti. For instance, if U is a table
instance associated with the User relation, as in the example above, then U is the triple
(U.uid, U.name, U.email).
Proposition 5.3.2. Consider a query Q of the form
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
WHERE ϕ
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We obtain a new query Q′ by replacing each relation Ri with a conjunctive view VRi
whose body is Ri(Ti) and whose filter is
R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ri−1(Ti−1) ∧ Ri+1(Ti+1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ ψ
Fix an environment E and a datasetD such that, for all E′ = E[T1 7→ τ1, . . . ,Tm 7→ τm],
if [[ϕ]]DE′ is true then E
′ is satisfiably extendable w.r.t. ψ onD. Then [[Q]]DE = [[Q′]]DE .
Proof. Consider an assignment of tuples τ1 ∈ VR1 , . . . , τm ∈ VRm such that [[ϕ]]DE′ is true,
where E′ = E[T1 7→ τ1, . . . ,Tm 7→ τm]. By hypothesis, E′ is a satisfying assignment of
ψ, and E′ satisfies R j(T j) for each j , i because τ j ∈ R j by construction. It follows that
R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ri−1(Ti−1) ∧ Ri+1(Ti+1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ ψ
evaluates to true under E′. Since E[Ti 7→ τi] can be extended to E′, it is satisfiably
extendable w.r.t. ψ. This means that the multiplicity of τi is exactly the same in Ri and VRi .
It follows that every tuple emitted by Q is also emitted by Q′. Since each VRi contains a
subset of the tuples in the corresponding Ri, the converse also holds, and so Q and Q′
emit exactly the same tuples. 
Proposition 5.3.2 applies even for queries that contain self-joins. Let Q be the query
SELECT F2.uid2
FROM Friend F1, Friend F2
WHERE F1.uid1 = 4 AND F1.uid2 = F2.uid1
which outputs friends of friend of User 4. We can rewriting Q as
SELECT F2.uid2
FROM VF1 F1, VF2 F2
WHERE F1.uid1 = 4 AND F1.uid2 = F2.uid1
137
with the respective bodies and filters of VF1 and VF2 defined by
Friend(F1.uid1, F1.uid2) n Friend(F2.uid1, F2.uid2)
∧ (F1.uid1 = 4) ∧ (F1.uid2 = F2.uid1)
Friend(F2.uid1, F2.uid2) n Friend(F1.uid1, F1.uid2),
∧ (F1.uid1 = 4) ∧ (F1.uid2 = F2.uid1)
If there are subqueries in the WHERE clause of Q then we must replace the relations in the
FROM clauses of those subqueries with filter-project views.
5.3.2 Automated Query Rewriting
In the discussion above we proposed a criterion that allowed each table referenced by a
SQL query to be replaced with a filter-project view that only revealed information about
a subset of the rows and columns in that table. However, we did not say how such views
could be computed. We now discuss a procedure for automatically generating a set of
views that satisfies our criterion.
As discussed above, given the SQL query
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
WHERE ϕ
we generate a filter-project view with body Ri(Ti) and filter
R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ri−1(Ti−1) ∧ Ri+1(Ti+1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ ψ
for each relation Ri. The predicate ψ is in principle arbitrary, subject to two restrictions.
First, it must be a conjunction in the filter-project query language. More precisely, ψ
must be a conjunction of predicates, each of which is either an atom R′(T ′) or an equality
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constraint (x = y) between bound variables and/or constants. And second, ψ must be
satisfiably extendable whenever ϕ is true. We refer to ψ as a generalization of ϕ.
A generalization always exists: setting ψ to the constant true will always satisfy our
constraints, no matter how ϕ is defined. This choice of ψ conservatively assumes that
every row of every Ri can affect the answer to Q. We endeavor, however, to do something
smarter when we can. We now define a recursive function gen(ϕ) that computes a
generalization for ϕ in a manner that satisfies our desiderata.
gen(x = y) ::= (x = y)
gen(ψ AND η) ::= gen(ψ) ∧ gen(η)
gen(ψ OR η) ::= true
gen(NOT ψ) ::= true
The rule for an EXISTS clause is a bit more involved. Let S denote the query
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
WHERE ϕ
Then gen(S ) is
R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ϕ)
We now verify that gen(ϕ) always satisfies the criteria of Proposition 5.3.2.
Proposition 5.3.3. Fix a formula ϕ, an environment E, and a dataset D such that
f v(ϕ) ⊆ dom(E′). For all E′ = E[T1 7→ τ1, . . . ,Tm 7→ τm], if [[ϕ]]DE′ is true then E′ is
satisfiably extendable w.r.t. gen(ϕ) onD.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction. Suppose [[ϕ]]DE′ is true. If ϕ is of the form
(x = y) then E(x) = E(y), so that E′ satisfies the filter predicate (x = y). If ϕ is of the
form (ψ OR η) or (NOT ψ) then gen(ϕ) = true, so E′ trivially satisfies gen(ϕ).
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If ϕ is of the form (ψ AND η) then [[ψ]]DE′ and [[η]]
D
E′ must be true, so that E
′ is
satisfiably extendable w.r.t. ψ and w.r.t. η by induction. This means that E′ is extendable
to environments E′ψ (defined on all the variables in ψ) and E
′
η (defined on all the variables
in η) which satisfy gen(ψ) and gen(η) respectively. Since f v(ϕ) ⊆ dom(E′) and all
table instance names are globally unique, E′ψ and E
′
η must agree with E
′ (and also
with each other) on all common variables. Hence, we can merge them to obtain an
environment E′′ that satisfies gen(ψ) ∧ gen(η). It follows that E′ is satisfiably extendable
w.r.t. gen(ψ) ∧ gen(η) because E′ is extendable to E′′.
Finally, suppose that the ϕ is of the form EXISTS S , where S is a subquery of the
form described above. If [[EXISTS S]]DE′ is true then S must emit at least one tuple.
If the relations in the FROM clause of S are R1, . . . ,Rm and the WHERE clause predicate
is ϕ then there must be some τ1 ∈ R1, . . . , τm ∈ Rm such that [[ϕ]]DE′ is true, where
E′ = E[T1 7→ τ1, . . . ,Tm 7→ τm]. By induction, gen(ϕ) must be satisfiably extendable
w.r.t. E′. By construction, Ri(Ti) holds for each i, so E′ is satisfiably extendable w.r.t.
R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ϕ)
as desired. E is satisfiably extendable as well, since it can be extended to E′. 
We next turn our attention to the problem of rewriting SQL queries. As before,
our goal is to replace each relation Ri in the FROM clause of a query Q and each of its
subqueries with a filter-project view VRi that emits only a subset of the tuples in Ri. The
rewriting is performed by a recursive function rew that takes two arguments. The first
argument is a query or formula to rewrite, while the second is a predicate θ that is known
to be true whenever the output of the query/formula is able to affect the final output.
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Rules for formulas are as follows:
rew(x = y, θ) ::= (x = y)
rew(ψ AND η, θ) ::= rew(ψ, θ) AND rew(η, θ)
rew(ψ OR η, θ) ::= rew(ψ, θ) OR rew(η, θ)
rew(NOT ψ, θ) ::= NOT rew(ψ, θ)
rew(EXISTS S , θ) ::= EXISTS rew(S , θ)
The rule for handling queries is more involved. Intuitively, the reason for this complexity
is that we simultaneously push constraints from Q down into its correlated subqueries
and pull constraints from the subqueries up into Q. If we have a query Q of the form
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
WHERE ϕ1 AND . . . AND ϕk
where no ϕi is itself a conjunction then rew(Q, θ) is
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM VR1 AS T1, . . ., VRm AS Tm
WHERE rew(ϕ1, θ1) AND . . . AND rew(ϕk, θk)
where each θi is equal to the conjunction
θ ∧ R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ϕ1) ∧ . . . ∧ gen(ϕi−1) ∧ gen(ϕi+1) ∧ . . . ∧ gen(ϕk)
If Ri is a base relation then the view VRi is a view with body Ri(Ti) and filter
θ ∧ R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ri−1(Ti−1) ∧ Ri+1(Ti+1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ϕ)
where ϕ is equal to (ϕ1 AND . . . AND ϕk). For example, if Q is the query
SELECT U.name FROM User AS U
WHERE EXISTS (SELECT 1 AS one FROM Friend AS F
WHERE F.uid1 = U.uid AND F.uid2 = 4)
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then rew(Q, true) will yield a query of the form
SELECT U.name FROM VU AS U
WHERE EXISTS (SELECT 1 AS one FROM VF AS F
WHERE F.uid1 = U.uid AND F.uid2 = 4)
that replaces the User table with VU and the Friend table with VF . Generalizing the
subquery yields the conjunction
Friend(F.uid1, F.uid2) ∧ (F.uid1 = U.uid) ∧ (F.uid2 = 4)
and this becomes the filter for VU . Within the scope of the inner subquery, θ is defined as
User(U.uid, U.name, U.email)
and therefore the filter for VF is
User(U.uid, U.name, U.email) ∧ (F.uid1 = U.uid) ∧ (F.uid2 = 4)
The first atom of the filter comes from θ, while the remaining two atoms are obtained by
generalizing the subquery’s WHERE clause.
In order to prove the correctness of the rewriting procedure outlined above, it would
be useful to show that if [[ϕ]]DE is false or unknown then [[rew(ϕ, θ)]]
D
E is also false or
unknown, no matter how θ is chosen. However, this might not be true if ϕ contains an
antijoin. Rather than assuming that [[ϕ]]DE evaluates to false or unknown, we assume that
E is not satisfiably extendable w.r.t. gen(ϕ). Proposition 5.3.3 tells us that this is a strictly
stronger hypothesis.
Lemma 5.3.4. Fix an environment E, a SQL formula ϕ, and a filter predicate θ. If E is
not satisfiably extendable w.r.t. gen(ϕ) onD then [[rew(ϕ, θ)]]DE is false or unknown.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on ϕ. If ϕ is of the form (x = y) then rew(ϕ, θ)
takes the form (x = y), so the proof is immediate. If ϕ is of the form (ψ OR η) or the
form (NOT ψ) then [[gen(ϕ)]]DE is always true, so the Lemma is trivially satisfied.
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Suppose ϕ is of the form (ψ AND η). Then gen(ϕ) is of the form gen(ψ) ∧ gen(η).
Let E′ be an extension of E that is defined on all the variables in gen(ψ) and gen(η).
Then E′ is not satisfied on gen(ψ)∧ gen(η), so either gen(ψ) is not satisfied or else gen(η)
is not satisfied; assume WLOG that the former is true. By induction, [[rew(ψ, θ)]]DE′ is
false or unknown, so that [[rew(ϕ, θ)]]DE′ , which is equal to [[rew(ψ, θ) AND rew(η, θ)]]
D
E′ ,
must also be false or unknown. This argument is true for every extension E′ of E, so the
hypothesis follows.
Finally, suppose ϕ is of the form (EXISTS S ) for some subquery S whose WHERE
clause ψ is of the form (ψ1 AND . . . AND ψk) and whose FROM clause is of the form
R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
Then gen(ϕ) is equal to
R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ψ)
Let E′ = E[T1 7→ τ1, . . . ,Tm 7→ τm] for some τ1 ∈ R1, . . . , τm ∈ Rm, and let E′′ be an
extension of E′ that is defined on every variable in gen(ψ). Then E′′ does satisfy gen(ϕ)
by hypothesis, but E′′ satisfies Ri(Ti) for each i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. So it must be the case that
E′′ does not satisfy gen(ψ). But gen(ψ) is the of the form
gen(ψ1) ∧ . . . ∧ gen(ψk)
so there must be some j such that E′′ does not satisfy gen(ψ j). By induction,
[[rew(ψ j, θ j)]]DE′′ must be false or unknown. Since this argument holds for all extensions
E′′ of E′, the WHERE clause of rew(S , θ) is never satisfied, and therefore [[rew(S , θ)]]DE is
empty, and [[rew(ϕ, θ)]]DE is false. 
With the preceding Lemma in place, we are now ready to prove that the correctness
of the rewriting procedure defined above. As usual, the proof is by structural induction.
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The rewriting procedure works whenever E is an environment that satisfies θ. If θ is
the constant true then the rewriting procedure will work for any environment. However,
our handling of subqueries requires us to prove the hypothesis for arbitrary θ.
Theorem 5.3.5. Fix a predicate θ and an environment E such that E is satisfiably
extendable w.r.t. θ, and let X be a formula or query such that f v(X) ⊆ dom(E). If E is
defined on all the variables that are common to gen(X) and θ then [[X]]DE = [[rew(X, θ)]]
D
E .
Proof. For formulas, the argument is straightforward. Given a formula ϕ of the form (x =
y) we have rew(ϕ) = ϕ, so the hypothesis holds trivially. Given a formula ϕ of the form
(ψ AND η), we know by induction that [[ψ]]DE = [[rew(ψ, θ)]]
D
E and [[η]]
D
E = [[rew(η, θ)]]
D
E ,
and therefore
[[rew(ψ AND η, θ)]]DE
= [[rew(ψ, θ) AND rew(η, θ)]]DE
= [[rew(ψ, θ)]]DE AND [[rew(η, θ)]]
D
E
= [[ψ]]DE AND [[η]]
D
E
= [[ψ AND η]]DE
The proof for OR and NOT statements is analogous. For a predicate ϕ of the form
(EXISTS S ) we know by induction that [[rew(S , θ)]]DE = [[S ]]
D
E , so that the former is
empty if and only if the latter is empty. We conclude that
[[rew(EXISTS S , θ)]]DE = [[EXISTS rew(S , θ)]]
D
E = [[EXISTS S ]]
D
E
The argument for queries is more involved. Consider a query Q of the form described
above, and let ϕ be equal to (ϕ1 AND . . . AND ϕk). Select tuples τ1 ∈ R1, . . . , τm ∈ Rm,
and set E′ = E[T1 7→ τ1, . . . ,Tm 7→ τm]. By Proposition 5.3.3, we know that E′ is
satisfiably extendable w.r.t. gen(ϕ) whenever [[ϕ]]DE′ is true. Furthermore, E
′ is satisfiably
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extendable w.r.t. θ by assumption. Since E′ is defined on all variables common to gen(ϕ)
and θ, we conclude that if [[ϕ]]DE′ then E is satisfiably extendable w.r.t. gen(ϕ) ∧ θ. By
Proposition 5.3.2, it follows that replacing each Ri with the corresponding RVi does not
change the query’s answer.
It remains for us to show that the original WHERE clause and the rewritten WHERE
clause are equivalent. More concretely, we claim that [[ϕ1 AND . . . AND ϕk]]DE′ is true
if and only if [[rew(ϕ1, θ1) AND . . . AND rew(ϕk, θk)]]DE′ is true. First suppose that E
′ is
satisfiably extendable w.r.t. gen(ϕi) for each i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. In this case, E′ is satisfiably
extendable for each θi, and therefore [[ϕi]]DE′ = [[rew(ϕi, θi)]]
D
E′ for each i by induction. It
follows that
[[rew(ϕ1, θ1) AND . . . AND rew(ϕk, θk)]]DE′
is true; this is the WHERE clause of the rewritten query.
Now suppose instead that E′ is not satisfiably extendable w.r.t. gen(ϕi) for some i.
By the preceding Lemma, we conclude that [[rew(ϕi, θi)]]DE′ is false or unknown as well.
This means that the rewritten WHERE clause is false or unknown, and so performing the
rewriting does not change the final answer. 
5.3.3 Query Generalization and Disclosure Orders
Section 5.1.2 defines a disclosure order that allows us to compare the amounts of infor-
mation revealed about the body atoms of two filter-project queries. There is a strong
connection between this notion of information disclosure and the transformation from
SQL to filter-project queries discussed in Section 5.3.1. In this section we explain and
formalize the connection. Suppose that, as in the preceding example, Q is the query
SELECT U.name AS name, F.uid2 AS uid2
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FROM User AS U, Friend AS F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4
We showed earlier in this section that Q could be rewritten as
SELECT U.name AS name, F.uid2 AS uid2
FROM VU AS U, VF AS F
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1 AND F.uid2 = 4
where VU and VF are defined by
VU(u, n) :− User(u, n, e) n Friend(u1, u2) ∧ (u = u1) ∧ (u2 = 4)
VF(u1, u2) :− Friend(u1, u2) n User(u, n, e) ∧ (u = u1) ∧ (u2 = 4)
respectively.1 The rewriting depends only on VF and VU , so the answers to VF and VU
must uniquely determine the answer to Q on any possible dataset. However, we can show
a much stronger result: if V′ is any set of filter-project queries such that {VF ,VU}  V′
then V′ also determines the answer to Q. For instance, if we define
V ′U(u, n, e) :− User(u, n, e)
V ′F(u1, u2) :− Friend(u1, u2)
then {VU ,VF}  {V ′U ,V ′F}, and therefore V ′U and V ′F uniquely determine the answer to Q
on any possible dataset. This is true even though V  V′ does not generally imply that
the answers to the views in V′ determine the answers to the views in V. For example,
although {VU}  {V ′U}, it is not the case that V ′U determines the answer to VU . In particular,
V ′U does not depend on the Friend relation, whereas VU does. However, {V ′U ,V ′F} still
determines Q because V ′U tells us everything we need to know about the User relation to
answer Q and V ′F tells us everything we need to know about the Friend relation. This
intuition is formalized by the following result.
1Rather than using fully qualified table columns names as we did above, we use much shorter variable
names to enhance readability.
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Proposition 5.3.6. Let Q be a SQL query, and let V = {VR1 , . . . ,VRm} be the views
referenced in the FROM clauses of Q and its subqueries. If V′ is a set of views such that
V  V′ then the views in V′ uniquely determine the answer to Q on any possible dataset.
Proof. For each VRi ∈ V we have {VRi}  V′, so there exists a rewriting V ′Ri of VRi using
V′. The transformation described in Section 5.3.1 replaces each reference to a relation Ri
in Q with a view VRi that reveals a subset of the rows and columns of Ri. Since {VRi}  V′,
the view VRi must have a rewriting V
′
Ri using V
′. By Proposition 5.1.8, we must have
Res(BodyCond(VRi),D) ⊆ Res(BodyCond(V ′Ri),D)
for all datasetD. This means that V ′Ri contains the same columns as VRi and contains a
superset of the rows. So we can replace each VRi in the rewritten version of Q with V
′
Ri
without affecting the correctness of Proposition 5.3.2. 
5.4 Condition Graphs
In the previous section we showed how to generate a collection of filter-project queries
that acted as an upper bound on the information needed to compute a SQL query’s answer.
We now present a different algorithm that solves the same problem by constructing and
then traversing a directed graph, which we refer to as a condition graph. For queries in
the restricted fragment of SQL discussed above, the two algorithms are equivalent, so
the condition graph algorithm is provably correct. The condition graph algorithm works
with many features that do not appear in the fragment of SQL defined in Section 5.2;
for queries containing such features we offer informal arguments of correctness. Our
running example will reference the queries in Figure 5.6.
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(a) SELECT U1.name FROM User U1, Friend F1
WHERE F1.uid1 = 1 AND F1.uid2 = U1.uid
(b) SELECT U1.name
FROM User U1 LEFT OUTER JOIN Friend F1
ON (F1.uid1 = 1 AND F1.uid2 = U1.uid)
(c) SELECT U1.name
FROM User U1 FULL OUTER JOIN Friend F1
ON (F1.uid1 = 1 AND F1.uid2 = U1.uid)
(d) SELECT U1.name
FROM User U1, Friend F1, Friend F2
WHERE F1.uid1 = 1 AND F1.uid2 = F2.uid1
AND F2.uid2 = U.uid
(e) SELECT U1.name FROM User U1 WHERE U1.uid IN
(SELECT F1.uid2 FROM Friend F1
WHERE F1.uid1 = 1)
Figure 5.6: SQL queries handled by our condition graph algorithm.
5.4.1 Constructing Condition Graphs
The condition graph for a query Q contains one node (labeled σ) for each SELECT
statement in the query, one node (labeled Z) for each two-way join in the query’s logical
evaluation plan, and one node for each table instance defined by the query. Figures 5.7a
through 5.7e show the condition graphs for the SQL queries from Figures 5.6a through
5.6e respectively.
In many cases, condition graphs bear a deceptive resemblance to expression trees in
the Relational Algebra. However, there are a number of important differences between
the two. Edges in condition graphs can be unidirectional or bidirectional, and every
condition graph must contain a SELECT node at its root. Furthermore, the same nodes
appear in the graph regardless of whether we perform an inner join or an outer join.
However, the directions of edges between those nodes can change depending on the
type of join we are dealing with (Figures 5.7a, 5.7b, and 5.7c). And finally, SELECT
nodes can have multiple children (Figure 5.7e). One child represents the FROM clause of
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Figure 5.7: Condition graphs for queries from Fig. 5.6
the corresponding SELECT statement, while the remaining children represent correlated
subqueries that appear in the statement’s WHERE and HAVING clauses. Temporary tables
(not shown here) are handled in a similar manner to nested subqueries.
Once we have constructed the condition graph we can determine which semijoin filter
atoms should appear in each of the output queries. Our criterion is based on reachability
in the condition graph: a directed path from table instance R to table instance S indicates
that a tuple in R can only affect the query’s output if it can be joined with a tuple from S .
In our running example, QU1 should contain a filter atom for F1 precisely when the node
associated with F1 is reachable from the node associated with U1 in the condition graph.
For the query in Figure 5.6a we obtain
QU1(u, n) :− U(u, n, h) n F(u1, u2)
QF1(u1, u2) :− F(u1, u2) n U(u, n, h)
The situation will be similar for the left outer join query in Figure 5.7b except that QU1
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will not contain any filter atoms. For the full outer join query in Figure 5.7c neither QU1
nor QF1 will contain any filter atoms. An analogous criterion can be used for other types
of queries, including those in Figures 5.7d and 5.7e.
The next step is to find equality constraints that should be added to QU1 and QF1.
We begin by finding all SELECT nodes that are reachable from the condition graph node
associated with U1. We then check the WHERE and HAVING clauses of the corresponding
SELECT statements for equality constraints that must hold for all tuples in the statements’
outputs. In the query from Figure 5.6a, we obtain two constraints: (F1.uid1 = 1)
and (F1.uid2 = U1.uid). When we integrate both constraints into QU1 we obtain the
filter-project query
QU1(u, n) :− U(u, n, h) n F(u1, u2) ∧ (u1 = 1) ∧ (u2 = u)
which can be simplified to
QU1(u, n) :− U(u, n, h) n F(1, u)
An analogous process can be performed with QF1 to obtain
QF1(1, u2) :− F(1, u2) n U(u2, n, h)
The filter-project queries QU1 and QF1 comprise the output of our extraction algorithm.
5.4.2 Correctness for Restricted SQL Queries
We now show that the condition graph algorithm discussed above is equivalent to the
rewriting algorithm from Section 5.3.2 for queries expressed in the fragment of SQL
defined in Section 5.2. Correctness of the condition graph algorithm then follows
immediately from the correctness of the rewriting algorithm.
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Recall that if Q is a query of the form
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM R1 AS T1, . . ., Rm AS Tm
WHERE ϕ1 AND . . . AND ϕk
then rew(Q, θ) is
SELECT A1 AS N1, . . ., An AS Nn
FROM VR1 AS T1, . . ., VRm AS Tm
WHERE rew(ϕ1, θ1) AND . . . AND rew(ϕk, θk)
where each θi is equal to the conjunction
θ ∧ R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ϕ1) ∧ . . . ∧ gen(ϕi−1) ∧ gen(ϕi+1) ∧ . . . ∧ gen(ϕk)
and if Ri is a base relation then the view VRi is a view with body Ri(Ti) and filter
θ ∧ R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ri−1(Ti−1) ∧ Ri+1(Ti+1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ϕ)
where ϕ is equal to (ϕ1 AND . . . AND ϕk).
The crux of our argument is that if Ri is a relation that appears in the FROM clause
of Q then traversing the subtree rooted at ϕ j is equivalent to appending gen(ϕ j) to the
filter of VRi . Traversing the node for Rk when k , i is equivalent to appending Rk(Tk)
to the filter of VRi . And traversing the remainder of the condition graph is equivalent to
appending θ to the filter of VRi . So performing a traversal of the condition graph starting
at Ri will yield the filter for VRi shown above.
Our proof relies on the following Lemma, which shows an equivalence between
traversing a condition graph and generalizing SQL formulas. We write χ to denote the
list of filter atoms in VRi .
Lemma 5.4.1. Traversing a SELECT block S and all of its children is equivalent to
appending gen(EXISTS S ) to χ.
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Proof. Suppose that the statement (R j AS T j) appears in the FROM clause of S . Then
traversing the corresponding node in the condition graph will cause us to append the
atom R j(T j) to χ.
Now suppose that ϕ j is a formula in the WHERE clause of S . If ϕ j is of the form (x = y)
then a the predicate (x = y) will be appended to χ when we traverse the node associated
with S ; this is equivalent to appending gen(ϕ j) to χ. By assumption, ϕ j is not of the form
(ψ1 AND ψ2), so we can ignore that case. If ϕ j is of the form (ψ1 OR ψ2) or the form
(NOT psi1) then it will have no impact on χ; furthermore, gen(ϕ j) is true in these cases.
Finally, suppose ϕ j is of the form EXISTS S ′. By induction, traversing S ′ and all its
children is equivalent to appending gen(EXISTS S ′) to χ.
Combining these observations we see that traversing S and all of its children is
equivalent to appending gen(EXISTS S ) to χ. 
We are now ready to prove equivalence of the condition graph traversal algorithm
and the rewriting procedure defined above.
Proposition 5.4.2. Fix a query Q, and suppose that the FROM clause of Q or one of its
subqueries contains the statement (Ri AS Ti). The filter χ generated by traversing the
query’s condition graph from the node associated with Ri is the same as the filter created
for VRi by rew(Q, true) up to reordering of conjuncts.
Proof. The original condition graph traversal algorithm starts at the node associated with
(Ri AS Ti) and visits every vertex that is reachable from that node (except the starting
node itself). However, we consider a variant of the algorithm that visits exactly the same
nodes in a different order. Our algorithm starts at the root SELECT block and descends
recursively into its children. Our claim is that this traversal yields the correct value of χ.
The actual traversal is the same except that nodes will be visited in a different order; this
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can affect the order of the conjuncts in χ but will not affect the truth value of χ because
conjunction is a commutative operation.
Starting from the root node S our algorithm first visits nodes corresponding to FROM
clause statements in S . It then visits all the subtrees associated with the WHERE clause of
S except for the one that contains (Ri AS Ti). This is equivalent to appending
R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ϕ1) ∧ . . . ∧ gen(ϕi−1) ∧ gen(ϕi+1) ∧ · · · ∧ gen(ϕk)
to χ. Finally, it descends into the last WHERE clause node; at that point, θ is equal to χ.
The process is repeated as necessary: we may need to descend into multiple layers of
correlated subqueries before we reach the SELECT block whose FROM clause contains
(Ri AS Ti). At each step, θ and χ are the same up to reordering of conjuncts.
We will eventually reach the SELECT block S ′ that has (Ri AS S i) in its FROM clause.
We traverse every FROM clause node except for the one associated with (Ri AS S i); this
has the effect of appending
R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ri−1(Ti−1) ∧ Ri+1(Ti+1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm)
to χ. We then traverse S and all of its WHERE clause children; this has the effect of
appending gen(ϕ) to χ. At the end of the process, the nodes in χ are exactly
θ ∧ R1(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ri−1(Ti−1) ∧ Ri+1(Ti+1) ∧ . . . ∧ Rm(Tm) ∧ gen(ϕ)
as desired. 
5.4.3 Correctness for Extended SQL
We now argue informally that condition graphs can be applied to a wide variety of SQL
features beyond the ones in our core query language.
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• Ambiguously named columns or unqualified column names can be disambiguated as
a preprocessing step. SELECT * can be expanded to list the names of the referenced
columns. And table instances can be assigned globally unique names. For example,
SELECT * FROM User WHERE uid = 4
can be rewritten as
SELECT U.uid AS uid, U.name AS name, U.hobby AS hobby
FROM User AS U
WHERE U.uid = 4
• When determining which filter atoms a view should have we can conservatively assume
that a complex selection predicate always evaluates to true; making this assumption
can only increase the number of tuples in the input relations that can affect the query’s
answer. For example, we can replace the query
SELECT * FROM User WHERE U.name = ’Alice’ AND U.uid < 5
with the query
SELECT * FROM User WHERE U.name = ’Alice’
Any row in U that can affect the first query’s answer can also affect the second query’s
answer. This argument, which can applied to a wide variety of selection predicates,
is an application of Proposition 5.3.2 above, and it naturally extends of the way our
query generalization algorithm handles negation and disjunction.
• Although we only consider select-project-join query blocks in our core language,
most clauses that might appear in a SELECT statement, including GROUP BY, HAVING,
aggregation, ORDER BY, and LIMIT, are logically evaluated after the query’s WHERE
clause. For instance, evaluating the query
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM User GROUP BY name
is logically equivalent to evaluating the much simpler query
SELECT name FROM User
and then counting the number of tuples associated with each name.
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• Dealing with set operations such as Q1 UNION ALL Q2 is conceptually straightfor-
ward: we compute a set of filter-project views that determines the answer to Q1 and
another set of views that determines the answer to Q2; the union of these two sets must
determine the answer to Q1 UNION ALL Q2.
• Outer joins can be rewritten using semijoins and unions. For example, the query
SELECT U.uid AS uid, F.uid2 AS uid2
FROM User AS U LEFT OUTER JOIN Friend AS F
ON (U.uid = F.uid1)
can be rewritten as
(SELECT U1.uid AS uid, F1.uid2 AS uid2
FROM User AS U1, Friend AS F1
WHERE U.uid = F.uid1)
UNION ALL
(SELECT U2.uid AS uid, NULL AS uid2
FROM User AS U2
WHERE NOT EXISTS
(SELECT * FROM Friend AS F2 WHERE U2.uid = F2.uid1))
Notice that the filter-project queries generated for F1 and F2 will both contain filter
atoms associated with the User relation; in fact, they will contain exactly the same
filter atoms up to isomorphism. However, the filter-project view generated for U1 will
contain a filter atom for the Friend relation, while the one associated with U2 will not.
The filter-project query generated for U2 will contain strictly more tuples than the one
generated for U1. Consequently, the filter-project queries generated for the query
SELECT U2.uid, NULL AS uid2
FROM User AS U2
WHERE NOT EXISTS
(SELECT * FROM Friend AS F2 WHERE U2.uid = F2.uid1)
will contain enough information to answer the original outer join on any possible
dataset. This observation justifies the graph topology in Figure 5.7(b).
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5.5 Summary
The results in this Chapter provide us with an end-to-end pipeline for reasoning about
information disclosure in complex SQL queries. We first generalize the SQL queries to
filter-project queries using the techniques discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. If desired,
we can subsequently use the analysis from Section 5.1 to efficiently label the resulting
filter-project queries as a post-processing step.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPLAINABLE SECURITY
In Chapter 3 we introduced disclosure labeling, which allowed us to reason about the
information needed to answer a database query. The results of Chapter 3 were extended
to richer query languages in Chapters 4 and 5. In this Chapter we discuss two applications
of disclosure labeling. Our main application is explainable security, a new security model
in which every security policy decision is accompanied by a formal justification, which
we call an explanation. However, we also show at the end of this Chapter how the same
results can be applied to the problem of query pricing proposed by Koutris et al. [35].
Our security guarantees are the same as in Chapter 3. A principal is granted access to
a set of views P, which we refer to as a security policy. He is then permitted to learn the
answer to any query Q whose answer is uniquely determined by the views in P on any
possible dataset, so that {Q}  P. In Section 6.1 we show how to construct a Boolean
formula that precisely characterizes the policies which satisfy this condition. In Section
6.2 we show how these policy formulas can be used to generate explanations for policy
decisions, and in Section 6.3 we discuss applications of policy formulas to query pricing.
6.1 Policy Formulas and Explanations
We start with a set of security views V defined by a human administrator. Each view in V
roughly corresponds to a single permission that a principal may or may not be granted. A
policy formula is a Boolean formula in which every security view is treated as a variable.
Policy formulas over V are formally defined using the BNF grammar
τ ::= 0 | 1 | V | (τ ∨ τ) | (τ ∧ τ)
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V1(u, n, h) :− User(u, n, h)
V2(u, n) :− User(u, n, h)
V3(1, n, h) :− User(1, n, h)
V4(h) :− User(u, n, h)
V5(u1, u2) :− Friend(u1, u2)
V6(1, u2) :− Friend(1, u2)
Figure 6.1: A set of security views
where each V is a security view in V. The constant 0 corresponds to a policy in which
a query’s execution is never permitted, while the constant 1 corresponds to a policy in
which a query’s execution is always permitted.
Consider the set of security views in Figure 6.1. The policy formula V1 indicates that
a principal must be granted access to the view V1 in order to execute a given query. The
formula (V1 ∨ V3) indicates that the principal must be granted access to either the view
V1 or the view V3. The formula (V1 ∧ V6) indicates that the principal must be granted
access to both the view V1 and the view V6.
In general, a policy formula ϕ can be attached to any query Q (or more generally,
any set of queries) over the dataset; the formula is then used by the reference monitor to
decide whether a given principal can execute Q. Given the set of security views P that the
principal is granted access to, the reference monitor (RM) checks whether P ` ϕ. If so,
the RM will allow the principal to execute Q; otherwise, the RM will deny the request.
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This check can be performed in linear time by recursively applying the following rules:
P ` 1 and P 0 0
P ` V if and only if V ∈ P
P ` (ϕ ∨ ψ) if and only if P ` ϕ or P ` ψ
P ` (ϕ ∧ ψ) if and only if P ` ϕ and P ` ψ
It is important to realize that the check described above is agnostic to the question of
how the views in P are computed. Consequently, the model is relevant even for systems
that rely on role-based access control or similar schemes where the process of computing
P can be arbitrarily complicated.
6.1.1 Generating Data-Derived Formulas
We now show how to generate data-derived policy formulas for database queries. Recall
that a data-derived policy specifies that a principal with access to views in P can receive
the answer to query Q if and only if {Q}  P. As explained in the Introduction, most
policies used in practice are not data-derived; we believe this is because checking directly
whether {Q}  P makes policy decisions computationally expensive and tricky for
humans to understand.
On the other hand, given a policy formula ϕ, checking whether P ` ϕ is straightfor-
ward and can be performed quickly even for large formulas. We therefore propose to
encode data-derived policy functions using policy formulas. That is, we want a system
that can take a query Q and compute a policy formula ϕ such that, for any subset P of
the security views, P ` ϕ if and only if {Q}  P. Intuitively, ϕ tells us precisely which
combinations of the security views contain enough information to uniquely determine
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the answer to Q. For example, consider the query
Q7(h) :− User(1, n, h)
Given the security views defined in Figure 6.1, Q7 can be answered if the principal is
granted access to at least one of the views V1 or V3. This is both a necessary and a
sufficient condition. No other view except V4 reveals the Hobby field of the User relation,
and V4 does not contain enough information to determine which hobby is associated with
User 1. The policy formula for Q7 is therefore
(V1 ∨ V3)
The question arises whether it is always possible to compute the formula ϕ we desire.
The answer is yes; there is a very deep connection between disclosure lattices and policy
formulas. Given any set of queries Q over the dataset there is a policy formula ϕ such
that P ` ϕ if and only if Q  P for every subset P of the security views. Furthermore, it
is possible to compute ϕ in a completely automated fashion.
Given a set of queries Q, there is a simple algorithm that computes policy(Q). The
basic idea is to compute all the subsets of the security views which contain enough
information to answer the queries in Q. Formally, let V denote the set of security views.
Then we define
policy(Q) =
∨
P⊆V: QV
∧
V∈P
V
The outer disjunction iterates over all the subsets of P that contain enough information to
answer Q. For each such subset, the conjunction of the views in P suffices to answer Q.
We now verify the correctness of this algorithm.
Theorem 6.1.1. For every set of queries Q ⊆ U and every security policy P ⊆ V it is the
case that Q  P if and only if P ` policy(Q).
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Proof. First suppose that Q  P. Then ∧V∈P V appears as a disjunct in policy(Q), and
therefore P ` ∧V∈P V . It follows that P ` policy(Q) as well.
For the other direction, suppose that P ` policy(Q). Then there must be some P′ ⊆ V
such that P ` ∧V∈P′ V . This means that P′ ⊆ P, and therefore Q  P′  P. The desired
result now follows from the transitivity of disclosure orders. 
Efficiency, however, is another matter entirely. The number of security views can be
quite large, and the size of a policy formula can be exponential in the number of security
views. We must limit policy formulas to a manageable size if they are to be used in
practice. We can ensure that this is the case by requiring the universe U of possible views
to be decomposable.
Formally, U is said to be decomposable if for every query Q and all sets of views V
and V′, {Q}  V ∪ V′ implies {Q}  V or {Q}  V′. Put another way, if neither V alone
nor V′ alone contains enough information to answer Q then the union of the two sets still
will not contain enough information to answer Q.
Decomposability holds when we restrict our attention to the universe Usingle of single-
atom conjunctive queries and views; it does not generally hold when applied to multi-atom
queries and views in the obvious way. We restrict our attention to single-atom queries
and views for now.
When decomposability holds, it is possible to compute concise policy formulas for
arbitrary queries. Given a set of queries Q and a set of security views V, the following
formula allows us to compute the formula governing Q:
policy(Q) =
∧
Q∈Q
∨
V∈V: {Q}{V}
V
For any subset P of the security views, P ` policy(Q) if and only if Q  P. Consequently,
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1: procedure Policy(Q, V)
2: ϕ← 1
3: for Q ∈ Q do
4: ψ← 0
5: for V ∈ V do
6: if {Q}  {V} then
7: ψ← (ψ ∨ V)
8: end if
9: end for
10: ϕ← (ϕ ∧ ψ)
11: end for
12: return ϕ
13: end procedure
Figure 6.2: Algorithm for computing policy formulas (decomposable case)
policy(Q) tells us exactly which combinations of the security views reveal enough
information to answer all the queries in Q. Furthermore, its size is polynomial in both
the number of queries and the number of security views. We now verify the correctness
of this revised procedure.
Theorem 6.1.2. Suppose that U is decomposable, and let V ⊆ U be a set of security
views. For every set of queries Q ⊆ U and every policy P ⊆ V we have Q  P if and only
if P ` policy(Q).
Proof. We first prove the Theorem for the special case where Q contains a single element
Q. Since U is decomposable,
{Q}  P
if and only if {Q}  {V} for some V ∈ P
if and only if {Q}  {V} and P ` V for some V ∈ V
if and only if P ` ϕQ
where ϕQ =
∨
V∈V: {Q}{V}
V
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We now generalize the proof to sets Q of arbitrary size:
Q  P
if and only if {Q}  P for every Q ∈ Q
if and only if P ` ϕQ for every Q ∈ Q
if and only if P ` policy(Q) 
The algorithm in Figure 6.2 computes the policy formula for a set of queries Q with
respect to a collection of security views V. It begins by setting the policy formula to 1
(Line 2) – an empty set of queries should always be permitted. It then loops through
the list of queries in Q (Lines 3-11), computes a separate policy formula for each query
(Line 4-9), and returns the conjunction of all the resulting formulas (Line 12); the result
is a policy formula over the views in V.
The inner loop (Lines 4-9) computes the policy formula for a single query Q. It starts
by setting the formula to 0 (Line 4) – if no security view contains enough information
to answer Q then the query’s execution should be disallowed. It then loops through all
the security views in V and takes the disjunction of all the views that contain enough
information to answer Q (Lines 5-9).
For example, let Q contain the queries
Q8(1, n) :− User(1, n, h)
Q9(h) :− User(u, n, h)
and let V consist of the views from Figure 6.1. Then
policy({Q8}) = V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3
policy({Q9}) = V1 ∨ V4
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and therefore
policy({Q8,Q9}) = (V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3) ∧ (V1 ∨ V4)
Given a set of queries Q, we have shown that there is a formula policy(Q) such that
Q  P if and only if P ` policy(Q). It is natural to ask whether we can go in the other
direction: given a formula ϕ, can we find a set of queries Q such that Q  P if and only
if P ` ϕ? In general, the answer is no. There are two basic difficulties. The first is that ϕ
may be inconsistent. For instance, it is possible to grant a principal access to V1 but not V2
even though the former reveals strictly more information about the dataset than the latter.
Even if we disallow such inconsistencies, however, we cannot guarantee that a policy
will correspond to any meaningful level of information disclosure. For instance (V1 ∨ V5)
is a policy that requires access to either the User relation or the Friend relation (but
does not require access to both). Unless we permit foreign-key constraints, the two views
reveal completely disjoint types of information about the dataset, and so only a trivial
(database-independent) query can be answered using the information that is common to
the two views.
In summary, we have shown how to represent the security policy governing any
query over the dataset as a data-derived policy formula. We do this by exploiting a deep
connection between disclosure lattices that precisely quantify information disclosure and
policy formulas that are easy for a reference monitor to evaluate. For every query Q
we compute a formula ϕ; the reference monitor makes policy decisions by evaluating
ϕ against the list of permissions P that were granted to the principal. If the universe of
queries is decomposable then policy formulas are guaranteed to be small and easy to
reason about. However, it is possible to compute policy formulas for queries even when
decomposability does not hold.
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6.1.2 Minimal Policy Formulas
In the discussion above, our goal was to characterize all the sets of views that contained
enough information to uniquely determine the answer to a given query. However, not all
sets of views are created equal. Consider the policy formula
policy({Q8,Q9}) = (V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3) ∧ (V1 ∨ V4)
from our running example. A principal who wishes to learn the answers to Q8 and Q9
can either request access to V1 or can request access to V2 and V4. The latter is preferable
because it reveals less information about the dataset: a principal who is granted access
to V1 can see which hobbies are associated with which users, whereas a principal who
is granted access to V2 and V4 generally cannot. We now consider the problem of
characterizing all the sets of views that contain enough information to answer Q but are
minimal in the sense that they reveal as little additional information about the dataset as
possible. (As we will see, it is also minimal in the usual set-theoretic sense.)
Given a set of queries Q and a set of security views V, we begin by computing the
policy formula for Q. We then apply the Distributive Law repeatedly until the formula is
in Disjunctive Normal Form. For example, when we apply the Distributive Law to the
policy formula above we obtain the expanded formula
(V1 ∧ V1) ∨ (V1 ∧ V4) ∨ (V2 ∧ V1) ∨ (V2 ∧ V4) ∨ (V3 ∧ V1) ∨ (V3 ∧ V4)
We next create a new set of axiomsA that encodes the relative amounts of information
disclosed by different sets of views. Let V be a security view in V, and let V′ ⊆ V. If
{V}  V′ thenA contains the implication
(∧
V′
)
⇒ V
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V1 ⇒ V2 V1 ⇒ V4
V1 ⇒ V3 V5 ⇒ V6
Figure 6.3: Axioms encoding relative information revealed by sets of views.
In our running example,A contains the axiom (V1 ⇒ V2) because {V2}  {V1}. Intuitively,
this axiom states that any principal who is granted access to V1 should also be granted
access to V2 because V2 reveals strictly less information about the dataset than V1. A full
list of axioms in our running example is shown in Figure 6.3.
In general, the size ofA can be exponential in the number of security views. However,
if the universe of queries is decomposable thenA only needs to contain axioms of the
form (V ′ ⇒ V) where V and V ′ are individual views. In this case, the size of A is at
most quadratic in the number of security views. To justify this optimization, suppose
that {V}  {V ′,V ′′}. Then {V}  {V ′} or else {V}  {V ′′}. In the first case we have
A ` V ′ ⇒ V and in the second we have A ` V ′′ ⇒ V . In either case it follows that
A ` (V ′ ∧ V ′′)⇒ V .
Finally, if policy(Q) contains a pair of disjuncts ϕ and ϕ′ such thatA ` ϕ⇒ ϕ′ then
we remove the disjunct ϕ from policy(Q). In the example above,
A ` (V1 ∧ V1)⇒ (V2 ∧ V1)
so we remove the disjunct (V1 ∧V1) from policy(Q). We repeat the process until no more
disjuncts can be removed. This step eliminates any non-minimal disjuncts in policy(Q).
After applying the procedure to the policy formula in our running example, every disjunct
that references V1 is removed, and we are left with the formula
(V2 ∧ V4) ∨ (V3 ∧ V4)
The result minpolicy(Q) of the procedure described above is logically equivalent to
the original policy formula policy(Q). For any policy P we haveA ∪ P ` policy(Q) if
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and only ifA∪P ` minpolicy(Q). This is true because the procedure outlined above first
converts the policy formula to DNF and then removes disjuncts ϕ such thatA ` ϕ⇒ ϕ′.
Converting a formula to DNF does not affect its truth value. Furthermore, ifA ` ϕ⇒ ϕ′
then any policy P such that A ∪ P ` ϕ also satisfies A ∪ P ` ϕ′, so removing ϕ won’t
affect the truth value of minpolicy(Q).
The resulting policy formula is also minimal in two different senses of the word.
First, any disjuncts that revealed more information about the dataset than we need to
answer Q have been removed: if V  V′ and V′  V then the disjunct associated
with V′ will imply the disjunct associated with V, and will therefore be removed. And
second, removing any more disjuncts from minpolicy(Q) would change its truth value.
Let ϕ be a disjunct of minpolicy(Q), and let badpolicy(Q) be the formula obtained by
removing ϕ from minpolicy(Q). Our claim is that badpolicy(Q) and minpolicy(Q) can’t
be logically equivalent. Let P be a policy that contains exactly the views that appear in
ϕ. ThenA∪ P ` minpolicy(Q). On the other hand,A∪ P 0 ϕ′ for every disjunct ϕ′ in
badpolicy(Q), so thatA∪ P 0 badpolicy(Q).
The discussion above demonstrates how to compute the minimal sets of views that
contain enough information to answer a principal’s queries but which reveal as little
additional information about the dataset as possible. Minimal policy formulas are closely
related to disclosure labels: a minimal policy formula identifies all the minimal subsets
of the security views that determine a query’s answer, whereas a disclosure label ensures
that the security views are selected so that the minimal set of views is essentially unique.
Unfortunately, the process outlined above requires us to expand a CNF formula to
DNF, which can result in exponential blowup. We therefore believe that the algorithm
discussed above is primarily of theoretical rather than practical interest, at least in its
current form.
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6.2 Explanations
Policy formulas are not just useful for enforcement; they can be used to generate expla-
nations, which are mathematical objects that justify the RM’s policy decisions.
Explanations come in two varieties: why-so explanations and why-not explanations.
If the execution of a query Q is authorized, a why-so explanation indicates which of
the principal’s permissions were responsible for the positive authorization decision. If
the execution of Q is not authorized, a why-not explanation indicates which additional
permissions need to be granted before the query can be successfully executed. Both types
of explanations can be efficiently computed from policy(Q).
As before, let Q denote a set of queries, V denote a set of security views, and let
P ⊆ V be the subset of the security views that a principal has been granted access to.
A why-so explanation for Q characterizes exactly which subsets of P contain enough
information to answer Q. It can be obtained by replacing every view V in policy(Q) that
the principal has not been granted access to with the constant 0. For example, suppose
Q = {Q8,Q9}, so that
policy(Q) = (V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3) ∧ (V1 ∨ V4)
If the principal is granted access to V1 and V2 then the why-so explanation for Q w.r.t.
{V1,V2} is
(V1 ∨ V2 ∨ 0) ∧ (V1 ∨ 0) = (V1 ∨ V2) ∧ (V1) = V1
indicating that V1 was solely responsible for the positive authorization decision. If the
principal is instead granted access to {V2,V3,V4}, the why-so explanation for Q is
(0 ∨ V2 ∨ V3) ∧ (0 ∨ V4) = (V2 ∨ V3) ∧ (V4)
indicating that in order to answer the query, the principal would need access to V4 and at
least one of V2 and V3.
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We can are now ready to formally define why-so explanations. Intuitively, the goal is
to characterize the subsets P′′ of the current policy P that satisfy ϕ.
Definition 6.2.1. A why-so explanation for ϕ w.r.t. a policy P is a formula ϕS such that,
for every P′ ⊆ P, we have P′ ` ϕS if and only if P′ ` ϕ. Furthermore, ϕS is only permitted
to reference the views in P.
We now verify the correctness of the procedure outlined above. Given a formula ϕ,
we write ϕ
(
0
V\P
)
to denote the formula obtained by taking ϕ and replacing each view in
(V\P) with the constant 0.
Theorem 6.2.2. ϕ
(
0
V\P
)
is a why-so explanation for ϕ w.r.t. P.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on ϕ. Fix P′ ⊆ P.
• If ϕ = V then
P′ ` ϕ
(
0
V\P
)
if and only if V < (V\P) and V ∈ P′
if and only if V ∈ P and V ∈ P′
if and only if V ∈ P′ (since P′ ⊆ P)
if and only if P′ ` ϕ
• ϕ = (ψ1 ∨ ψ2) then
P′ ` ϕ
(
0
V\P
)
if and only if P′ ` ψ1
(
0
V\P
)
or P′ ` ψ2
(
0
V\P
)
if and only if P′ ` ψ1 or P′ ` ψ2 (by induction)
if and only if P′ ` ϕ
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• ϕ = (ψ1 ∧ ψ2) then
P′ ` ϕ
(
0
V\P
)
if and only if P′ ` ψ1
(
0
V\P
)
and P′ ` ψ2
(
0
V\P
)
if and only if P′ ` ψ1 and P′ ` ψ2 (by induction)
if and only if P′ ` ϕ 
If the RM’s authorization decision is negative, a why-not explanation identifies the
additional permissions that would need to be granted in order to reverse the decision. A
why-not explanation is obtained by replacing every view V in policy(Q) that the principal
has been granted access to with the constant 1. If
policy(Q) = (V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3) ∧ (V1 ∨ V4)
then the why-not explanation for Q w.r.t. {V2,V3} is
(V1 ∨ 1 ∨ 1) ∧ (V1 ∨ V4) = 1 ∧ (V1 ∨ V4) = (V1 ∨ V4)
indicating that in order to execute the queries in Q, the principal would need to be granted
additional access to at least one of the permissions V1 and V4. Similarly, the why-not
explanation for Q w.r.t. {V4} is
(V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3) ∧ (V1 ∨ 1)
= (V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3) ∧ 1
= (V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3)
indicating that the principal would need to be granted access to at least one of the views
V1, V2, and V3 before all the queries in Q could be answered.
We next formalize why-not explanations. The basic idea is to characterize the
additional views P′′ that would need to be added to P in order to ensure that ϕ is satisfied.
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Definition 6.2.3. A why-not explanation for ϕ w.r.t. a policy P is a formula ϕN such that,
for every P′ ⊆ (V\P), we have P′ ` ϕN if and only if P ∪ P′ ` ϕ. Furthermore, ϕN is only
permitted to reference the views in (V\P).
We now verify the correctness of the procedure outlined above. As before, ϕ
(
1
P
)
denotes the formula obtained taking ϕ and replacing every view in P with the constant 1.
Theorem 6.2.4. ϕ
(
1
P
)
is a why-not explanation for ϕ w.r.t. P.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on ϕ. Fix P′ ⊆ (V\P).
• If ϕ = V then
P′ ` ϕ
(
1
P
)
if and only if V ∈ P or V ∈ P′
if and only if V ∈ P ∪ P′
if and only if P ∪ P′ ` ϕ
• If ϕ = (ψ1 ∨ ψ2) then
P′ ` ϕ
(
1
P
)
if and only if P′ ` ψ1
(
1
P
)
or P′ ` ψ2
(
1
P
)
if and only if P ∪ P′ ` ψ1 or P ∪ P′ ` ψ2 (by induction)
if and only if P ∪ P′ ` ψ1 ∨ ψ2
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• If ϕ = (ψ1 ∧ ψ2) then
P′ ` ϕ
(
1
P
)
if and only if P′ ` ψ1
(
1
P
)
and P′ ` ψ2
(
1
P
)
if and only if P ∪ P′ ` ψ1 and P ∪ P′ ` ψ2 (by induction)
if and only if P ∪ P′ ` ψ1 ∧ ψ2 
Why-so and why-not explanations are helpful to both the principal and the system
administrator. From the administrator’s perspective, if the principal holds some permis-
sions that never show up in why-so explanations for his or her queries, this may be an
indication that the principal is overprivileged and that those unused permissions should
be revoked. On the other hand, from the principal’s perspective, if a query is denied, the
why-not explanation provides clear guidance on which additional permissions to request
from the appropriate granting entity. With our data-derived policy formulas, both kinds
of explanations are straightforward to compute at query time.
6.3 Query Pricing
In addition to assisting in the derivation of why-so and why-not explanations, explicit
policy expressions can also be applied to the problem of query pricing. [35] Adapted to
the terminology of our framework, an administrator defines a set of security views V and
independently assigns a separate price pi(V) to each view V ∈ V. A user who purchases a
subset P of the security views can issue any query he likes, so long as we can ensure that
the query’s answer is uniquely determined by the answers to the views he has purchased.
Given a set of queries Q that a principal wants answered, our goal is to find a subset
172
P ⊆ V such that Q  P and the total price ∑V∈Q pi(V) is minimal subject to this restriction.
The first condition ensures that P contains enough information to answer all the queries
in Q, while the second ensures that the total purchase price is minimized.
The problem can be solved by setting up a relatively small 0 − 1 linear program. We
associate a distinct variable with PV with every security view V ∈ V. The variable will
be set to 1 if the corresponding security view is purchased and will be set to 0 otherwise.
Our goal is to minimize the total purchase price∑
V∈V
pi(V) · PV
subject to the constraint that S ≥ 1, where S is obtained by replacing every view V in
policy(Q) with the corresponding variable PV , replacing conjunction with multiplication,
and replacing disjunction with addition. This ensures that the set of purchased views
contains enough information to uniquely determine the answers to all the queries in Q.
In our running example, suppose we assign prices to the security views as follows:
pi(V1) = 1 pi(V2) = 1/2 pi(V3) = 1/3
pi(V4) = 1/4 pi(V5) = 1/5 pi(V6) = 1/6
Then the goal is to minimize the total price
1 · PV1 + (1/2) · PV2 + (1/3) · PV3 + (1/4) · PV4 + (1/5) · PV5 + (1/6) · PV6
subject to the constraint that
(PV1 + PV2 + PV3) · (PV1 + PV4) ≥ 1
Any variable assignment that satisfies this constraint will induce a solution to
(V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3) ∧ (V1 ∨ V4)
which is the policy formula for Q, and vice versa. Hence, S ensures that the purchased
views will contain enough information to answer all the queries in Q.
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The disclosure orders that we focus on are all dataset-independent. Hence, our
solution yields a dataset-independent version query pricing, whereas previous work by
Koutris et al. (e.g., [35]) has focused on the problem dataset-dependent query pricing.
The main advantages of using a dataset-independent model are that query prices can
never leak valuable information about the contents of the dataset and the computational
overhead for query pricing tends to be much lower (since our algorithms are independent
of the contents of the dataset). In addition, we can deal with security views that contain
column projections, which are difficult to handle in the dataset-dependent model. On
the other hand, dataset-dependent query pricing can sometimes exploit information
about the current state of the dataset to generate solutions that are cheaper than the best
dataset-independent alternatives.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPLAINABLE SECURITY IN PRACTICE
We now discuss a prototype system that we built to evaluate the feasibility of comput-
ing policy formulas and explanations for SQL queries. Our prototype system combines
the algorithms developed to handle complex queries and policy constraints from Chapter
5 with the explainable security model discussed in Chapter 6.
The high-level architecture of our system is shown in Figure 7.1. Computing policy
formulas is a two-stage process. First, queries issued by a principal are fed to a SQL
processor that generalizes them to filter-project queries. Our generalizer is architecturally
similar to a compiler, but the translation process is conservative: the generalized versions
of the queries disclose at least as much information as the original SQL queries, and may
reveal strictly more information in some cases. As discussed in Chapter 5, this may cause
the reference monitor to overestimate the information disclosed by and consequently
reject certain legal queries. It will, however, ensure that illegal queries are never accepted.
A policy formula therefore represents an upper bound on the information needed to
answer a query.
Security views are similarly translated into filter-project queries at initialization time;
the translation process for security views is lossless due to the restriction we imposed
above.1 Once the translation is complete, the system computes a policy formula for the
generalized query using the algorithm from Figure 6.2. The entire pipeline is database-
independent; policy formulas and explanations can reveal information about the database
schema but cannot leak information about the contents of the underlying database.
The remainder of this Chapter describes the architecture of our system in more detail.
1The semantics of equality comparisons involving NULL values are different for SQL and filter-project
queries. Consequently, security views must only contain comparisons between pairs of non-NULL values.
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Figure 7.1: Computing policy formulas – System Architecture
In Section 7.1 we discuss the compilation pipeline used by our system. Then in Section
7.2 we discuss an experimental evaluation of our system.
7.1 Generalization Pipeline
Our generalizer begins by lexing and parsing the raw SQL queries using JSqlParser [1],
an open-source query parsing library written in Java. We then execute a series of passes
on the resulting abstract syntax tree (AST). Each pass corresponds to a complete traversal
of the AST. A complete depiction of the passes is seen in Figure 7.2.
Our running example focuses on the query
SELECT name FROM User U1, Friend F1
WHERE uid1 = 1 AND uid2 = uid
Preprocessing and column resolution: Parsing the raw SQL queries yields an
AST representation as mentioned earlier. Once the AST is available, we identify table
instances and perform column resolution. In our example, we identify U1 as a table
instance associated with the User table and F1 as a table instance associated with the
Friend table. Using information about the database schema, we infer that the columns
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Figure 7.2: Query generalization pipeline
uid and name belong to U1 whereas the columns uid1 and uid2 belong to F1. When
applicable, column resolution also takes into account information about the query’s
nested structure.
Type-checking: We perform aggressive type-checking on the AST in order to ensure
that it corresponds to a semantically well-defined query. The motivation for performing
type-checking is simple: we can’t reason about the disclosure of a query unless we
understand its semantics. Our system performs two different kinds of type-checking.
Aggregate type-checking detects bad queries such as
SELECT SUM(SUM(U1.uid)) FROM User U1
that mix aggregate and non-aggregate expressions in illegal ways. Ordinary type-checking
detects bad queries such as
SELECT * FROM User U1 WHERE U1.uid IN
(SELECT F1.uid1, F1.uid2 FROM Friend F1)
that provide invalid inputs to built-in functions, operators, and predicates.
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Term initialization: The next step is to convert the AST for a SQL query Q into a
collection of projection queries Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn that together reveal enough information
to uniquely determine the answer to Q on any possible dataset.
The extraction proceeds as follows. First, we generate one query for each table
instance in Q. For example, given any of the SQL queries from Figure 5.6a, Figure
5.6b, or Figure 5.6c, we generate two queries: QU1 and QF1. The sole body atom of
QU1 references the User relation whereas the body atom of QF1 references the Friend
relation.
We next determine which variables in our queries should be existential and which
should be distinguished. A variable is marked as existential if the corresponding column
is never referenced in the definition of Q, and is marked as distinguished in all other
cases. This ensures that the output queries reveal all the columns needed to evaluate any
arithmetic expression or inequality or logical predicate that appears in Q. We obtain the
same values for QU1 and QF1 for all of the queries in Figures 5.6a, 5.6b, and 5.6c:
QU1(u, n) :− U(u, n, h)
QF1(u1, u2) :− F(u1, u2)
If we were to stop the generalization process at this point we would have a collection of
single-atom conjunctive queries. However, our ultimate goal is to generate a collection of
filter-project queries that can keep track of interactions between different table instances
in a query. This is done by constructing and then traversing a condition graph using the
algorithms discussed in Section 5.4. After performing this step, the updated versions of
QU1 and QU2 will be defined as follows:
QU1(u, n) :− U(u, n, h) n F(1, u) ∧ (u1 = 1) ∧ (u2 = u)
QF1(1, u) :− F(1, u) n U(u, n, h)
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These two filter-project queries together comprise the final output of the generalizer.
We can then apply the algorithms from Chapter 6 to generate policy formulas and
explanations.
7.2 Experimental Evaluation
We now present an evaluation of our prototype system. The goal of our experimental
evaluation was three-fold. First, we wanted to verify that SQL queries containing a
wide range of commonly used features could be correctly handled by the generalization
pipeline discussed in Section 7.1. Second, we wanted to determine whether the language
of filter-project queries described in Section 5.1 was powerful enough to represent a
variety of practical security constraints. And third, we wanted to determine whether
policy formulas could be generated quickly enough to be used in practical systems.
We implemented a prototype system in Java. The prototype’s architecture is depicted
in Figure 7.3. Our system consisted of three main components: (i) a generalizer for
translating SQL queries into filter-project queries, (ii) a module for representing and
reasoning about filter-project queries, and (iii) a module for representing and evaluating
policy formulas and generating why-so and why-not explanations. The implementation
of our generalizer consisted of just over 5,500 lines of Java code, while filter-project
queries were implemented in about 1,000 lines, and policy formulas were implemented
in 250.
For the first goal, we began by writing end-to-end tests for our generalizer based on
several dozen SQL queries taken from a standard undergraduate database textbook. (See
Chapter 5 of [45].) We gradually added more tests over time to keep track of the border
cases we encountered. At the time of publication, we had 110 of our 115 end-to-end
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tests running successfully, and the remaining five were rejected as being semantically
invalid. Of these, three were rejected due to limitations of JSqlParser. The last two were
valid according to the SQL standard, but were considered to be invalid by both MySQL
and PostgreSQL. The results gave us confidence that our compilation-based approach
to disclosure control could be successfully applied to a broad range of real-world SQL
features.
For the second and third goals, we ran experiments on a database inspired by the one
used by the Facebook Query Language (FQL). [4] The schema has a rich and diverse
set of security requirements. For example, albums containing media such as photos and
videos can be made visible to friends of the current user, to friends of friends, or to the
public at large. The membership of a group can be made world-visible, can be restricted
to members of that group, or can be completely hidden. Lists of attendees for events
can similarly be made world-visible or can be restricted to other attendees. All of these
contingencies were accounted for using filter-project security views.
Our test database schema contained 18 relations with a grand total of 269 distinct
columns – or an average of 15 columns per relation. We deliberately selected relations that
had nontrivial security policies. The number of columns per relation ranged from two for
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the Friend relation (which stores information about friendship relations between users)
to 62 for the Application table (which stores information about third-party Facebook
Apps). We ended up defining a total of 75 security views. Equality constraints appeared
in all but one of our security views; the exception was a view over the Application
table that listed certain types of publicly available information about Facebook Apps.
Filter atoms appeared in 59 security views. Column projections were used in just four of
the security views.
A useful but unexpected consequence of the restrictions we impose on our handling
of filter-project queries was that it is possible to define a form of inheritance for cases
where the visibility of rows in one table depends on the visibility of rows in a different
table. For instance, access to a photo is determined by the album which contains that
photo. Any given album can be made world-visible or else its visibility can be restricted
to the owner’s friends or to friends of friends. We defined multiple security views over
the album relation to handle the latter contingencies. However, we only needed to define
one security view over the photo relation:
SELECT * FROM photo
WHERE aid IN (SELECT aid FROM album);
In effect, the security view above forces any principal who queries the photo relation
to perform a join on aid (Album ID) with the corresponding row of the album relation.
Since our system performs a separate policy check for every table instance of the input
query, this means that a principal can access information about a photo only if he or she
is granted access to a view containing information about the corresponding album. In
this way, the visibility of photos is inherited from the visibility of the albums to which
they belonged.
In addition to the qualitative experiments above, we also evaluated the performance
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of our prototype system. Our experiments were run on a workstation with two 4-core
2.13 GHz Intel Xeon processors and 50 GB of RAM. Our code was run on the OpenJDK
1.7 VM on Ubuntu 12.04.
Our experiments made use of a synthetic query generator that worked by recursively
stringing together predefined templates. Our use of templates allowed us to generate
realistic-looking queries whose joins and equality predicates encoded meaningful security-
related constraints. Two sample queries generated by our system (chosen completely at
random) are shown below:
SELECT R1.owner, R1.video_count FROM album AS R1
WHERE R1.visible = ’friends-of-friends’ AND EXISTS
(SELECT DISTINCT 1 FROM friend AS R2, friend AS R3
WHERE R2.uid1 = 4 AND R2.uid2 = R3.uid1
AND R3.uid2 = 4);
SELECT R1.size, R1.src, R1.width
FROM photo_src AS R1 WHERE EXISTS
(SELECT DISTINCT 1 FROM photo AS R2, album AS R3
WHERE R1.photo_id = R2.pid
AND R2.aid = R3.aid
AND R3.visible = ’everyone’);
Each of the queries we generated contained between one and six table instances; the
median was 2 and the mean was 2.5.
We measured the wall time needed to (i) randomly generate queries, (ii) lex and
parse them, (iii) extract filter-project queries from the parsed output, (iv) compute policy
formulas from the resulting filter-project queries, and (v) generate a policy decision for
each query, a why-so explanation for each permitted query, and a why-not explanation for
each denied query. Since each stage depended on the output of the previous stage, these
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Figure 7.4: Performance for ordinary queries
measurements were cumulative: we measured the time for (i) alone, the time for (i) + (ii),
and so on. We also varied the number of execution threads between 1 and 8. All of our
algorithms are trivially parallelizable, and the threads operated completely independently
of each other. In each case, we measured the time needed to process 1,000,000 queries.
All numbers are averaged across five runs; the variation across runs was less than one
second in almost all cases.
The results are shown in Figure 7.4. As expected, throughput scaled nearly linearly
with the number of cores. The analysis pipeline took a total of 366 seconds on a single
core or 50 seconds on 8 cores. If we exclude the time needed to randomly generate
queries, these numbers change to 333 and 44 seconds respectively. If we focus on the
last three stages (which are where we claim algorithmic contributions), the numbers
fall to 181 and 26 seconds respectively. All computation was CPU-bound, and memory
consumption ranged from 60 MB to 220 MB per thread. The time needed to perform
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Figure 7.5: Performance for prepared statements
policy checks and generate explanations was negligible compared to the rest of the system
– about 3.5 seconds on a single core or 0.5 seconds on eight cores – and is barely visible
in Figure 7.4.
Since query compilation time dominated the benchmark numbers in Figure 7.4, we
speculated that throughput could be significantly improved by using prepared statements.
The filter-project queries associated with prepared statements only needed to be calculated
once (as a preprocessing step), and could be retrieved on demand when the prepared
statements were executed. Parameters passed to prepared statements at execution time
could be substituted directly into the generalized filter-project queries, bypassing the
need for a heavy-weight compilation step.
Results are shown in Figure 7.5. Our use of prepared statements yielded about a 3x
improvement in the system’s overall throughput. The time spent on query generation,
lexing and parsing was negligible, and the time needed to retrieve filter-project queries
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and plug in parameter values paled in comparison with the time needed to perform
end-to-end query compilation. As a result, computation of policy formulas dominated
the running time.
The experiments above focus on the generalizer’s performance for semijoin queries.
These types of queries effectively stress steps (iv) and (v) of our query analysis pipeline
because they tend to yield large filter-project queries that have many filter atoms. Our final
experiment was designed to get a better idea of the generalizer’s performance on real SQL
queries. Our workload consisted of queries drawn from a list of 86 predefined strings,
most of which were taken from Chapter 5 of [45]. The workload incorporated a diverse
set of features, including aggregates, arithmetic comparisons, GROUP BY statements
and aggregates, inner, outer, and semijoins, set operations, and temporary tables. The
security constraints that naturally arose for our sample database were simpler than for
our Facebook case study. Because the third experiment focused on the compilation phase
of our pipeline, we defined only nine security views: three views for each of three base
relations.
Results for the third experiment are shown in Figure 7.6. Query generation time was
essentially zero because the queries were selected from a predefined list. The total time
needed to generalize 1,000,000 queries (which was the main focus of our experiment) was
around 111 seconds on a single core, or around 15 seconds when distributed across eight
cores. The number is significantly lower than in earlier experiments, where compilation
time averaged 244 seconds on a single core or 31 seconds on eight cores. This is not
surprising because queries in the synthetically generated workload from our previous
experiment tended to yield relatively large ASTs and well-connected condition graphs.
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Figure 7.6: Performance for complex SQL features
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Although there has been a great deal of work on database security in the past, security
constraints do not exist in a vacuum. They are typically defined and maintained by
people, and are therefore prone to error. The problem is exacerbated on platforms such
as Android and Facebook Apps: not only are the permission structures used by these
systems complex, but app developers and end users are not required to undergo any kind
of formal security training.
Although the need for reliable reliable security mechanisms is broadly understood, it
is insufficient on its own: we must also reduce opportunities for human error, both for
developers and for end users. Explainable security represents an attempt to reduce devel-
oper error by providing app developers with explanations that indicate what permissions
their apps should be requesting based on the queries they execute.
Explainable security is built on the theory of disclosure labeling, which we formally
introduced in Chapter 3 and extended in Chapters 4 and 5. Disclosure labeling allows
us to measure the information needed to answer a query Q in terms of a set of security
views V. Disclosure labeling allows us to characterize precisely which subsets of the
views in V would be sufficient to answer Q, and this serves as the basis for explanations
that can guide principals towards requesting the right permissions for their queries.
Although the experiments in Section 7.2 suggest that explainable security is viable,
a significant amount of work remains before explanation generation mechanisms can
be integrated into existing systems. One key challenge is that many access control
mechanisms that are used in practice, including those used by Facebook Apps, rely on
Truman rather than non-Truman view rewriting. (See Section 2.3.) Rather than rejecting
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queries outright, such mechanisms will semantically modify arbitrary SQL queries into
queries that are known to be comply with a security policy. Since queries are always
answered in such systems, it is unclear how our explanations should be adapted to such
models. We leave this as future work.
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